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Abstract 
 
This study aims to investigate how the U.S. military presence has become possible and why 
the U.S. military bases have concentrated in Okinawa. Since 1945, the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government have maintained U.S. military bases in Okinawa. U.S. military 
accidents and soldiers’ crimes have been serious problems in Okinawa. Moreover, 
Okinawans have not been protected from military violence by adequate judicial measures 
for over a half century. I employ the analytical insights of Michel Foucault and Giorgio 
Agamben to analyze archival and secondary documents and investigate historical and 
current U.S. military problems in Okinawa. Foucault’s insight allows me to analyze 
American rationalizing discourses and power relations that have contributed to the U.S. 
military presence and concentration on the Okinawa islands. The analytical insight of 
Giorgio Agamben is a useful reference to investigate juridical contradictions of U.S. 
military presence in Okinawa. I argue that the U.S. military and the Japanese government 
have attempted to make the American military presence in Okinawa legitimate through 
multiple tactics of governance. Given Okinawans’ persistent resistance against the U.S. 
military and the Japanese government, the U.S. military base presence does not seem 
wholly accepted in Okinawa. Nevertheless, the military burden has been imposed on 
Okinawans who are represented and treated by the U.S. military and the Japanese 
government as the insignificant “Other.” I argue that the analytical approaches that I 
develop in this study can be applicable to grasp patterns of modern domination in other 
cases of governance wherein political elites realize their interests by suspending the 
juridical rights of minority groups. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the continuing U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The Japanese 
prefecture of Okinawa, or the Okinawa Islands (shoto), were placed under American 
administration between 1945 and 1972, and continue to be a site on which U.S. military 
bases operate. Despite resistance by Okinawans to the U.S. military presence on their 
islands (Kyan 1964; McCormack and Norimatsu 2012; Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Oota 
2000), the U.S. military and the Japanese government have sustained and imposed a heavy 
military and social burden on Okinawans. I will examine governing techniques through 
which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have managed the concentrated U.S. 
military bases in Okinawa since 1945.  
Before I visited and eventually settled for over two years in Okinawa, I knew little 
about Okinawa. I had seen Japanese travel agencies and media promoting Okinawa’s image 
as healing islands. Scenes of sunny beaches, beautiful skies and a slow lifestyle in the semi-
tropical islands are often printed, transmitted and uploaded (China 2011; Magazine House 
Mook 2001). There were also occasional reports of U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ 
crimes by Japanese newspapers and TV news. News about military accidents and soldiers’ 
crimes seemed incommensurable with the image of an Okinawa paradise. I became 
interested in the strangely mixed representations of peace and violence and turned my 
sociological attention to the islands. This thesis is a result of my interest and subsequent 
research in Okinawa. I engaged in a total of four months of research in Okinawa between 
September and November in 2007 and between March and May in 2008 and returned there 
again in 2010. While researching and writing continued between 2010 and 2012, I lived and 
worked on the Okinawa main island (hontou).  
I noticed that the beautiful ocean, cuisine, music, dance, language, and people’s 
ways of life in general were different from what I had seen in other regions of Japan. 
Moreover, the tense coexistence of peace and violence which I witnessed made me sense a 
remarkable everyday incongruity about the islands. I experienced that the sound of warning 
sirens could suddenly interrupt my quiet afternoon in a seemingly perfect day on the semi-
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tropical island. In January 2011, I witnessed a few Japanese Self-Defense Forces personnel 
get off an automobile that is designated for bomb disposal, pile unexploded bombs on the 
ground, and defuse them at a construction site. Bombs have remained on the island since 
1945 when Japanese soldiers and American soldiers fought in the Battle of Okinawa in the 
Pacific War. Another time, before daybreak, the roaring sound of a U.S. fighter aircraft 
pried my sleepy eyes open. Past midnight, I saw drunk and disorderly American soldiers 
shouting and hanging out in a red-light district.  
My observations draw attention to the insight by Arasaki et al. (2001), that while 
Okinawa is a great sightseeing spot, it also has another aspect: war and U.S. military 
presence. Since 1945, Okinawans have been victims of the Pacific War, U.S. military 
accidents and soldiers’ crimes (Fukuchi 1995; Maedomari 2011). I have wondered why and 
how people who traditionally lived in a peaceful culture have been exposed to unexpected 
and unwelcome American violence.  
Critical bodies of literature (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Senaga 1971) indicate that 
the U.S. military established the U.S. military bases in Okinawa by force. Today, forty-two 
U.S. military facilities including bases, camps and training sites continue to occupy 24,526 
hectares in Okinawa that represent over 10 percent of the prefectural area (Okinawa 
Prefecture 1996; also see maps contained in the Appendix). These critical bodies of 
literature provide information about the U.S. military problems, but the processes, 
mechanisms and reasons of governance through which the U.S. military bases have been 
stationed and concentrated in Okinawa are not well examined. I employ theoretical 
approaches, drawing especially on concepts developed by Michel Foucault and Giorgio 
Agamben, to examine how and why the U.S. military and the Japanese government have 
maintained the concentrated U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I argue that the military 
burden has been imposed on Okinawans who have been represented and treated as the 
insignificant “Other” by the U.S. military and the Japanese government.  
In the first chapter, I introduce general information about U.S. military problems in 
Okinawa as well as an overview of theories and methods I employ in this study. I also 
present the central theme and focus of this study along with the research questions that the 
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thesis addresses, which are as follows: 
(1) What factors have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases 
in Okinawa?  
(2) What is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in 
Okinawa? 
 
1.1 Okinawa and U.S. Military Issues 
Located southwest of Japan proper, Okinawa prefecture consists of 49 settled and 111 
unsettled islands. The total area of Okinawa prefecture is approximately 2,276 square 
kilometers, and about 1.4 million people reside on the islands (Okinawa Prefecture 2013). 
The population in Okinawa represents 4.4% of the overall population in Japan, and the 
prefecture covers 0.6% of the gross state area (Okinawa Industrial Site Promotion Division 
2013). The semi-tropical climate and island environment have shaped distinctive ecology, 
scenery and culture in Okinawa. Unique species, beautiful beaches, Okinawan cuisine and 
traditional music make the area a popular resort destination, and Okinawa is commonly 
represented as the healing (iyashi) islands (Nozato 2007). Over five million mainland 
Japanese people annually visit Okinawa, with tourism contributing about 15-20% of the 
gross income in Okinawa.  
In contrast to the images of Okinawa as a popular tourist destination, it is not hard 
for visitors to notice the U.S. military presence. The bases currently occupy about 18% of 
Okinawa hontou. More than 70% of overall U.S. military bases in Japan are concentrated in 
Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). While the U.S. military bases contribute to 
employment and business opportunities for those local people who work at U.S. military 
facilities or who are engaged in shops, restaurants and taxi businesses around U.S. military 
bases, concentration of the U.S. military bases has impeded sound economic and industrial 
development in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Some bases are located in urban 
areas, and proper city planning is still impracticable (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). For 
example, in Yomitan Village, 3,517 hectares (46.9% of the total area) are occupied by U.S. 
military facilities (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). In Ginowan City, 33.2% of the total 1,937 
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hectares are allocated for U.S. military facilities (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). In both cases, 
roads have to bypass the U.S. military facilities, and lack of efficient arterial roads causes 
traffic congestion and contributes to economic loss in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; 
Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003).  
U.S. military facilities also cause environmental problems in Okinawa (Okinawa 
Prefecture 1996; Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). For example, in 
1996 and 2002, PCB (polychlorinated biphenyl) contaminated sludge and water were found 
in sewage treatment plants (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). The 
sewage treatment plants were located at former U.S. military facility sites which had been 
recently restored (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). In 2001 and 
2002, 215 buried metal drums which contained tarry substance were found also at a former 
U.S. military facility site (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). In other 
cases, it is difficult to detect pollutants which issue from or exist at active U.S. military 
sites since information about U.S. military activities is controlled by the U.S. military and 
the Japanese government. For instance, between 1995 and 1996, the U.S. marine corps 
mistakenly used a depleted uranium bomb during their maneuvers in Okinawa (Okinawa 
Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). The U.S. government kept the information 
for about one year, and the Japanese government kept it for about another month until the 
Okinawa prefecture was informed (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003).  
U.S. military activities pose considerable physical risks to residents of Okinawa. 
Between 1972 and 2010, there were 1,545 reported cases of U.S. military accidents 
(Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2010). Among these, 506 cases involved 
U.S. military aircraft accidents, including crashes and forced landing in resident areas 
(Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2010). There were 543 forest fires caused 
by maneuvers between 1972 and 2013 (Okinawa Prefecture 2013). In total, about 3.646 
hectares were burnt by maneuvers (Okinawa Prefecture 2013). Although no death among 
Okinawans due to U.S. military maneuvers has been reported since 1972, frequent military 
accidents have contributed to anti-U.S. military sentiments among Okinawans (McCormack 
and Norimatsu 2012; Oota 1984).  
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Car accidents and crimes by American soldiers while they are off-duty also pose 
risks to people in Okinawa. Statistical data related to car accidents by military personnel 
and their family members are available since 1981. Between 1981 and 2010, there were 
2,588 car accidents reported (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2010). 
Between 1972 and 2011, the number of U.S. military personnel and their family members 
arrested in Okinawa was 5,654 (Okinawa Prefecture Police 2014). About 10% of those 
arrested persons committed vicious crimes such as murder, robbery, arson and sexual 
assault (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2010).     
 These incidents related to the U.S. military suggest that Okinawans have 
undergone considerable military problems contributing to an increased risk of physical 
harm on their islands. U.S. military activities have caused environmental problems and 
accidents in Okinawa. American soldiers have committed crimes and caused traffic 
accidents. Despite these military related problems, the U.S. military presence and 
concentration in Okinawa have continued since 1945. In this study, I examine mechanisms 
of governance that have sustained the concentrated U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I 
present two research questions and objectives of this study in the next section.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives 
Having learned about the U.S. military problems in Okinawa, I aim to answer the following 
two research questions through analysis of archival and secondary sources. (1) What factors 
have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa? (2) What is 
the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa? This first question 
is concerned with techniques of governance that have contributed to the continuous U.S. 
military presence in Okinawa. The second question is concerned with identity politics 
wherein a heavy U.S. military burden has been imposed on Okinawans who have been 
constituted as a marginalized population by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. 
Okinawans have resisted the heavy military burden in Okianawa. I draw their counter-
narratives primarily from secondary sources and not from primary voices in this study.  
The process, mechanisms and reasons through which the U.S. military bases have 
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been constructed, maintained and concentrated in Okinawa are very complex. I do not 
pretend or intend to provide exhaustive and perfect answers to the research questions, but 
aim to provide a focused explanation that is guided by an analytical framework that draws 
attention to underlying issues of governance and regulation. In addressing these specific 
research questions, I draw attention to the wider sociological understanding of 
contemporary problems of governance. I will provide an overview of analytical approaches 
to governance in this chapter and elaborate them in chapter 3.  
While literature which addresses issues of U.S. military bases in Okinawa initially 
helped me develop my knowledge about and interests in the U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa, reference to those existing bodies of literature posed some limitations in 
advancing my study. I found that while many studies of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa 
exist, most of these remain collections of historical facts that are not discussed through 
analytical insights (Okinawa Prefecture 1996) or emotional testimonies (Senaga 1971). By 
employing sociological insights to this research, I aim to address the research questions in 
ways that can contribute to advancement in understanding of U.S. military problems in 
Okinawa. In particular, I intend to contribute to the development of an analytical foundation 
for the historical understanding of the unwelcome and forcible presence of the U.S. bases in 
Okinawa. 
Alternately, by looking at administrative, judicial and legislative practices in 
Okinawa by the U.S. military and Japan as concrete examples, I aim to contribute to 
analytical development in a broader study field of governance. In the theoretical and 
abstracted sense, governance can be understood as a system of institutional control 
(Guzzini 2012). Given that a variety of factors can contribute to the formation and 
management of governance in practice, each empirical case of governance may contain 
unique features. Therefore, multiple analytical avenues that can correspond to empirical 
diversity need to be made and refined. I propose that some of these analytical avenues can 
be consolidated based on relative stability in patterns of governing practices, contributing to 
overall theoretical development in the study of governance. I argue that a better 
understanding of historical processes through which the U.S. military bases have been 
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sustained and concentrated in Okinawa helps to make sense of the relatively stable patterns 
of American and Japanese governance of Okinawa that can be linked to structures of 
governance in other cases.  
 As I discussed in this section, existing literature has provided me with relevant 
information that offer a useful foundation for analyzing in greater detail issues of U.S. 
military presence in Okinawa. In the next section, I introduce some secondary sources 
which I found particularly relevant for understanding and organizing the subsequent 
chapters.  
 
1.3 Preceding Studies 
The archival sources – referred to in chapters 5 and 6 – are helpful to discover what has not 
yet been widely encompassed and discussed by scholars, but it is difficult to organize the 
structured discussion solely based on the fragmented archival data. Therefore, I needed to 
collect additional information to make a coherent and structured discussion in this thesis. 
Along with the collection and reading of archival data, I searched and read books related to 
U.S. military issues in Okinawa. Reviewing selected bodies of literature can help guide and 
structure the discussion in this thesis. In this section, I introduce bodies of literature which 
helped me understand issues of U.S. military bases and identity politics in Okinawa.  
Secondary sources provide relevant information such as historical incidents and 
recent issues as well as personal and scholarly accounts of such incidents and issues. 
Reading of secondary sources helped me grasp what has been taking place and discussed 
about the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. While most officials, both American and 
Japanese, support the U.S. military presence in Okinawa for security reasons, critical 
studies emphasize juridical contradiction and Okinawans’ hardships regarding the U.S. 
military bases. I assumed that the continuing and concentrated U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa was a product of constant power struggles between the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government, representing the dominant side that supports the military presence 
and those who are resistant, respectively. I will introduce bodies of literature written in 
Japanese and illustrate dominant and counter narratives in the following chapters. 
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Dominant narratives that are produced by the U.S. military in archival documents will be 
analyzed in depth in chapter 5. 
In both dominant and counter narratives, Okinawa is represented as a unique 
region within the boundary of the Japanese state. For example, the Okinawa Development 
Basic Policy (shinkou kihon houshin), illustrating official views, mentions various special 
circumstances for Okinawa that include recognition of its island environment and semi-
tropical climate and defines Okinawa as one of the frontiers of Japan (Cabinet Office, Japan 
2012). Nakachi, who is critical of the history of Japanese nation state building, also argues 
that Okinawa is politically, culturally and geographically a frontier (2005, 55). As I will 
present in the next chapter as part of historical information, Okinawa became a field of 
battle during the Pacific War and was administered by the U.S. military between 1945 and 
1972. The dominant and counter narratives share the view that Okinawa has been 
disadvantaged due to its historical relation with the war and the U.S. military, that is, the 
battle on Okinawa and subsequent U.S. military administration (Cabinet Office, Japan 
2012; Maeda 2005; Okinawa Development Bureau 1980). In general, Okinawa is 
represented as unique islands that are characterized by geographical remoteness, unique 
customs and historical hardships within the Japanese state.  
The dominant and counter narratives differ in regard to the portrayal of 
fundamental issues arising from the Battle of Okinawa and post-war experiences on 
Okinawa. While the government reports concerns over economic stagnation, critical 
scholars and testimonies of Okinawans focus on violent consequences of military presence 
and actions in Okinawa. The former often acknowledges that Okinawans became victims of 
the war and military, but essential problems in Okinawa remain largely economic. For 
example, the Okinawa Development Bureau (kaihatsu chou) states that, in order to address 
an economic gap between Okinawa and hondo (Japan proper) stemming from the battle and 
U.S. administration in Okinawa, the onus lies with Okinawa itself to try to improve its 
position in the Japanese economy (Okinawa Development Bureau 1980). Similarly, the 
Defense Facilities Administration Agency (bouei shisetsu chou) sees U.S. military facilities 
as obstacles to Okinawa economic development projects (2007).  
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The counter narratives emphasize numerous hardships that Okinawans have 
experienced because of the war and military presence. For example, Fukuchi (1971a; 
1971b; 1973) and Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA 1970) document military 
base pollution; Fukuchi (1995) also has compiled extensive studies on American soldiers’ 
crimes in Okinawa. The process of foreign base construction and persistent military 
exploitation on Okinawa are also common themes in the critical analysis of Okinawa. The 
dominant and counter narratives share the view that Okinawans have been marginalized in 
their relation to the War and U.S. military, but these narratives emphasize different concerns 
with regard to the current issues that Okinawans have. While the former emphasizes 
economic stagnation in Okinawa as the primary concern, the latter identifies the U.S. 
military presence itself as the problem that has resulted in continuous hardships among 
Okinawans.   
In regard to critical analysis of post-war governance of Okinawa, Oota (1972) and 
Miyazato (1975) have produced pioneering scholarly works. Their works also represent 
Okinawa as a politically and economically marginalized region. Oota, who was trained as 
an educator and a social researcher and became an Okinawa governor, is critical of 
structural political inequality between the Japanese government and Okinawa (1972) and of 
American occupation of Okinawa (1984). Meanwhile, Oota argues that Okinawa’s 
economic subordination to Japan has impeded autonomous development of Okinawa 
(1972). Oota (2000) acknowledges the importance of economic development, but still 
regards the U.S. military presence as a factor that has caused other hardships, including 
economic stagnation, U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes within Okinawa. His 
autobiography (Oota 2000) is also a rich source of information about Okinawa history. It 
includes his early experiences in the Battle of Okinawa as well as his role in political 
decision making processes as a governor. Miyazato (2000; 1981; 1975) analyzes American 
policy towards Okinawa with archival references. He presents critical perspectives on 
American strategy and policies in the Pacific and the post-war Japan – U.S. relationship 
(Miyazato 1975). His studies serve not only as thorough historical accounts of Okinawa, 
but also as references for archival data.  
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Critical studies of dominant historical narratives elaborate issues of sovereignty 
and constitutional matters in relation to the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. While the 
dominant narrative emphasizes that, because Okinawa belongs to Japan, Okinawans need to 
cooperate with Japan and the U.S. for security matters, the counter narrative tells us that 
Okinawans are not protected equally under the Japanese constitution. The fundamental 
issue that divides the two perspectives is the Japan – U.S. Security Treaty. Substantive 
information and issues regarding the Security Treaty will be presented in the next chapter as 
part of historical background of governance in Okinawa. As for understanding of the 
subsequent comparison between official accounts and critical views on this topic in this 
section, it is helpful to provide brief information about the Security Treaty with regard to 
U.S. military presence in Okinawa. Japanese policy makers, or members of conservative 
parties, have made international decisions largely in compliance with American political 
and security requirements. Ratification of the Security Treaty in 1952 and renewal in 1960 
illustrate this form of diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Under the terms of 
the Security Treaty, the U.S. military is responsible to ensure Japan’s security in the event 
of foreign military invasion into Japan. In return, the Japanese government supports the 
U.S. military presence in the Far East and cooperates with U.S. security operations. 
Currently, U.S. military bases are located in Okinawa and other prefectures of Japan in 
accordance with Japan’s commitment in the security cooperation with the U.S. military.  
The 2012 Annual Defense White Paper (bouei hakusho) illustrates official views 
and emphasizes the importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to assure peace and 
stability around Japan as well as the strategic importance of Okinawa in the region 
(Ministry of Defense 2012). The Defense Facilities Administration Agency (2007) 
recognizes that the U.S. military facilities that occupy significant land areas of Okinawa 
constrain Okinawa development, but still regards the Security Treaty as a more prevalent 
concern. While the agency proposes that it is necessary to reduce the burden posed by a 
military base on a hosting region, it emphasizes the defence capabilities made possible by 
the Security Treaty (Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007). The agency also 
argues that this security policy has legitimacy (taigi), but it has not been possible to 
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establish efficient defence capabilities without the sympathy and trust of Japanese citizens 
(Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007). In practice, the problems posed by the 
concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa have not been resolved since 1945, 
suggesting that the Japanese government has not seriously tried to mitigate the military 
burden in Okinawa, and therefore has not gained the sympathy and trust of Okinawans 
(Sawachi 2012; Yamada 2012).  
On the other hand, the counter narrative points out juridical contradictions in 
relation to the presence of and practices associated with American military bases (Ibata 
2010). Considerable attention has been paid to ways in which the Security Treaty has 
contributed to conditions that violate human rights and suspend constitutional provisions. 
Ibata (2010) and Arakaki (2010) point out that two contradictory legal mechanisms exist in 
Japan. One mechanism is organized under the constitution, the other under the Security 
Treaty. The latter has infringed on the former mechanism and allowed sovereign immunity 
for the U.S. military in Japan (Arakaki 2010). Similarly, in the 1960s, a Japanese jurist, 
Masayasu Hasegawa, suggested that dual legal systems exist in Japan (Wada 2012). One 
system is based on the constitution, and the other is defined by the Security Treaty (Wada 
2012).  Gabe (2000) and Ikemiyagi (2008) argue that the Security Treaty privileges the U.S. 
military in Japan, so that Japanese sovereignty is compromised. Several contradictions 
regarding the constitution and sovereignty are manifested in Okinawa where the U.S. 
military bases are concentrated. Yoshida (2008) argues that Okinawa, insofar as the 
Japanese constitution and laws do not apply to U.S. military matters, is a U.S. military 
colony.  
Another theme in the literature explores cases of military accidents and soldiers’ 
crimes with reference to human rights, sovereignty and the constitution. During the U.S. 
military occupation of Okinawa, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) has 
introduced cases of military base pollution and soldiers’ crime during the American 
occupation (1970). The Federation recognized significant human rights violations caused 
by American military activities in Okinawa and argued that these contradict not only 
democratic principles, but also the UN Charter and international laws (JFBA 1970). 
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Yoshida et al. (1971) argued that the U.S. did not have legal or constitutional legitimacy to 
administer Okinawa. The Japan – U.S. Peace Treaty allowed the U.S. to administer 
Okinawa, and Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa was greatly compromised (Yoshida et al. 
1971). In 1975, the JFBA (1975) compiled a report called the Okinawa White Paper 
(hakusho) in which it argued that Okinawa was treated unfairly under the same (Japanese) 
constitution, and Okinawans’ basic human rights were still violated by the U.S military. The 
report was compiled three years after Okinawa fukki (reversion or return), that is, transfer of 
administrative rights over Okinawa from the U.S. military to Japan. The JFBA points out 
that as the administrative rights of Okinawa were returned to Japan, co-management of the 
U.S. military bases – maintained by Japan and operated by the U.S. – began in accordance 
with the terms of the Security Treaty (JFBA 1982).  
Critique of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and the Security Treaty is also 
directed against dominant geopolitical discourse. The Japanese government has attempted 
to provide a rationale for the U.S. military presence in Okinawa by emphasizing the 
geopolitical importance of Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Yara 2009). Yamada (2012) 
argues that Okinawans who became victims of the Battle of Okinawa as a result of 
Japanese military presence do not believe in the deterrence of the U.S. military presence. 
Moreover, Yara (2009) argues that the U.S. military personnel do not cling to Okinawa as 
an essential site for a military base, so that the Japanese government’s claim that the U.S 
military is necessary in Okinawa for geopolitical reasons is doubtful. 
In this section, I present selected bodies of literature in order to provide a 
foundation for understanding Okinawa identity and U.S. military issues in Okinawa, which 
are concerned with the proposed research questions. I have shown how debates and 
alternative discourses have been framed around such issues as military security, legal and 
juridical matters, and geopolitical factors. The purpose of this section is not to provide 
readers with comprehensive information about Okinawa identity and U.S. military issues, 
but to introduce prevalent views and competing interpretations on the given topics. These 
existing studies helped me organize and guide my discussions in chapter 5, 6, and 7. In 
turn, bodies of literature presented above are important in identifying themes that emerge in 
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more detail in subsequent discussions. In the next section, I will outline analytical 
approaches that I employ in this study. The analytical approaches served as another element 
on which I organized my discussions in this study.  
 
1.4 Theory and Method 
Hook and Siddle (2002) argue that Okinawans occasionally have subverted structural 
constraints posed by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. For example, the 
Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military administration contributed to the reversion in 
1972 (Senaga 1976). The Okinawans’ anti-war movements in the post-reversion era 
influenced political decision-making by the Japanese government. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
military and the Japanese government have managed to maintain a continuing U.S. military 
presence in Okinawa since 1945. In response to the two research questions, I analyze 
patterns or structures of governance through which the U.S. military and the Japanese 
government have addressed the Okinawans’ resistance and maintained the U.S. military 
presence in Okinawa. To this end, I integrate diverse theoretical and methodological 
elements. In this section, I provide an overview of these analytical approaches and 
elaborate on these in chapters 3 and 4. The purpose of this section is to present an analytical 
link between theories and methods applied in this study with reference to Foucault’s 
insights in discourses and structures.  
 The analytical approaches developed by Foucault (1991a; 1978; 1977; 1975) and 
Agamben (2005; 1995) are useful reference points for the analysis of how unequal 
allocation of authority among people within a national setting or one regime is sustained. 
The theory of state of exception developed by Agamben (2005) is applied in this study to 
examine the U.S. military administration in Okinawa between 1945 and 1972. State of 
exception means the suspension of law and centralization of power on the pretext of 
emergency such as internal and external wars (Agamben 2005). Political executives who 
monopolize sovereignty are able to create states of exception in which legal rights of 
certain groups are suspended and violence is deployed as a means of control (Agamben 
2005). Agamben introduces several cases of state of exception such as the Japanese 
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American internment during the Second World War and the Guantanamo Bay detention 
camp in which violence is exercised on certain groups without juridical protection. In a 
state of exception, certain forms of knowledge that are produced by executives become 
privileged, while other forms of knowledge shared among those who are oppressed remain 
unheard (Agamben 2005). Agamben argues that “[i]n every case, the state of exception 
marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur with each other and a pure violence 
without logos claims to realize an enunciation without any real reference” (2005, 40). He 
further contends that a state of exception becomes a rule, which means that juridical 
contradictions such as suspension of our juridical rights can become a deeply entrenched 
norm (Agamben 2005).  
Foucault defined a wide range of institutional techniques of modern governance as 
governmentality (1991a). Foucault (1991a; 1977) analyzed how a modern government 
exercises its power and disciplines its citizens through institutions. What characterizes 
modern governance is the exercise of power in the form of knowledge/discourse which has 
replaced the exercise of sovereign violence in the pre-modern era (Foucault 1977). In his 
studies of modern institutions such as clinics and prisons, Foucault (1977; 1975) 
demonstrates how professional knowledge and discourses are deployed to construct a 
division between the normal “Self” and the abnormal “Other” and then to discipline and 
normalize the abnormal “Other.” Professionals employ the representational division in 
order to justify their intervention in practices seeking to regulate or modify the abnormal 
“Other.” In this sense, the professional discourses function as means to provide a rationale 
or justification for institutional control and regulation. In this study, I analyze production 
and deployment of discourses through which the U.S. military and the Japanese 
government have attempted to provide a rationale and justification in their control and 
regulation of Okinawans. Reference to Foucault’s theoretical concept of governmentality 
and knowledge/discourse is relevant to grasp ideas and practices of U.S. military and 
Japanese governing institutions. In the chapters that follow, I refer to production and 
deployment of discourse as a tactic of “rationalization” that provides authorities with a 
means to claim a rationale and justification of governance. I use the concept of 
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“rationalization” in conjunction with my preceding study (Yamaguchi 2012) and with 
respect to Foucault’s attention to a role of discourses in institutional practices. He argues 
that “rationalization” includes not only an “ensemble of rules, procedures, means to an 
end,” but also “a production of true discourses” in institutional practices (Foucault 1991, 
79). In other words, his definition of “rationalization” is different from that which is 
commonly used in the discipline of sociology focusing on development in modern 
bureaucratic and industrial systems in relation to traditional systems.  
Said (1978) explores on a much broader scale the impact of the representational 
division between the superior Occidental “Self” and the inferior Oriental “Other” on 
colonial domination. He argues that intellectuals played a significant role in helping to 
disseminate ideas of European superiority over the Orient and legitimize colonial 
domination (Said 1978). By referring to the concept of hegemony, he explained how the 
cultural influence promoted by the intellectuals through colonial discourse contributed to 
the durability of colonial regimes (Said 1978). Harvey (2003) and Chomsky (2003) also 
used the concept of hegemony to explain the durability of American imperial domination 
after World War II. Hegemony is a form of governance wherein a ruling class or state 
manipulates values and maintains its influence without the constant exercise of military 
power (Chomsky 2003; Gramsci 1971; Harvey 2003; Said 1978).  
With reference to these analytical approaches, I examine the particular forms of 
governing practices in Okinawa since 1945 and the shifting dynamics among them. The 
U.S. military employed exceptional measures in its governance in Okinawa. For example, it 
used military forces to appropriate land for its base construction, and Okinawans’ rights to 
access their land were compromised. I argue that the U.S. military and the Japanese 
government have deployed multiple tactics through institutional channels in their governing 
practices in Okinawa in order to sustain and normalize U.S. military exceptionalism in 
Okinawa. Through multiple tactics, the U.S. military and the Japanese government have 
dealt with Okinawans’ resistance and critique of the U.S. military burden. I will introduce 
three tactics of governance which I characterize as “rationalization” of governing practices, 
“concealment” of inconvenient information, and “provisionality” of exceptional measures 
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in chapter 3. In the subsequent analysis, I look at representational and empirical dimensions 
of these tactics which have contributed to durability and stability of governing practices by 
the U.S. military and the Japanese government in Okinawa. 
As I will elaborate on in Chapter 4, my study is based on an analysis of archival 
and textual documents in accordance with two research methods developed by Foucault in 
his archival research. Foucault (1972) employed an approach he identified as an 
“archaeology of knowledge” to discover relatively stable patterns of discourse/knowledge 
produced by medical professionals and shared among the multitude in medical practices. 
Foucault (1977) developed another method, genealogy of power, to link discourses to 
power relations surrounding penal systems in Discipline and Punish. His analysis of power 
challenges a common understanding that power is an instrument of coercion wielded by 
agents (Foucault 1977). He also rejected the idea that power is embedded in a structure 
apart from agents’ will and acts (Foucault 1977). Instead of the conventional Ontological 
dilemma, or binary oppositions between agency and structure, Foucault’s understanding of 
power suggests the interplay of various forms of agency and structures (1978). Because the 
exercise and contestation of power is diffused through particular discourses, there is 
relative stability in the prevailing structures of ideas and practices (Foucault 1977). In this 
study, I intend to grasp the relatively stable structures of governance produced in the course 
of actions and regulations imposed by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in 
efforts to control Okinawans’ resistance and normalize the heavy U.S. military burden on 
Okinawa. I examine archival documents, bodies of literature, and Japanese government 
reports that reveal relatively stable patterns of thought employed by the U.S. military and 
the Japanese government in the governance of Okinawa.  
I pay attention to the gap between empirical reality and representational reality in 
order to explain non-hegemonic yet durable governing practices over Okinawa by the U.S. 
military and the Japanese government. I argue that empirical reality of governance in 
Okinawa since 1945 has not always been consistent with the discourses of governance 
produced by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. As Hook and Siddle (2002) 
argue, Okinawans occasionally have resisted constraints posed on them by the U.S. military 
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and the Japanese government. In that sense, there appear to be limits to the success 
achieved by the deployment of discourses by the U.S. military and the Japanese 
government to assert full control over Okinawa. In other words, patterns of subjective 
accounts shared among U.S. and Japanese executives and institutional practices do not 
necessarily have hegemonic influence over Okinawans. I suggest in this study that the 
larger the gap between dominant discourses and practices, the less hegemonic influence of 
the U.S. military and the Japanese government over Okinawans is exercised.  
Analysis of the gap between empirical and representational realities of governance 
in Okinawa requires analytical elaboration. Disparity between representational and 
empirical realities implies that modern forms of governance in practice are discursive and 
dynamic. I suggest in this study that the analytical approaches developed by Foucault and 
Agamben are relevant to analyze different parts of the discursive and dynamic structures of 
modern governance. Agamben’s approach to state of exception is relevant to analyze 
threshold of governance wherein the production and deployment of discourse are premature 
and therefore the disciplinary powers of institutions are limited. I refer to Agamben’s theory 
to begin my analysis of U.S. military administration immediately after World War II which 
illustrates apparent suspension of Okinawans’ sovereignty and political rights. Foucault’s 
approach to modern governance is relevant to analyze relatively stable governance wherein 
institutional discipline has great influence to manipulate ideas and practices of the 
population. Institutional practices, such as the production and deployment of discourses, 
also help political executives create stability in their governance. I will refer to Foucault’s 
approach to analyze how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to 
control Okinawans through institutional means to create stability in their governances of 
Okinawa. In conjunction with the analytical insights of Foucault and Agamben, I also 
examine several tactics of governance employed by the U.S. military and the Japanese 
government that contributed to their relatively enduring capacity to exercise control over 
Okinawa. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented two research questions that seek to understand the presence 
and concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. The chapter serves as a foundation 
to provide a general understanding of the more detailed discussion presented in the 
following chapters. In this study, I aim to examine, drawing from the insights of Foucault 
and Agamben, how U.S. military exceptionalism has been sustained in Okinawa. Among 
many cases of state of exception (Agamben 2005), this study is concerned with relations of 
governance represented in the particular case of Okinawa between 1945 and the present. 
Nevertheless, understanding of juridical contradictions and people’s hardships in Okinawa 
through the analytical framework can contribute to the broader study of governance. With 
reference to the two analytical approaches, I will demonstrate how the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government have tried to sustain the heavy U.S. military burden on Okinawans 
through relatively stable patterns of governance. I argue that, despite the unique 
circumstances associated with the case of Okinawa, the analytical frameworks which I 
employ in this study may be useful in considering other cases of governance as well. In the 
next chapter, I describe the historical background of the current U.S. military problems as 
well as identity politics in Okinawa which are relevant to understand themes that are the 
focus of substantive discussion in this study.  
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Chapter 2: Histor ical Background 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will present a general background of governance in Okinawa and 
Okinawans' identity politics. In addressing the two research questions, this study focuses on 
issues of governance and identity politics in Okinawa from 1945 up to the present. This 
period represents a small but significant period within a much longer history of Okinawans’ 
encounter with foreign oppressors which began in the 17th century. Okinawans’ hardships 
were escalated by their inclusion in the modern Japanese state in the 19th
 
 century and 
involvement in the Pacific War in the mid 1940s. Okinawans’ identity as an “Other” ethnic 
group initially was constructed in relation to the Japanese people. As Hook and Siddle 
(2002) point out, Okinawans occasionally resisted structural constraints posed by the 
Japanese government and the U.S. military, and their identity was negotiated and 
constructed in the course of power struggles with the Japanese people and the American 
people. The ways in which the identity of Okinawans as a unique ethnic group has been 
constituted are important factors for understanding the nature of their resistance to the U.S. 
military presence which is central to the substantive discussion of this study. 
2.1 History of Governance: Okinawa, Japan and the U.S. 
Okinawans encountered Japanese feudal invasion in the 17th
 Between 1429 and 1879, kings of Ryukyu governed the Okinawa region. The 
Ryukyu Kingdom brought tributes to Chinese kingdoms, and it functioned as a tally trade. 
The Ryukyu Kingdom prospered as a tributary trading hub since few countries were 
 century. Since then, their au-
tonomous decision-making has been impeded by Japanese and American political interven-
tion in Okinawa Islands. What I address in this study, U.S, military governance and Japa-
nese governance in Okinawa since 1945, can be situated in longer historical contexts of 
foreign control over Okinawa. In this section, I provide an overview of Japanese and U.S. 
military control over Okinawa, focusing on how Japanese and American geopolitical inter-
ests and interventions in Okinawa have contributed to historical and current hardships of 
Okinawans. 
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permitted to trade directly with China. In 1609, a troop of Satsuma-han (domain) invaded 
Ryukyu and took practical control over the Kingdom. The Ryukyu Kingdom was annexed 
to, and became a tributary domain of, the Edo Shogunate (feudal government). European 
and American colonial expansion into Asia in the 19th
 The Meiji government was in haste to modernize Japan in order to strengthen the 
country and survive in an international environment in which imperial influence of the 
Western powers was predominant (Weiner 1997c). As part of Japan’s modernizing projects, 
the Meiji government promoted industrialization, adopted modern military technology, and 
introduced a nation state system. Hokkaido, which lies northeast of Japan proper, was an 
important area for Japan due to economic and strategic reasons. Hokkaido not only 
provided the Meiji government with abundant natural resources for industrialization such as 
timber and coal, but also served as a northern gate of the Empire of Japan against Russian 
pressure (Oguma 1998). The Meiji government colonized Hokkaido and expropriated land 
from indigenous people, the Ainu (Oguma 1998; Siddle 1997; Yamaguchi 2004). By 
contrast, the Meiji Government was less certain about whether the Ryukyu domain should 
be incorporated into the modern Japanese state boundary since Okinawa was not 
economically promising (Oguma 1998). Nevertheless, Okinawa was a geopolitically 
important site for the modern Japanese state since it could serve as a defence against 
European powers and a base for marine traffic (Oguma 1998). The Japanese government 
began negotiation with the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1872 and sent troops to Okinawa in 1879 
for forceful annexation. The process of annexation, called Ryukyu shobun (disposition), 
terminated the Ryukyu regime that had lasted for over 400 years (Okinawa Prefecture 
 century altered political structures 
and international relations among Asian countries. In 1853, the arrival of American fleet 
vessels led by Commodore Matthew Perry to Japan tore apart feudal Japan’s sakoku (closed 
country) policy that had lasted for over two centuries (Dower 1999). The opening of Japan 
to the world (kaikoku) and subsequent unequal treaties with European states and the U.S. 
resulted in weakening of political and economic systems in the Edo feudal government. In 
1868, the Edo Shogunate was overthrown, the Japanese Emperor was restored, and the 
modern Meiji Government was established (Okinawa Prefecture 1996).  
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1996). Imperial expansion of the Japanese Empire continued throughout three reigns of 
Japanese emperors: Meiji, Taishou and Shouwa. The Japanese Empire colonized Taiwan, 
Korea, and other regions in East and Southeast Asia until its defeat in 1945 against the 
Allied Forces in the Pacific War. While Japan lost its military supremacy over most regions 
in East and Southeast Asia, Hokkaido remained to be a prefecture of Japan after the World 
War II. Meanwhile, Japan maintained its residual sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands, but 
the Okinawa Islands were administered by the U.S. military between 1945 and 1972.  
 After the Japanese surrender to the Allied Forces in 1945, the U.S. took the 
initiative in administering Japanese people and reforming the Japanese political system. For 
over six years after the end of World War II, Japan was placed under U.S occupation and 
did not have diplomatic relations with other states (Dower 1999). The Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Power (SCAP), General MacArthur, monopolized occupation 
rules over Japan and promoted democratization programs (Dower 1999). Dower (1999) 
argues that SCAP promoted top-down democracy, liberation, civilization and enlightenment 
in its occupation of post-war Japan. During the U.S. occupation of Japan, Japanese 
sovereignty was greatly compromised. General MacArthur held lawmaking authority and 
administrative authority which were exercised through Japanese state institutions. General 
MacArthur issued directives, and Japanese bureaucracy carried them out (Dower 1999). 
Moreover, extraterritoriality was applied to Americans who were in Japan. Japanese 
jurisdiction was not exercised over Americans in Japan, and “Americans accused of crimes 
against Japanese were tried by their own government” (Dower 1999, 211). In addition to 
the institutional control, SCAP also “created a web of programs designated to reach every 
man, woman, and child” in Japan (Dower 1999, 206). For example, while SCAP promoted 
its democratization agendas through the education system and media in Japan, “any 
criticism of the alien overlords whatsoever was forbidden” (Dower 1999, 211). 
Initially, “the response of huge numbers of Japanese was that the supreme 
commander was great, and so was democracy” (Dower 1999, 205). Japanese people, 
regardless of their ideological positions, saw the “American occupation force as an army of 
liberation” (Dower 1999, 69). Japanese people also accepted SCAP’s demilitarization 
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policy as well as Article 9 of the new Constitution of Japan, which committed the nation to 
the renunciation of war. Towards the end of the 1940s, as ideological tension between the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. intensified, the U.S. began to expect Japan to take a new role in 
security in the Far East (Gabe 2002). The U.S. demanded the reluctant Japanese 
government to reestablish military power and take responsibility for security against 
communist powers (Dower 1999).  
The relationship between Okinawans and mainland Japanese people was altered by 
Japan’s defeat against the Allied Powers and participation of the U.S. in the post-war 
governance of both Japan proper and Okinawa. Hook and Siddle argue that since 1945, 
Okinawa has been situated within a dual political relationship “with the other two angles 
being made up by the US and Japan” (2002, 3). While the mainland of Japan was gradually 
recovering from the lost war, Okinawa was struggling under strict U.S. military control. 
The Okinawa Islands were a place where American “harsh strategic considerations held 
sway” (Dower 1999, 26). On the 1st of April, 1945, the U.S. military advanced to the 
Okinawa main island and began to appropriate the islands for forward airborne and staging 
bases from which they could strike major cities in Japan proper. The American presence on 
the Okinawa Islands was initially intended to use the islands “as a steppingstone to Japan” 
(Fisch 1988, 3). The U.S. troops brought the northern half of the Okinawa main island 
under their control during April, and collective action by Japanese soldiers in the island’s 
southern half ended by mid June. Japan surrendered within about two months after 
American ascendancy over Okinawa. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, in March 1945, the 
U.S. Forces made Proclamation No. 1 (Nimitz Proclamation) signed by Chester W. Nimitz, 
who was Fleet Admiral as well as Military Governor of the Islands of Nansei Shoto and 
adjacent waters which had been hitherto occupied by Japan. Under the terms of the 
Proclamation, all powers of the Japanese government were suspended, and final 
administrative responsibility of these areas was vested in Nimitz. For 27 years since this 
point, Okinawans were governed under the U.S. military rules without any clear decision 
on their sovereign rights. As one of the conditions in the 1952 Peace Treaty between Japan 
and the U.S., Okinawa was officially separated from Japan for an indefinite period.  
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Okinawans suffered from frequent incidents of U.S. military accidents and 
soldiers’ crimes during the period of U.S. military administration. According to a 
“noticeable” incident list (Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1996), more than 150 
Okinawans were killed and more than 200 were injured as a result of U.S, military 
accidents between 1948 and 1972. Reported cases of crimes numbered 205 in 1947 and 220 
in 1948 (Fukuchi 1995). Fukuchi (1995) argues that Okinawans had a sense of inferiority to 
American troops who were the victors of World War II, so it required courage for them to 
demand compensation for the U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes. Therefore, the 
recorded cases are just “the tip of an iceberg” (Fukuchi 1995, 15). Because some cases of 
accidents and crimes remain unreported, there are no accurate numbers of the U.S. military 
accidents and soldiers’ crimes that took place during the U.S. military occupation in 
Okinawa. Indeed, different record sources (Fukuchi 1995; Okinawa Prefecture Military 
Base Affairs Office 2003) provide different estimates of U.S. military accidents and 
soldiers’ crimes.  
Under the U.S. military rules, Okinawans did not have rights to manage their own 
land (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Moreover, Okinawans were exposed to violence without 
full legal protection while other Japanese citizens were in principle protected under the new 
constitution which became effective in 1947. During the 1940s, although Okinawans 
endured hardship under the U.S. military rules, they did not organize systematic resistance 
against U.S. military. Few Okinawans requested the U.S. military reversion of Okinawa to 
Japan, and many Okinawans even considered it taboo to talk about reversion (Kyan 1964). 
In 1950, as news about the Peace Treaty gathered public attention in Okinawa, Okinawans 
became anxious about their future situation (Kyan 1964). In September, 1950, the U.S. 
State Department announced that the U.S. would administer Okinawa under U.N. 
Trusteeship, and the Japanese government would comply with this under the terms of the 
Peace Treaty between Japan and the U.S. (Kyan 1964).  
In 1972, administrative rights over Okinawa were returned to Japan, but this 
transfer did not resolve the military issues in Okinawa. The U.S. military bases have 
remained in Okinawa, military accidents have been prevalent, and Okinawans’ legal rights 
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have been largely compromised against U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ violence. 
Japanese Prime Minister Sato made concessions to the U.S. in the reversion agreements, 
many of which he concealed from public scrutiny by Okinawans and the Japanese 
population as a whole. From the beginning of negotiations with the U.S. government for the 
reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control, he secretly acted with few supportive members 
in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) including its chief secretary, Fukuda (Nishiyama 
2007). Sato’s weak position on Okinawans’ sovereignty not only allowed continued U.S. 
military presence, but also strengthened the U.S.’s superiority in military matters in 
Okinawa and Japan proper. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. also maintained its 
political superiority over Japan. During the Cold War, Japan became an important ally of 
liberal states. Sato and other political elites misread the American situation and believed 
that the U.S. government could not spoil the Japan-U.S. relationship simply as a result of 
problems in Okinawa. As a result, the U.S. continues to exercise its superiority over Japan 
by maintaining a military presence in Okinawa. The Japanese government has 
economically compensated Okinawans for the military burden, but has not taken 
fundamental measures to resolve recurrent military problems in Okinawa (Okinawa 
Prefecture 1996).  
As I discuss in chapter 7, the Japanese government seems more concerned with 
U.S. security demands than Okinawans’ demands to reduce the military burden in Okinawa. 
For the Japanese government and decision makers in the post World War II era, meeting 
American security demands has been a challenge. Right after World War II, the Japanese 
Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, expected that the United Nations would be an 
international apparatus that could maintain post-war international security in the near future 
(Gabe 2002). Meanwhile, in order to conclude pacification and achieve independence for 
Japan, he negotiated with the U.S. government, proposing to maintain U.S. military 
presence for Japanese security (Gabe 2002). In response to Yoshida’s proposal, John Foster 
Dulles, a special envoy to Japan who negotiated a peace treaty with Yoshida, demanded 
Japan’s cooperation with U.S. military action and contribution to the Free World (Gabe 
2002). The Japanese government responded to the U.S. demand with the establishment of a 
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National Police Reserve (NPR) and support for U.S. military facilities in Japan (Gabe 
2002). NPR eventually became the Self-Defense Forces (jieitai) in 1954. Along with the 
Treaty of Peace with the U.S., the Japanese government ratified the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty (anpo jouyaku) in 1951. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is a juridical foundation for 
an unequal bilateral relationship between Japan and the U.S. (Arakaki 2010; Ibata 2010; 
Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Nishiyama (2012) argues that the Japanese government has 
adhered to the Security Treaty and adjusted its security policy in accordance with U.S. 
security strategies.  
 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan has played a central role in decision 
making by the Japanese government since 1955. The LDP was established in 1955 based on 
conservative political parties in Japan and continued to be a ruling party for over fifty years. 
The LDP has contributed to the maintenance and renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. 
Shinsuke Kishi, who served as a Prime Minister of Japan and a president of the LDP 
between 1957 and 1960, negotiated with the U.S. government for renewal of the Security 
Treaty (Utsunomiya 1996). Utsunomiya (1996) argues that Kishi tried to resolve Japanese 
dependence on U.S. military power and sought mutual military cooperation between the 
two countries. Kishi was confronted with a nation-wide student movement against the 
Security Treaty. In 1960, he managed to renew the Security Treaty, but had to resign to take 
responsibility for the student movement (Utsunomiya 1996). As I elaborate on in chapter 7, 
under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Japanese provisional rules, the U.S. military bases 
have been maintained, and Okinawans’ legal rights are still compromised. As a result, 
Okinawans still suffer from military accidents and soldiers’ crimes in the course of their 
everyday lives (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). For the Japanese government, Okinawa is a 
convenient site that it can exploit for the purpose of national security (Sawachi 2012). 
 
2.2 Identity and Resistance of Okinawans 
In addressing the second research question, I examine how the identity of Okinawans has 
been a contributing factor to the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. As I 
discussed in the previous section, the modern Japanese government and the U.S. military 
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governed Okinawa in order to meet their geopolitical interests. Okinawans were 
represented and treated as the “Other” ethnic group by the Japanese people as well as the 
U.S.military personnel and did not acquire equal national membership within the Japanese 
nation or the American nation. In this section, I introduce how Okinawans’ identity has 
been constructed since their inclusion in the Japanese state boundary in the 19th century.  
Oguma (1998) argues that the national boundary of the mainland Japanese people 
was not fixed, but negotiated among political executives in the Meiji government. The 
Meiji government’s policy towards Okinawa was characterized by the inclusion of 
Okinawa islands in the modern Japanese state boundary while Okinawans were excluded 
from equal Japanese national membership (Oguma 1998). Okinawa was included in the 
Japanese modern state, but Okinawans were not respected or treated equally within the 
Japanese nation (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Okinawans’ customs were seen as backward 
practices (Oguma 1998). Therefore, their traditional practices were regulated and altered by 
the Japanese central government. For example, utaki (sacred sites) were converted into 
Japanese style shrines, and the use of Okinawa dialects was discouraged and penalized. In 
the late 19th and early 20th
Weiner (1997b) illustrates the ambivalent identity of Okinawans. In his analysis of 
Okinawans’ anti-U.S. military actions, Weiner argues that “most resistance simultaneously 
employs ideas of Okinawa’s historical difference from Japan” (1997b, 189). Alternately, 
 centuries, to be part of the Japanese nation meant to become 
children of the Emperor within the imperial project. Oguma (1998) argues that alteration of 
Okinawans’ customs was not simple assimilation, but was aimed at nurturing the 
“Japanese” who were loyal to the Empire of Japan. While Japanization of Okinawans was 
implemented through official institutions, assimilation within the Japanese nation was a 
means for Okinawans to mitigate discrimination. Some influential Okinawan scholars such 
as Fuyuu Iha assented to the assimilation policy and proposed common ancestry of 
Okinawans with the Japanese people (Oguma 1998). The Japanese policy has not resulted 
in complete assimilation of Okinawans, thereby contributing to the construction of an 
ambivalent identity in which Okinawans are accorded simultaneously characteristics of 
both sameness and otherness (Oguma 1998).  
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Weiner points out Okinawans’ sense of belonging to the Japanese nation in their resistance 
to the U.S. military presence; 
although there are powerful anti-war and anti-American messages 
employed in the protests, there is little sense of a need for independence 
from Japan. Rather, protesters demand first that the Japanese state act 
politically on Okinawans’ behalf, and second that further economic 
support from Tokyo should be forthcoming, as compensation for the 
bases, the accidents, and the environmental devastation that has taken 
place since 1945. Such rhetoric illustrates the ambivalence of identity in 
contemporary Okinawa (1997b, 189). 
While Oguma (1998) analyzes Okinawans’ ambivalent identity as a product of Japanization 
and “othering” practices by the Japanese government, Weiner (1997b) contends that 
Okinawans also act in accordance with the ambivalent identity.  
The Okinawans’ ambivalent identity has been politically exploited by the Japanese 
government on many occasions. For example, during the Pacific War, Okinawa became a 
battle field, and Okinawans were involved in the battle as civilian workers and student 
corps in support of Japanese soldiers (Ooshiro 1983). The islands and people were used in 
order to postpone Japanese surrender and draw better surrender terms (Arasaki et al. 2001). 
Okinawans were forced to cooperate with the Japanese military as the Japanese people, but 
they were sacrificed as an insignificant group within the Japanese nation (Arasaki et al. 
2001; Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Ooshiro (1983) argues that although many civilians in 
Okinawa cooperated with Japanese military plans, there was a rumor spread among 
Japanese soldiers that Okinawans were spies for the U.S. military. As I discuss in chapter 7, 
the Okinawans’ ambivalent identity is also flexibly exploited in varying ways by the 
Japanese government with regard to contemporary U.S. military issues within the Japanese 
state boundary. 
 During the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, the U.S. military began to administer 
Okinawa, and the U.S. military administration continued until 1972. The relationship 
between U.S. military personnel and Okinawans was different from that between the 
Japanese people and Okinawans. The U.S. military personnel regarded and treated 
Okinawans as a fundamentally “Other” ethnic group, so that Okinawans’ identity for the 
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U.S. military personnel was not ambivalent, but foreign. The relationship between the U.S. 
military personnel and Okinawans parallels that between the U.S. military personnel and 
the Japanese people after World War II. Dower (1999) argues that the SCAP’s 
democratization activities involved American neocolonial attitudes and authoritarian rules. 
American planners and executives of the democratization programs regarded Japanese 
people as “the obedient herd … of Orientals” who were incapable of self-governance 
(Dower 1999, 218). The U.S. top-down democratization agenda in Japan “rested on the 
assumption that … Western culture and its value were superior to those of ‘the Orient’” 
(Dower 1999, 211). As I discuss in more detail in chapter 5, U.S. military personnel also 
represented Okinawans as docile people who are not capable of self-governance. Therefore, 
U.S. military policy did not reflect Okinawans’ demands. Meanwhile, American military 
problems in Okinawa, such as military accidents, soldiers’ crimes and land appropriation, 
resulted in anti-U.S. military governance sentiments in Okinawa.  
In 1951, leftist political parties in Okinawa, shadai tou (Social Mass Party) and 
jinmin tou (People’s Party), organized a bipartisan alliance for reversion (fukki kiseikai) 
(Kyan 1964). The alliance conducted an island-wide signature-collecting campaign for 
Okinawa reversion to Japan and collected signatures from about 80% of the whole 
Okinawan electorate (Kyan 1964). The two parties continued to be influential leftist parties 
during the U.S. military occupation, but the bipartisan alliance in the early 1950s ended due 
to internal political conflicts (Kyan 1964).  
 During the 1950s, different organizations such as the Okinawa Teachers’ 
Association and Land Owners' Association (tochiren) acted on their own agendas to 
petition the U.S. military, the U.S. government and the Japanese government for reversion 
(Kyan 1964). For example, the Okinawa Teachers’ Association started organized actions for 
reversion such as regular conventions and petitions to the Japanese government in 1952 
(Kyan 1964). In 1953, the U.S. military began forceful land appropriation (Okinawa 
Prefecture 1996). Moreover, in 1954, U.S. President Eisenhower announced occupation of 
Okinawa for an unlimited duration (Kyan 1964). Accordingly, the U.S. military in Okinawa 
proposed military use of appropriated land for an unlimited duration in exchange for a 
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lump-sum payment to land owners. In 1956, in response to the land problem, Okinawans 
started shimagurumi (island-wide) tousou (struggle or strife) (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). 
About 300,000 Okinawans participated in conventions that took place at all Okinawa 
municipalities in June 1956 (Okinawa Prefecture 1996).  
In 1960, a council for reversion (sokoku fukki kyougikai) was established with 
participation of 54 organizations such as the Teachers’ Association, labour unions, and 
leftist political parties in Okinawa (Kyan 1964). They called Japan their sokoku (homeland) 
and emphasized Okinawa’s belonging to Japan. In the late 1960s, Okinawans’ demand for 
reversion with supports from leftists in Japan proper was echoed within an agenda 
advanced by Prime Minister Sato to achieve his personal political ambitions (Sawachi 
2012). It is still uncertain why Sato proposed the reversion as a priority, but he was in haste 
to realize the reversion during his term as Prime Minister.  
Reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa from the U.S. to Japan was 
achieved in 1972, but several survey results show that the reversion did not satisfy 
Okinawans. According to a survey conducted in 1982, about 57% of Okinawans had 
positive attitudes towards the reversion (Oota 1984). Oota (1984) argues that this number is 
significantly low given that 88.4% of Okinawans wished for reversion to Japan in another 
survey conducted in 1966. In 1982, only about 30% agreed that the Japanese policy towards 
Okinawa reflected Okinawans’ sentiments (Oota 1984). In the same survey, over 80% 
answered that the U.S. military facilities in Okinawa should be removed or reduced (Oota 
1984). Along with economic stagnation in Okinawa, U.S. military issues have impeded 
harmonious integration of Okinawans into the Japanese nation (Oota 1984).  
Okinawans emphasized their sense of belonging to the Japanese nation state during 
their movements to promote reversion (Kyan 1964; Senaga 1971). They defined reversion 
movements as a struggle through which Japanese people including Okinawans would be 
able to protect Japanese land from the U.S. (Oguma 1998). Surveys conducted after the 
reversion revealed among Okinawans an intensified iwakan, or feeling that something was 
wrong with their belonging to Japan (Oota 1984). According to two surveys by the Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation in 1978 and 1982, about 70% of Okinawans thought that the 
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ways of thinking between Okinawans and mainland Japanese people were different (Oota 
1984). Another survey by the Prime Minister’s Office in 1975 indicated that about two 
thirds of Okinawans felt that they were not integrated with the rest of Japanese people 
(Oota 1984). In contrast, results from two surveys conducted by Tokyo University and 
Okinawa Times showed that numbers of Okinawans who had aichaku, a sense of 
attachment, to Okinawa increased from 60% in 1966 to 81% in 1977. Recent surveys 
conducted by Chuan-Tiong Lim, a political scientist who specializes in identity issues in 
East Asia, between 2005 and 2007 also indicated Okinawans’ iwakan about their belonging 
to the Japanese nation (Lim 2009). About 30% to 40% of research participants answered 
that they were Okinawans; about 20% to 30% were Japanese; and about 30% to 40% were 
both Okinawans and Japanese (Lim 2009). These research results support Oota’s claim 
(1984) that Okinawans’ dissatisfaction arising from the U.S. military problems in Okinawa 
has created a chasm between Okinawans and other Japanese people since the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan.  
Yamada (2012) argues that it is the collective opinion of Okinawans that the heavy 
military burden in Okinawa represents discrimination by the Japanese people against 
Okinawans. He argues, further, that Japanese citizens must share the U.S. military burden if 
a U.S. military presence is necessary in Japan. Throughout the post-reversion era, 
Okinawans continued to resist U.S. military presence in Okinawa. For example, in 1971, 
about 3,000 Okinawans whose lands had been appropriated by the U.S. military during the 
U.S. military occupation organized hansen jinushi kai (anti-war landowners’ association) 
and continued to resist U.S military presence in Okinawa (Arasaki 1995). In 1982, about 
800 leftists in Okinawa and Japan proper established an anti-war landowners’ association, 
hito tsubo Hansen jinushi kai, (Arasaki 1995). Each member bought one tsubo 
(approximately 3.3 square meters) of land appropriated for U.S. military bases and joined 
anti-U.S. military movements in Okinawa as a land owner (Arasaki 1995).  
Yamada (2012) argues that some Okinawans who support the LDP withstand the 
U.S. military burden on the basis that they have been compensated in part by Okinawa 
development projects implemented by the Japanese government. The Okinawa 
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development projects provide the Okinawa prefectural government with subsidies and local 
people with employment and business opportunities. Nevertheless, these projects did not 
eliminate Okinawans’ anti-U.S. military sentiments. In September, 1995, Okinawans’ 
frustration over the U.S. military burden in Okinawa was heightened after three U.S. 
servicemen abducted and assaulted a 12-year-old Okinawan girl (Okinawa Mondai 
Henshuu Iinkai 1995). In response to this incident, Okinawans organized a prefectural rally 
(kenmin taikai) and criticized both the U.S. military presence and inequality between 
Okinawa and Japan proper under the Security Treaty.  
Since 1995, Okinawans’ prefectural rallies have taken place periodically following 
other incidents related to the U.S. military presence. For example, Okinawans’ kenmin 
taikai took place against a military aircraft crash in 2004, another assault incident in 2008, 
and deployment of a V-22 Osprey in 2012 (Kurosawa 2005; McCormack and Norimatsu 
2012). In 2013, Prime Minister Abe proposed that the government would hold an annual 
ceremony for the Restoration of Sovereignty Day on April 28th
 
. Okinawans regard the same 
date as Humiliation Day. They expressed discomfort with the Prime Minister’s proposal 
and held the prefectural rally so as to publicize their discomfort. The date marks the day in 
1952 that the Treaty of Peace with Japan came into effect. The Treaty officially ended the 
post-war occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces while its Article 3 entitled the U.S. to 
administrative rights of Okinawa. Okinawans continue to feel this as humiliating 
(McCormak and Norimatsu 2012) because the treaty not only separated Okinawa from 
Japan without consideration of their will, but also imposed the subsequent military burden 
on Okinawa.  
2.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined the historical background of U.S. military problems 
and discussed identity politics in Okinawa. Okinawans have resisted the U.S. military 
presence in Okinawa since the period of U.S. military administration, but political and 
security interests of the U.S. and Japan have impeded a withdrawal of U.S. military bases 
from Okinawa. I argue that what underlies the U.S. military problems in Okinawa is the 
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Okinawans’ marginalized position in relation both to the U.S. and within the Japanese 
nation-state. In response to the two research questions, I will analyze a mechanism of 
administrative practices by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in greater depth 
in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In the next chapter, I will introduce theoretical approaches to 
governance and identity which are relevant to analyze governance and identity politics in 
Okinawa.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review and Analytical Or ientation 
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I introduce several analytical approaches that are relevant to address the two 
research questions that are the focus of this thesis, that is, “what factors have made possible 
the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa?” and “what is the significance of 
the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa?” The first research question is 
concerned with the processes and techniques through which the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government have governed Okinawa and made the U.S. military presence 
possible in Okinawa. The second research question is concerned with reasons why a 
heavier U.S. military burden has been imposed on Okinawans as compared to other 
Japanese citizens. The analytical approaches that I introduce in this chapter are related to a 
system of control and institutional practices that can be defined as governance (Guzzini 
2012; Reus-Smit 1998) as well as identity politics. In this study, I examine a particular case 
of administrative, judicial and legislative practices in Okinawa by the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government, focusing on how the U.S. military bases have been maintained and 
concentrated in Okinawa with reference to analytical foundations provided in this chapter.  
Reference to analytical approaches to international governance introduced in the 
first section is intended to offer a relevant foundation on which I analyze the case of U.S. 
military presence and concentration in Okinawa and situate it in a larger context of 
governance. In the second section, I introduce analytical approaches developed by Foucault 
and Agamben in depth. As I discussed in the first chapter, the two approaches can be linked 
in order to examine dynamics and diversity of modern governance. In the third section, I 
discuss identity politics and tactics of governance that enable hegemonic control over those 
who are represented and treated as the “Other.” 
 
3.1 Governance, Sovereignty and Inequality 
Modern institutions of governance were established in the 18th century within European 
nation-states, replacing “the absolutist system of sovereign states” (Reus-Smit 1998). These 
institutions include structures of accumulation that assure economic development and 
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wealth of a nation, organization of coercion through which a state assures national security, 
and frameworks of ideas that “constitute[s] institutional design and action (Reus-Smit 
1998, 10). Reus-Smit (1998, 3) argues that questions of governance are concerned with 
how “human beings organize their social relations to enhance individual and collective 
security and physical well-being and to enable the pursuit of common goals and the 
management of common problems.” In the principle of popular sovereignty, each modern 
nation-state acts in accordance with the will of its citizens and facilitates security and 
wealth of its nation through a centralized system of administrative, legal and legislative 
institutions. Sassen (2006, 6) argues that in the state centric view, “the national sovereign 
gains exclusive authority over a given territory.” Moreover, in the principle of “the formal 
equality of states” (Broude and Shany 2008), each modern state is supposed to be 
independently responsible for its domestic governance, but in practice, governance of one 
state is influenced by various factors that include political and economic interests of each 
state in the international context. 
Anghie (2005) argues that Spanish colonialism gave rise to what he calls the 
sovereignty doctrine. He defines a sovereign doctrine as “the complex of rules deciding 
what entities are sovereign, and the powers and limits of sovereignty” (Anghie 2005, 16). 
For Spain, religious authority of Christianity was a foundation of governance and 
sovereignty (Anghie 2005). While the colonized “heathen Indians” were excluded from the 
realm of Spanish sovereignty, war was waged against “Indians” in the name of sovereign’s 
rights in order to occupy the territory and to dominate “Indians” (Anghie 2005). The 
colonial era continued, as influence of colonial states such as England, France and Holland 
spread to non-European regions. In the 19th
 
 century, sovereignty of the colonized people 
was still suspended, and colonized populations were exposed to colonial violence. Anghie 
(2005) argues that positivism, in conjunction with rational legal principles, helped colonial 
states to legitimize their colonial violence as civilizing missions and also created a 
foundation of international law. 
The late nineteenth century was … the period in which positivism 
decisively replaced naturalism as the principal jurisprudential technique of 
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the discipline of international law. The sovereign is the foundation of 
positivist jurisprudence, and nineteenth-century jurists sought to 
reconstruct the entire system of international law as a creation of sovereign 
will. Positivism was the new analytic apparatus used by the jurists of the 
time to account for the events which resulted in this dramatic development, 
the universalization of international law and the formulation of a body of 
principles which was understood to apply globally as a result of the 
annexation of ‘unoccupied’ territories… (Anghie 2005, 33) 
 
 After the First World War, the League of Nations was established. Anghie argues 
that this was the time when “the international institution emerged as a new actor in the 
international system, providing international law with a new range of ambitions and 
techniques for the management of international relations” (2005, 115). The aim of the 
Mandate System by the League of Nations was to govern formerly colonized peoples by 
colonial states which had been defeated in the First World War. Anghie (2005) discusses 
how the structure of international governance has been developed based on the Mandate 
System. In principle, the Mandate System promotes self-governance, independent 
sovereignty and equal participation in the international system (Anghie 2005). What 
underlay the Mandate System was the idea that the formerly colonized people were 
backward and incapable of self-governance (Anghie 2005). Anghie argues that international 
governance by the Mandate System promoted desirable behaviours of formerly colonized 
people “not through physical punishment but through persuasion” (2005, 186). Since the 
end of the Second World War, many formerly colonized countries in Asia, Africa and South 
America have been de-colonized. The United Nations (UN) has acted as an influential 
international institution that supervises governance of the de-colonized states. The 
trusteeship system of the UN is supposed to facilitate self-governance and sovereignty of 
the de-colonizing and de-colonized states, but the UN inherits colonial legacies such as “the 
persistence of the structure of the civilizing mission” (Anghie 2005, 199). Consequently, 
despite the formal independence of formally colonized states, these states are still subjected 
to political and economic interventions by international organizations and other states 
(Anghie 2005).  
The studies of international governance which I introduced above point to 
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inequalities among sovereign states in the field of international politics. Recent studies of 
globalization help understand how national sovereignty is compromised and inequality 
among sovereign states is produced within recent international political economy. Studies 
of globalization (Broude and Shany 2008; Cooley 2003; Guzzini 2012; Hardt and Negri 
2000; Nickel 2002; Reus-Smit 1998; Sassen 2006) examine recent transitions within 
national and international governing bodies and the arrangements among them. For 
example, Hardt and Negri (2000) and Kollmeyer (2003) point out that economic 
globalization, such as trans-national capital flows and the establishment of global 
production networks, weakened state sovereignty and provided international organizations 
with greater authority. According to Broude and Shany (2008, 5), questions regarding the 
supremacy of international institutions over national sovereignty are “who decides what? 
and how to settle normative and jurisdictional conflicts, which the present unsatisfactory 
delineation of authority encourages.” Broude and Shany (2008, 5) suggest that “the 
resolution of such conflicts may well depend on the allocation of power between the 
competing parties to the political or legal interaction.”  
Sassen (2006) looks at parallel structures between domestic and international 
institutions. She argues that institutions of global governance are developed based on those 
of nation-state governance. The interaction of domestic governance and international 
governance has contributed to inequality among citizens within a state as well as among 
sovereign states (Sassen 2006). At the domestic level, “legal citizenship does not always 
bring full and equal membership rights because these rights are often conditioned by the 
position of different groups within a nation-state” (Sassen 2006, 292). Power is unequally 
distributed among citizens and institutions in a nation-state. The advancement of 
globalization has resulted in “a significant shift of power to the executive, loss of 
lawmaking capacities and political participation” by the legislature in developed nations 
like the U.S. (Sassen 2006, 145). Aalberts (2012) explores the issue of inequality among 
sovereign states and dynamic process of global governance in relation to power and 
knowledge. Aalberts (2012, 239) suggests that it is necessary “to analyze sovereignty as a 
governmental project, as part of a manifold regime of power/knowledge that is constitutive 
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of the international order and its (various) subjects.” As I elaborate in the next section, 
Foucault argues that a modern government employs techniques of governance, which he 
defines as governmentality, in order to control its population. According to Aalberts (2012), 
global governance can be analyzed through Foucault’s analytical approach to 
governmentality.  
The studies of global governance from colonialism to globalization demonstrate 
that sovereign authorities are unequally distributed among nation-states. Cooley and Spruyt 
(2009, 4) argue that “sovereignty consists of a bundle of rights and obligations that are 
dynamically exchanged and transferred between states.” They further (2009) point out that 
recent bilateral and international agreements avoid clear and longer-term contracts, leaving 
a space for future negotiation, reapportion and transfer of sovereignty. All cases “of 
sovereign transfer – including imperialism, supranationalism, decolonization, and 
agreements to locate military bases overseas – involve the reapportioning of sovereign, 
rights, functions, and territories from one actor to another” (Cooley and Spruyt 2009, 8). 
Cooley and Spruyt (2009, 4) propose that their analytical approach to temporary aspects of 
bilateral and international contracts, which they define as incomplete contracting theory, 
“can clarify how and why states choose to bundle and unbundle their sovereignty.” 
The analyses of international relations and governance which I introduced in this 
section show how sovereign authorities have been constructed and negotiated within 
international politics. Sassen’s (2006) work demonstrates that national and international 
frameworks of governance are intertwined and share similar structures in which the rights 
of certain groups in a national context or sovereign authorities of certain states in an 
international context can often be compromised. Within a nation-state, some executives or 
institutions are given greater authority while those who have special identities – for 
example, identities related to race, ethnicity, religion and gender – may be excluded from 
legal entitlement (Sassen 2006). In international politics, some states hold greater authority 
than others.  
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3.2 Governmentality and the State of Exception 
In this section, I introduce Foucault’s concept of governmentality and Agamben’s theory of 
state of exception to help explain a case in which the sovereignty of members of a 
particular nation is compromised by interests from outside that nation or territory. 
Foucault’s analysis of deployment of discourses through means that are fundamentally non-
violent, is a relevant approach to examine efficient control over a population by a 
government. Meanwhile, Agamben’s analysis of state of exception in which the rights of 
certain individuals are suspended provides a useful framework through which to examine 
the exercise of a violent means in governance. Agamben’s analytical approach is also 
relevant to examine the U.S. primacy that allowed it to be exempted “from the general 
norms” (Guzzini 2012, 12) in its initial military occupation of Okinawa. I propose that the 
analytical approaches of Foucault and Agamben make it possible to examine differences in 
and dynamics of governance as they are expressed in the case of Okinawa.  
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) examines transformations of techniques 
of control, from the pre-modern domination levying on sovereign violence to modern 
governance implemented through disciplinary institutions, a theme that he also carries into 
much of his other work. In the pre-modern era, sovereign power had “the right to decide 
life and death” (Foucault 1978, 135) or capacity to “take life and let live” (141), and 
presentation of sovereign violence functioned as a means of domination. Such sovereign 
violence as a technique of control was replaced by modern governance through formal and 
legal institutions.  
Foucault’s attention in Discipline and Punish (1977) is directed to a role of 
disciplinary power or micro-physics of power, as well as a discourse through which modern 
institutions promote self-control of individuals. He argues that disciplinary power is 
exercised through production and deployment of discourses (1978; 1977). Discourses, or 
representational realities, construct order and hierarchy among things or people (Foucault 
1977; 1970). Modern institutions such as prisons and clinics not only promote 
representational division between the normal “Self” and the abnormal “Other,” but also 
problematize and intervene in actions of the “Other” (1977; 1975). Referring to an 
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architectural model of the Panopticon, Foucault argues that prisoners who are exposed to 
constant possibility of surveillance internalize discipline and regulate and “normalize” their 
behaviours according to the discipline (1977). Institutional discipline not only within 
prisons but also in factories, schools, hospitals, or military regiments creates “docile 
bodies” that comply with norms of the industrialized society. In this sense, production and 
deployment of discourses by modern institutions do not signify exclusion so much as 
“subtle methods of normalization” (Oliwniak 2011, 53).  
Foucault (1977) suggests that the influence of discipline and normalization does 
not remain within institutions, but extends to modern society at large. A network which 
consists of various institutions such as prisons, schools and hospitals contributes to the 
formation of a panoptic society wherein its members are observed and disciplined in 
accordance with discourses produced by scientific authorities. Foucault (1978) also argues 
that juridical institutions and laws take part in the discipline and normalization of citizens. 
He (1978, 144) argues that “the law operates more and more as a norm, and … the judicial 
institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, 
administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory.” 
Foucault examines biopower, that is, another form of power which influences the 
population (1978). Unlike sovereign power which is characterized by its capacity to take 
life, biopower promotes life (Ojakangas 2010). Foucault argues that “disciplines of the 
body and the regulation of the population constituted the two poles around which the 
organization of power over life was deployed” (1978, 139). On the one hand, disciplinary 
power “sought to turn individuals into docile bodies that worked in favor of the new 
conditions of an industrialized society” (Erlenbusch 2013, 45). On the other hand, biopower 
“is concerned with the population on the level of aleatory yet predictable events that can be 
observed by statistics and managed by security mechanisms” (Erlenbusch 2013). The 
introduction of calculated governance – for example, the use of statistics – along with the 
discipline of individuals through institutional practices enabled modern governments to 
control individual life while regulating total populations at the same time.  
The concept of “governmentality” extends Foucault’s “previous analyses under the 
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rubric of bio-politics and biopower” (Ojakangas 2010, 7) and links Foucault’s disciplinary 
power “to forms of political rule and economic exploitation” (Lemke 2000, 4). 
Governmentality, which Foucault calls the art of government is a wide range of governing 
techniques to control each individual and the population (1991a). With regard to 
governmentality, Foucault (1991a) attributes to laws additional meaning. That is, laws are 
tactics employed by government to achieve multiple aims. He contends that:  
With government it is a question not of imposing law on men, but of 
disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and 
even of using laws themselves as tactics to arrange things in such a way 
that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be 
achieved (1991a, 95). 
Agamben’s understanding of sovereignty, power and laws is different from 
Foucault’s. Referring to Carl Schmitt’s concept of “state of exception,” Agamben (2005) 
examines historical and current examples of governance in which power is monopolized by 
certain political executives. In times of emergency, such as internal and external wars, 
political executives claim a state of exception, increase their spheres of authority, and 
suspend political rights of citizens (2005). Referring to some examples, such as American 
responses to the 9/11 incidents, Agamben argues that “the voluntary creation of a 
permanent state of emergency … has become one of the essential practices of 
contemporary states” (Agamben 2005, 2). He states that those political executives who 
claim exception hold sovereign power. In other words, unlike Foucault, Agamben does not 
assume that the sovereign as an absolute figure disappeared in the modern era, but finds 
that sovereign rule has been represented in recent political developments in which political 
executives can decide on exception. Agamben’s analysis of sovereignty exercised by 
executives is somewhat akin to Sassen's (2006) observation concerning the extension of 
executive power. Agamben argues that “the state of exception appears as a threshold of 
indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism” (Agamben 2005, 3). For Agamben, 
“the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order” (1995, 15). The 
sovereign is able to transcend the boundary of legality and illegality where necessary, and 
therefore avoid sanction or constitute new rules. In this sense, Agamben’s (2005) 
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understanding of sovereignty can be a relevant approach to examine recent governing 
practices in which the population is controlled by executive decisions rather than 
institutional discipline.  
In the state of exception, certain individuals are deprived of their legal rights, and 
indeterminate periods of detention and degrees of sanction are decided by the sovereign 
authority (1995). Agamben (1995) argues that archaic Roman law initially created those 
individuals whose political rights are suspended. Those who committed certain crimes were 
deprived of their political rights and defined as homo sacer (sacred life) in Roman law 
(Agamben 1995). Homo sacer, or what Agamben calls bare life, is “included in the juridical 
order … solely in the form of its exclusion” (1995, 8). Bare life is “subjected to sovereign 
violence” (Erlenbusch 2013, 45) and “a sort of un-dead life that has no other form of 
content than being exposed to death” (Ojakangas 2010, 104). Agamben argues that 
“inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original - if concealed - nucleus 
of sovereign power” (1995, 6). In recent politics, the relationship between sovereign power 
and bare life is “hidden in normal times and brought to light in exceptional circumstances” 
(Erlenbusch 2013, 48).  
Agamben (2005) argues that the field of Western law contains two tendencies; 
 
on the one hand, a normative tendency in the strict sense, which aims 
at crystallizing itself in a rigid system of norms whose connection to 
life is, however, problematic if not impossible (the perfect state of law, 
in which everything is regulated by norms); and, on the other hand, an 
anomic tendency that leads to the state of exception or the idea of the 
sovereign as living law, in which a force-of-law that is without norm 
acts as the pure inclusion of life (2005, 73). 
While Agamben acknowledges normative elements of law, he suggests that current juridical 
systems contain possibilities for political executives to claim a state of exception and 
suspend normal enforcement of law. He (2005, 7) argues that an essential characteristic of 
the state of exception is a lasting practice of “the provisional abolition of the distinction 
among legislative, executive, and judicial powers.” Moreover, “the gradual erosion of the 
legislative powers of parliament” has been a common practice since the First World War 
(Agamben 2005, 7). In such practice, normative regulation is not plausible, so that he 
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rejects an idea that norms are applied in law making and application. He continues “[w]hat 
the ‘ark’ of power contains at its center is the state of exception – but this is essentially an 
empty space, in which a human action with no relation to law stands before a norm with no 
relation to life” (Agamben 2005, 86).  
 As I discussed above, Foucault and Agamben provide different insights into 
techniques of governance with regard to power, subject and law. While Foucault argues that 
sovereign power was replaced by disciplinary power and biopower in modern societies, 
Agamben argues that sovereign power is still exercised in recent political contexts. In 
conjunction with disciplinary power and biopower, Foucault analyzed how modern subjects 
and the population as a whole are regulated through institutional practices. In contrast, 
Agamben argues that sovereign violence can be exercised towards certain individuals, or 
bare life, without juridical protection. Moreover, Foucault and Agamben address laws in 
different manners. For Foucault, laws are norms or tactics through which a government 
achieves its aims. Agamben acknowledges normative roles that laws play, but also contends 
that sovereign power surpasses influence of laws in the time of emergency.  
 I argue that differences between the analytical approaches proposed by Foucault 
and Agamben do not necessarily contradict one another in their application to the analysis 
of modern forms of governance. Given the dynamic and discursive nature of modern 
politics and society, one cannot expect a single paradigmatic element or abstract concept to 
be applicable to all empirical cases of governance. Any concept or theory is limited to 
explaining only part of diversified realities that reflect geographical and temporal 
differences. Alternately, multiple concepts and theories can be employed to analyze one 
case of governance that contains various aspects as a result of contradictory practices and 
dynamic transitions in political and social structures. In the following analysis of Okinawa, 
I analyze the time period from 1945 to the present. During this period, Okinawa has not 
been a static society, but has experienced radical transition. For analyzing the political and 
social transition, I refer to analytical approaches developed by Foucault and Agamben in 
ways that together constitute main elements in an analytical framework in this study.  
I regard Agamben’s model as referring to a threshold in the capacity of nation-
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states to make rules and Foucault’s model as one that focuses on a process in which rules 
are normalized and accepted by the populations. A modern society does not contain a 
paradigmatic essence, but is defined by various elements in contrast to the greater cohesion 
often attributed to a traditional society. Since the collapse of traditional regimes, what is 
broadly defined as modern society has been characterized by not only diversity but 
accelerated transitions. Concepts of post-modern or late-modern society, for example, seek 
to grasp such transitions. Scholars such as Spohn (2003) emphasize the need to 
acknowledge pragmatic differences among many cases of modernity (Spohn 2003). This 
thesis seeks to understand the particular features of governance of Okinawa within the 
broader dynamics in which relations among and within nation-states have been changing 
since the mid-twentieth century. 
 The analytical approaches developed by Foucault and Agamben make it possible 
to understand how Okinawa has been governed as a unique case within contemporary 
Japan. Agemben’s theory of state of exception is relevant to analyze how rules are made by 
those who monopolize sovereignty. In the case of U.S. military governance in Okinawa, 
U.S. military personnel could decide on rules with which Okinawans should comply. 
Foucault’s insight into the production and deployment of discourses is relevant to analyze 
how normative control becomes possible through institutional practices. I argue that rules 
themselves do not necessarily contain normative essence, but through institutional 
practices, political executives discipline citizens to accept certain rules. In this study, with 
reference to Foucault, I examine how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have 
tried to make Okinawans accept imposition of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I do 
not argue that Okinawans have accepted the U.S. military presence as a rule that they have 
to obey. Instead, I look at ongoing institutional practices through which the U.S. military 
and the Japanese government have attempted to sustain the presence of the U.S. military 
bases in Okinawa regardless of whether or not they are acceptable to Okinawans. In 
addition to Foucault’s analysis of institutional practices, reference to the concept of 
hegemony and tactics of governance, which I present in the next section, are relevant for 
better understanding of mechanisms of governance through which the U.S. military and the 
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Japanese government have controlled Okinawans and maintained U.S. military bases in 
Okinawa. 
 
3.3 Hegemony and Representation of the “Other” 
Hegemony is a relevant concept to understand enduring mechanisms of inequality between 
two groups. What Gramsci (1971) calls cultural hegemony refers to manipulation of values 
through which one group is able to sustain its stable and durable domination over the other 
group. Harvey (2003), in regard to hegemony of the U.S. in post-World War II international 
politics, argues that it is not only by military superiority, but also its relative success in 
receiving consent from and satisfying the general interest of other powerful states that the 
U.S. has been able to maintain a dominant position in international politics. Ongoing 
resistance by Okinawans to the U.S. military presence in their territories under the 
governance of both the U.S. military and Japanese state illustrates that dominant positions 
held by the U.S. military and the Japanese government over Okinawans are not fully 
accepted by Okinawans (Hook and Siddle 2002). I argue that although practices of 
hegemonic domination can contain stability and durability, it does not mean that they are 
never unchallenged. One group has to deal with challenges and resistance through multiple 
techniques in order to maintain its hegemonic influence over the other group. The U.S. 
military and the Japanese government also employed multiple means to deal with 
Okinawans’ resistance to existing forms of governance. While the U.S. military 
occasionally exercised military force to control Okinawans, the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government at large have relied on non-coercive institutional techniques of 
governance to sustain authority over Okinawans. Whether or not the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government have been aware of a recipe for hegemonic domination and 
successfully applied it in their governances of Okinawa, reference to the concept of 
hegemony makes it possible to understand more fully how mechanisms of U.S. military and 
Japanese governance have contributed to the long-term U.S. military presence in Okinawa. 
In this section, I introduce studies of hegemony and identity politics as well as techniques 
of governance that serve as relevant reference point in the analysis of means of governance 
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by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in Okinawa.  
In recent years, in many parts of the world, the U.S. has been a powerful actor in 
international politics. Harvey (2003) and Chomsky (2003) referred to the concept of 
hegemony to explain the long-term U.S. primacy in the post-World War II international 
politics. By contrast, Silver and Arrighi (2011) point out that the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 indicates the decline of the U.S. hegemony. Recent signs of decline in the U.S. 
primacy indicate that hegemony is not a static form of domination, but can lose its 
influence. Reus-Smit (1998) argues that globalization has spread Western cultural values to 
non-European regions, but some of the former colonized states have rejected Western 
cultural hegemony. Effective hegemonic governance needs to include “a vision of order 
which is to some extent consensual, or at least rational insofar as countries do not see any 
better alternative … and therefore share an interest in its continuation” (Reus-Smit 1998, 
12).  
Edward Said (1978) applied Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine how 
colonized people were represented as the Oriental “Other” in relation to the Western “Self,” 
but representation by a powerful group does not guarantee its cultural hegemony over the 
“Other.” Said argues that, “[i]t is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at 
work, that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength” (1978, 8). According to 
Gramsci (1971) and Said (1978), intellectuals play a great role to disseminate certain 
knowledge and make it widely accepted and believed. In the colonial period, European 
superiority over the “Oriental Other” was not merely representational reality, but became 
established as consent or cultural norms which made colonization a durable project (Said 
1978). The application of scientific knowledge and logics by specialists, embedded in 
forms such as Social Darwinism in the colonial era and Neo-Malthusian theories in the 
context of international development, helped a dominant group legitimate its intervention 
into the activities of another group.  
Harvey argues that the U.S. has acquired its hegemonic power “through an ever-
shifting balance between coercion and consensus” (2003, 38). Unlike colonial regimes, 
coercion as a means of control toward the “Other” does not easily create wide and durable 
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consent both in a homeland and a targeted community in recent years. Therefore, I argue 
that dominant groups employ multiple tactics of control to sustain their domination over 
another group or other groups. For example, as Vine (2009) examines in the case of U.S. 
military bases in Diego Garcia, the U.S. military concealed that fact that it expelled 
inhabitants from the island and appropriated the island for its military base construction. In 
this study, I define such practices of domination that conceal unfavourable information for a 
dominant group as a tactic of “concealment.” While a mighty group attempts to justify its 
domination over the “Other” by a tactic of “rationalization,” it conceals unfavourable 
practices or information for which it cannot easily provide a rationale.  
In this study, I also pay attention to “provisionality” of institutional practices. 
Cooley and Spruyt (2009) argue that unequal bilateral relationships between two sovereign 
states is sustained and negotiated in a flexible or shifting manner by incomplete contracts. 
They argue that recent bilateral treaties avoid or defer specific terms so that the states “can 
adapt to changing circumstances” (2009, 5). Furthermore, deferral of specific terms makes 
“the distribution and allocation of sovereign rights a matter of on-going negotiation” 
(Cooley and Spruyt 2009, 5). In other words, dominant states obscure and cover their 
exercise of power over other states with provisional terms in bilateral treaties. I look at 
provisional aspects of U.S. military and Japanese governances to analyze Okinawa 
sovereignty which has been contested since its suspension in 1945 among the U.S. military, 
the Japanese government and Okinawans.  
I do not argue that U.S. military and Japanese forms of governance in Okinawa 
contain necessary components that can be defined as hegemony or are as durable and stable 
as other examples of hegemony. The purpose of this section is to examine institutional 
practices that provide one regime with a capacity to create and sustain dominance or control 
over marginalized populations. Examination of preceding cases of hegemony is helpful to 
derive hints for analysis of U.S. military and Japanese governances. I suggest that a tactic 
of “rationalization” supported and disseminated by experts help a dominant group extend 
its cultural influence over marginalized populations as means of domination. Given that 
hegemony is not a static and permanent form of domination, a hegemonic group needs to 
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adopt several institutional techniques in order to maintain its primacy. I suggest that 
“concealment” and “provisionality” are tactics of governance that help a dominant group 
avoid immediate critiques and prolong its authority. I will look into U.S. military and 
Japanese governances of Okinawa and see if these tactics help them sustain their influence 
and control over Okinawans.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Studies of international and global governance which I presented in this chapter allow me 
to situate the case of the U.S. military and Japanese government in a broader issue of 
governance. I employ Foucault’s (1991a) concept of governmentality and Agamben’s 
(2005) theory of state of exception in this study as principal analytical approaches in order 
to examine how the U.S. military bases have been maintained and why they are 
concentrated in Okinawa. The theory of state of exception is relevant to examine how the 
U.S. military could construct and maintain its bases in Okinawa by monopoly of 
sovereignty. Foucault’s analytical approach to modern institutions is relevant to examine 
how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have tried to normalize U.S. military 
exception in Okinawa by deployment of power/knowledge through their institutional 
practices. In the analysis that follows, I refer to Foucault’s insight into the production and 
deployment of discourses in terms of a tactic of “rationalization” that makes it possible to 
examine how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to justify their 
practices of governance in Okinawa. In addition to the tactic of “rationalization,” I also 
refer to tactics of “concealment” and “provisionality” to examine complementary forms of 
institutional practice that have sustained the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.  
Foucault’s study also has contributed to methodological development in analysis 
of modern institutional governance. I employ Foucault’s discourse analysis in this study as 
a main methodological approach. In the next chapter, I introduce how I analyze archival 
data as well as how I collected those archival data collected at the Okinawa Prefectural 
Archives.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline how I collected and organized archival data which are referred to 
in chapters 5 and 6. I also introduce the analytical approaches and research methods which I 
employ in this study. My points of departure were the research questions that I developed 
while I stayed in Okinawa; I explored existing literature in order to understand what factors 
have made possible, and what are the major implications of, the U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa. My experiences in Okinawa sensitized me, in particular, to recognizing with 
respect to the second research question that the U.S. military presence has been imposed on 
Okinawans as people who are represented and treated as an “Other” group by both the U.S 
military and the Japanese government. Therefore, I introduce analytical approaches that are 
concerned with identity construction. Research methods for this study were influenced by 
Foucault’s approaches to investigate archaeology of knowledge and genealogy of power. I 
also discuss how I incorporated Agamben’s analytical insights in the research methods.  
 
4.1 Archival Research 
Kawulich (2004, 96) argues that data analysis in qualitative research “involves immersing 
oneself in the data to become familiar with it, then looking for patterns and themes, 
searching for various relationships between data that help the researchers to understand 
what they have.” This section describes my archival data sources and the themes that 
emerged during the course of my archival research. In the first research phase, I began to 
search for archival documents that corresponded to broad themes such as U.S. military 
bases and governance in Okinawa. In reading these archival documents, I learned that the 
U.S. military presence in Okinawa was resisted by Okinawans and contested within U.S. 
internal, bilateral and international politics. Therefore, I searched for archival sources that 
are relevant to investigate Okinawans’ resistance and politics surrounding the U.S. military 
governance in Okinawa. I organized these archival data into the ten categories in order to 
investigate patterns of thought that were shared within each concerned group and related 
them to practices of U.S. military governance and presence in Okinawa. Then in the 
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following section, I will present methodological approaches which I employed to analyze 
these patterns of thought with regard to the two research questions of this study.  
I conducted the first phase of archival research between mid September and mid 
November in 2007, and the second phase between mid March and mid May in 2008 at the 
Okinawa Prefectural Archives (OPA) in Japan. During my time in the archives, I focused 
my efforts on retrieving documentary records that illustrate characteristics of U.S. military 
governance in Okinawa between 1945 and 1972. I collected most archival data during this 
total period of four months; however, between March 2010 and November 2012, I 
occasionally visited the OPA when complementary information was necessary. I used a 
search engine at the OPA and conducted a keyword search to find archival documents, but 
descriptions in the OPA database did not provide sufficient information to know the 
detailed contents of the documents. Therefore, I needed to request files that seemed 
relevant, based on my focus in gathering data about U.S. military governance in Okinawa 
in order to find out whether they contained relevant information or not. During the original 
four months of data collection, I requested and copied as many relevant documents as 
possible at the OPA. In this section, I outline how I searched, collected and organized 
archival data.  
The archival collection of the Okinawa Prefectural Archives (OPA) is divided into 
four categories: Okinawa Government’s official documents, Ryukyu Government’s official 
documents, U.S. Government’s documents, and Okinawa regional materials. In addition to 
these primary sources, secondary sources related to Okinawa’s history and region are also 
available in a reading room. Archival and secondary sources in the OPA are published 
either in Japanese or English. All archival sources which I used as references in this study 
were English documents, but I referred to and cited some secondary sources originally 
written in Japanese. I interpreted and translated these Japanese documents for this study and 
indicated at reference sections Japanese titles of the referred and cited sources along with 
translated English titles.  
At the OPA, archival data are entered in a database, and a file and document search 
can be conducted at local computers or on the OPA website. Most English documents 
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related to American governance of Okinawa are selected and copied from an archival 
collection at the United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) by 
OPA archivists, and the USCAR documents alone at the OPA count 3.5 million pages. It 
was not possible to read through the entire archival collection at the OPA, so I consulted 
with archivists at the OPA about my research at the beginning of my data collection in 
2007. One archivist suggested I look into the United States Civil Administration of Ryukyu 
Islands (USCAR) files. Another archivist at the reading room showed me how to search 
archival files by keywords and narrow down a search result by selecting a category in the 
flow sheet on the OPA database.  
 I narrowed down my search by “U.S. Data Collection” in the flow sheet and began 
a keyword search. I entered keywords related to U.S. military bases such as military, base 
and land. A brief description is attached to each archival file such as a file title, a compiler, 
a time period, and a number of pages on the database, and a keyword search corresponds to 
the brief description. In the first week, I requested as many files as possible that were found 
through the first keyword search and read as many documents as possible. The number of 
documents contained in each file varies from a couple of pages to a few thousand pages. I 
spent the first two days scanning through a microfiche that contained about 1200 pages of 
USCAR documents in several files. The microfiche contained documents not only about 
land and U.S military bases, but also various issues in Okinawa such as the status of 
Okinawans, communists, economy, crime, immigration, prohibition of parades, and 
farming experiments. I copied 344 pages out of the microfiche related to USCAR policies 
and administrations in Okinawa. From these documents, I learned that the U.S. military 
established the USCAR in order to maintain U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I also learned 
that the USCAR established the Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI) and issued directives 
to control the Okinawa islands.  
 During the second week, I searched documents related to land appropriation for 
U.S. military bases and also began to search documents related to U.S. security interests in 
Okinawa since the Pacific War. U.S. top secret records that contain documents about the 
General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the Joint Chiefs 
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of Staff were useful sources to learn U.S. military interests in Okinawa and negotiations 
between the U.S. State Department and the U.S. military. During the third week, I 
continued to search, read and copy archival documents related to land, U.S. military bases, 
and U.S. military interests in Okinawa. Beginning in mid October, I began to search files 
compiled by the GRI, communist activities, and private collections by Okinawans. These 
documents helped me learn about Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military as well as 
petitions to the U.S. government and the Japanese government. In late October, I began to 
search archival documents related to reversion of U.S. administrative rights over Okinawa 
to Japan. Due to time constraints, I did not have enough time during this first data 
collection phase to read through many of reversion documents, and as a result these were 
examined during the second data collection phase.  
In the second data collection phase, I continued to search and read archival 
documents related to U.S. military governance in Okinawa. I paid attention to how the U.S. 
military had prolonged its governance in Okinawa despite juridical problems its governance 
had contained. My search was directed especially to documents that included key words or 
terms like directives, legislation, sovereignty and laws. 
Meanwhile, I searched archival documents related to reversion negotiations 
between the U.S. government and the Japanese government, the U.S. military government 
between 1945 and 1950, and local newspapers issued during the U.S. military governance 
in Okinawa. I searched reversion negotiation documents by keyword “reversion” and 
requested files that were compiled by the U.S. State Department. Archival documents about 
Okinawa reversion negotiations have been gradually declassified at the NARA. Before I 
conducted the archival research, I was not sure if I could access the newly declassified 
archival documents at OPA. I found about 20 copied files in the OPA collection that 
contained documents that referred to or contained details about the reversion negotiations. I 
could acquire a fair amount of archival sources which were recently declassified. These 
archival sources provide relevant information to illustrate important dimensions in the 
process of transition from U.S. military governance to Japanese governance in Okinawa. 
Therefore, I decided to write an independent chapter on reversion negotiation issues. 
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Through the reversion negotiation documents, I learned that the U.S. State Department had 
regarded the U.S. military governance and Okinawans’ resistance in Okinawa as 
undesirable political factors in international politics and bilateral relations with Japan and 
sought for ways in which it could maintain its military presence without direct 
administrative responsibility in Okinawa.  
The OPA has about 300 files related to the U.S. military government between 1945 
and 1950. I requested about 50 files and copied 9 files that were related to U.S. military 
bases and directives. In the OPA collection, I found two kinds of local newspapers – Uruma 
Shinpou (1945 - 1951) and its renamed issue Ryukyu Shinpou (1951 onwards) – issued 
during the U.S. military governance. Uruma Shinpou initially was issued as a bulletin by 
the U.S. military and supervised by U.S. military personnel (Arasaki 1999; Yoshioka 2012). 
Therefore, Uruma Shinpou did not carry articles which explicitly criticized the U.S. 
military governance in Okinawa. In 1947, the Uruma Shinpou Office became an 
independent publishing company, and in 1951, Uruma Shinpou was renamed to Ryukyu 
Shinpu in conjunction with the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between the U.S. and Japan. 
In the mid 1950s, as Okinawans’ land struggle against the U.S. military took place, Ryukyu 
Shinpou began to take a stance that was critical of the U.S. military governance in Okianwa 
(Yoshioka 2012). At the OPA, I had access to Uruma Shinpou published in three volumes 
and Ryukyu Shinpou in microfiche. I scanned through and copied newspaper articles dating 
from 1945 up to 1972 that were related to U.S. military accidents and crimes in Okinawa. 
Current issues of Ryukyu Shinpou and another local newspaper, Okinawa Times, dating 
from 1972 up to the present are also available at the OPA. The two local newspapers are 
critical of U.S. military problems and often carry articles that report or discuss U.S. military 
accidents, soldiers’ crimes and Okinawans’ protests against U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa (Yoshioka 2012). I scanned through Ryukyu Shinpou and Okinawa Times and 
copied relevant articles related to U.S. military issues in Okinawa.  
In the process of data collection, I copied in total 11,510 pages of archival 
documents from 240 files and took notes based on the archival documents as well as 
selected local newspaper articles. I took digital copies of the collected data and converted 
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them into a PDF format. I underlined and left comments on the PDF documents. I 
organized the archival files into ten categories: U.S. State Department, U.S. Military 
Government in Okinawa, USCAR, U.S. Army Department, Ryukyu Government, Ryukyu 
Civil Society, Communist activity, Reversion Negotiation, Okinawa Prefectural, and 
Private Collection. Notes from archival sources are organized under the same categories in 
the spreadsheet.  
The first four categories – U.S. State Department, U.S. military government in 
Okinawa, USCAR, and the U.S. Army Department – are relevant to my investigation of 
U.S. internal, bilateral and international negotiations and interests regarding the U.S. 
military presence in Okinawa. The next three categories – Ryukyu Government, Ryukyu 
Civil Society, and Communist Activity – contain useful references that make possible the 
analysis of Okinawans’ counter discourses and movements against the U.S. military in 
Okinawa. The documents under these six categories are referred to mainly in chapter 4. 
Most of those in the category of Reversion Negotiations are recently disclosed documents 
regarding Japan-U.S. bilateral negotiations of Okinawa reversion that are the focus of 
analysis in chapter 5. Of the files in the Okinawa Prefectural category, all but two 
documents are directly referred to in this thesis. The last category, Private Collection, 
contains various documents such as newspaper scraps and testimonies of American and 
Japanese officials that are not relevant for the analysis in the thesis. 
 
4.2 Methods and Analysis 
I employed Foucauldian discourse analysis, or constructivist approaches in a broader sense 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002) to analyze the archival and secondary data. In this section, I 
introduce Foucault’s methodological approaches that allowed a focused analysis of 
discourses in archival and secondary sources. In order to investigate historical processes 
related to how and reasons why the U.S. military bases have been concentrated in Okinawa, 
I paid attention to discourses that represent American and Japanese geopolitical interests in 
Okinawa. Discourses that show American and Japanese security interests in Okinawa as a 
keystone of the Pacific are apparent in U.S. archival documents as well as Japanese official 
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reports and books. Moreover, with reference to Foucault’s insight and postcolonial studies 
that analyze representational between the “Self” and the “Other,” I examined statements by 
American and Japanese authorities to identify discourses that attempt to legitimate the 
security interests by creating divisions between the American and Japanese “Selves” who 
rhetorically promise good governance in Okinawa and the Okinawan “Other” whose 
incapability to engage in effective self governance is emphasized. In this section, I 
introduce how I analyzed the American and Japanese discourses through my archival 
research in Okinawa. Additionally, I outline how I elaborated the Foucauldian discourse 
analysis in order to measure relative failure and success in American and Japanese 
governances in Okinawa.  
 Kawulich (2004, 96) argues that “there is no prescribed way” for analyzing data in 
qualitative research. Instead, qualitative researchers analyze data in accordance with “the 
research questions being asked …[and]… the theoretical foundation of the study” 
(Kawulich 2004, 96). In this study, in response to the two research questions, I refer to 
concepts and theories developed by Foucault and Agamben to investigate techniques of 
governance and identity politics that contributed to prolonged and concentrated U.S. 
military base presence in Okinawa. The methodological framework which I employ in this 
study to analyze the data from archival and secondary sources also reflects insights of 
Foucault and Agamben. The framework is founded on two methods of discourse analysis 
which Foucault developed in his archival work, that is, archaeology of knowledge and 
genealogy of power and elaborated with reference to Agemben’s theory of state of 
exception.  
 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) argue that “[i]n almost all discourse analytical 
approaches, Foucault has become a figure to quote, relate to, comment on modify and 
criticize.” Criticisms of Foucault’s discourse analysis are directed to his limited attention to 
material reality in contrast to his heavy emphasis on discourse (Young 2001) or his one-
sided attention to repressive aspects of modern rationality (Best and Kellner 2002). 
Nevertheless, Foucault’s insights in discourse can provide researchers with “tactics, 
strategies and approaches” for their investigations (Nicholls 2008). Foucault (1972) 
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developed and applied archaeology of knowledge in his earlier works in order to grasp a 
system of knowledge and rules that governs discourse in a given time. In particular, 
Foucault was interested in the discourses ‘that seek to rationalize or systematize themselves 
in relation to particular ways of ‘saying the true’” (Dean 1994 in Ritzer 2000). Jorgensen 
and Phillips (2002, 13) point out that most “contemporary discourse analytical approaches 
follow Foucault’s conception of discourses as relatively rule-bound sets of statements … 
and build on his ideas about truth being something which is … created discursively.”  
 In his archaeological method, Foucault tended to “identify only one knowledge 
regime in each historical period” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 13). In other words, in his 
earlier works prior to Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault did not take into account a 
“conflictual picture in which different discourses exist side by side or struggle for the right 
to define truth” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 13). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
(1977) adopts genealogy of power and explores relations between knowledge and power 
that are mediated and expressed in a form of discourse. He argues that power is unequally 
distributed among individuals, but not possessed by them (Foucault 1977). Power is 
exercised and contested among individuals within power relations (Foucault 1977). In one 
geographical space and historical moment, as a result of power relations and struggle, 
certain knowledge becomes accepted as the truth. Discourse analysis then allows a 
researcher to trace relatively stable rules that underlie discourse as well as power relations 
and struggles that define what is true in the given space and period.  
 In my analysis, I employ thematic discourse analysis to demonstrate the nature and 
forms of discourse employed by American military or government and Japanese 
government authorities. The discourses that are the focus of my analysis are those produced 
by American and Japanese government authorities, represented in official documents and 
statements presented by authorities in the course of administering or making decisions 
about Okinawa during the time frame covered by my study. These can be considered 
representative of official discourses because multiple documents illustrate similar patterns 
of thought employed by U.S. military personnel and Japanese officials in their governing 
practices in Okinawa since 1945. In order to grasp these patterns, I organized words and 
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phrases which are repeatedly used in archival documents under several codes which are 
concerned with themes of governance in response to the two research questions.  
 As a first step to thematic discourse analysis, I familiarized myself with archival 
data during and after my archival research in 2007 and 2008. The archival files which I 
collected were organized into ten categories. I scanned through archival documents in all 
ten categories and sought for words and phrases which deemed relevant to respond to the 
two research questions of this study. Each file contained fragmented information, so that I 
did not target all documents exhaustively, but selected and took notes of paragraphs and 
sections in each file that were relevant to investigate the research questions.  
 In response to the first research question - what factors have made possible the 
continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa? - I paid attention to words and 
phrases that illustrate intention and reason of U.S. military governance in Okinawa. I 
noticed that some words and phrases were repeatedly used by the U.S. military personnel. 
These words and phrases include liberty, peace, freedom, well-being, justice and civilizing 
mission which are related to U.S. military rhetoric of good governance in Okinawa. Words 
and phrases which are related to U.S. military interests in and concern about security 
matters in Asia, such as defense, communists, communist China, threat and security 
demand, were also recognizable. I coded the former as “democracy” and the latter as 
“security” and took detailed notes from 63 archival files which illustrated the two codes. In 
response to the second research question - what is the significance of the concentration of 
U.S .military bases in Okinawa? - I noticed that the U.S. military personnel often 
differentiated Okinawans from themselves. I coded the words and phrases which illustrate 
U.S. military representation of Okinawans, such as Orientals, Oriental mind and Asian, as 
“identity.” 36 archival files which I collected contained relevant words and phrases, so that 
I took detailed notes from these files. The three codes were analyzed in relation to 
governing practices by the U.S. military as well as events that took place in Okinawa. I also 
examined secondary sources whether similar discourses are employed and deployed in the 
case of Japanese governance in Okinawa.  
 Discourse analysis has been applied in many fields of social research, such as 
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psychology (Tarabochia 2013), medicine (Rose 2006), criminology (Tator and Henry 
2006), education (Popkewitz and Brennan ed 1998) and interdisciplinary studies (Blain 
2012). Said (1978) examined how representation of the Oriental “Other” has been 
disseminated by professionals as true knowledge and employed to legitimate political 
intervention of one group to another. Escobar (1995) also applied Foucauldian discourse 
analysis to examine representational division between industrialized nations and former 
colonized nations that legitimized practices of international development. While many 
examinations and critiques of such representation and practices have been made, it is not 
clearly discussed how representation and practices lose their legitimacy and at the same 
time one regime declines. Foucault (1972) suggests discontinuity of discourse in 
archaeology of knowledge and refines the idea of discontinuity in terms of contingency that 
has a great impact on power relations and knowledge formation. Alternately, the 
contingency causes a shift in a historical course and condition of a society. Moreover, a 
project of control by one militarily strong group can fail if it does not meet with a 
contingent condition in a particular moment and location. In the failed project, the 
discourse loses its legitimacy as the true or does not produce consensus about the true. 
Therefore, I propose that there is disparity or contradiction that can be observed between a 
discourse and outcomes in one failed project of control.  
As Agamben (2005) argues, exception is demonstrated in many recent political 
circumstances. Some cases of exception, such as American military campaigns in the 
Middle East after the 9/11 events, have created civil and intellectual resistance. Between 
American claims of ‘war on terror’ or ‘justice’ and resistance to these, we can observe 
disparity and contradiction. I incorporate this aspect – the gap between rationalizing 
discourse and resistance – into the analytical framework which is founded on Foucault’s 
methods.  
I trace the genealogy of power by exploring the statements and actions or forms of 
governance employed to assert and maintain rule over Okinawa or Okinawans at different 
stages. In conjunction with this analysis, I conduct an archaeology of knowledge by 
examining the relationships among these ruling practices as well as the factors that have 
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enabled or limited the translation of these practices into effective control over Okinawa and 
its population. Firstly, I present a link between discourse and deployment of discourse in 
practice. For example, I examine how the U.S. and Japanese policies in Okinawa are 
concerned with discourses of security. As I will elaborate in chapter 5, the U.S. military 
deployed the security discourse in order to justify its presence and administration in 
Okinawa. Secondly, I examine whether the deployment of discourses is accepted by 
Okinawans by observing how they respond to the American and Japanese practices. The 
two attempts by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in normalizing the U.S. 
military presence may entail observable difference. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I will refer to 
this difference in order to measure relative success and failure in the normalization of 
American state of exception in Okinawa by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I outlined my archival research in Okinawa and introduced research 
methods that were used in order to investigate what factors have made possible the 
continued U.S. military presence in Okinawa and what is the significance of the 
concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. The analytical framework that I developed 
provides an analytical focus. Through this framework, I analyze how the U.S. military and 
the Japanese governments have attempted to normalize the U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa. Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge and genealogy of power are the main 
methods that I employ in this analysis. I analyze discourses of governance that are 
employed by the U.S. personnel and the Japanese officials in archival and secondary 
sources and link them to the problem of long-term presence and concentration of the U.S. 
military bases in Okinawa. In the following chapter, I analyze what kinds of rationalizing 
and othering discourses the American military personnel produced, how the discourses 
along with tactics of control are deployed in maintaining the U.S. military bases in 
Okinawa, and how the representational and material realities are shaped within the dynamic 
international, national and local power relations.  
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Chapter 5: American State of Exception 
5.0 Introduction 
In response to the research questions, I examine the reason why the U.S. military decided to 
garrison in Okinawa and the techniques through which the U.S. administrators managed the 
military presence. The U.S. military began to build military bases in 1945 and eventually 
governed Okinawa for 27 years. During and immediately after World War II, the U.S. 
military and State Department did not have a consensual plan about Okinawa governance. 
Governance throughout this twenty-seven year period was a product of complex American 
strategy and negotiation within dynamic national and international political contexts. 
Several studies (Miyazato 1986; Oguma 1998) point out that while the U.S. State 
Department acknowledged that Okinawa belonged to Japan, the U.S. Defense Department 
became interested in the Okinawa Islands as a strategic site in the Far East as early as 1942. 
This internal politics – intertwined with post-war American diplomacy with Japan and the 
Allied Forces – caused indecision that made it possible to suspend key aspects of 
sovereignty and human rights on the islands during its governance. As the ideological 
rivalry became apparent in the Far East, the U.S. began to regard the Okinawa Islands as a 
vital and convenient site on which it could maintain a military presence.  
In this chapter, I analyze exceptional practices of U.S. governance of Okinawa and 
resulting contradictions on the islands. I focus especially on tactics of governance that made 
it possible for Okinawa to be governed in accordance with what Agamben refers to as a 
state of exception. I argue that institutional governance by using a local political body – 
which the U.S. initially planned – was unsuccessful, but the U.S. managed to govern the 
islands for over a quarter century by making Okinawa a zone of exception where regular 
political functions and human rights were suspended, and a mechanism of control was 
created and maintained. As a result, unlawful and forceful establishment, presence and 
maintenance of military bases became possible. Nevertheless, the local institutions in 
Okinawa did not function in such a way as to establish hegemonic control over the islands 
by the U.S. military. Most American administrators and soldiers represented and treated 
Okinawans as the incommensurable “Other” (Steeves 1956a) and did not seek assimilation 
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of this foreign ethnic group into the American political system (Senaga 1971). Meanwhile, 
the U.S. administrators imposed American form of rationality, such as security and 
geopolitical importance of the Okinawa Islands in the Far East, on Okinawans. American 
adherence to principles associated with democracy and security were often contradictory 
and too foreign for those Okinawans who did not share American values (Senaga 1971). 
Therefore, resistance by Okinawans emerged and persisted after the initial and provisional 
phase of the American occupation. In the face of resistance, the U.S. military employed 
multiple tactics in order to sustain its presence. The tactics were not fully functional, but 
allowed the U.S. military to prolong its administration.  
 The first section deals with the period of early U.S. military governance of 
Okinawa between 1945 and 1950. It refers especially to two conflicting discourses, of 
democracy and (military) geopolitics, found in archival documents. The discussion also 
draws from secondary sources that offer helpful references to guide and structure this 
analysis. The second section deals with the period after 1950 when the U.S. quasi-civil 
administration began to contract the exceptional regime on the islands. The conflicting 
discourses were still prevalent, but newly emerging political difficulties posed by the 
appearance of communist states in the Far East led the U.S. to enter into a long term 
strategic planning phase in Okinawa. It was also during this period that the U.S. began to 
seek an ideological alliance with Japan and laid a stronger emphasis on liberal democratic 
principles. The liberal democratic principles were narrated in relation to communist 
ideology and distorted within the anti-communist atmosphere. In Okinawa, American 
democracy in practice meant a longer term U.S. military domination over the islands. In the 
third section, I analyze the two conflicting discourses in reference to techniques of 
American governance of Okinawa. Moreover, I introduce discourses that represent 
Okinawans as the “Other” in relation to the discourses of democracy and security as well as 
some cases of resistance on the islands. 
 
5.1 Making Exception in Uncer tainty 
As observed previously, Miyazato (1986) argues that the U.S. State Department had 
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consistently acknowledged since the early 1940s that the Okinawa Islands belonged to the 
Japanese state. As the Pacific War progressed towards the mid 1940s, the U.S. military 
authorities, such as Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and U.S. Navy Department, began to regard 
the Okinawa Islands as a strategically important site in their post-war base planning. In 
other words, the U.S. government did not have consent among these departments for its 
post-war plan to occupy and govern Okinawa. The U.S. military began its military 
administration of the Okinawa Islands in such uncertainty. Despite the uncertainty and 
resulting ad hoc policies, the initial U.S. military administration during these five years 
represented the most stable period of its total 27 year governance in Okinawa. I argue that 
the unintentional “provisionality” in its initial governance by the U.S. military in Okinawa 
contributed to the stability. The U.S. encountered relatively few problems within Okinawa 
and from Japan with respect to its military control in this provisional phase. Therefore, the 
U.S. could initially monopolize control over the islands without any complex bilateral 
consideration and negotiation with Japan as it established its military bases. Nevertheless, 
in the initial five years, the U.S. had to deal with three major obstacles to the military 
government on Okinawa. Firstly, the U.S. military occupation of Okinawa posed a financial 
burden on the U.S. government. Secondly, the U.S. had to resolve ongoing debates within 
the American government about Okinawa sovereignty. Despite the geopolitical significance 
of the Okinawa Islands, many American decision makers were hesitant to formally colonize 
the islands since an explicit colonial action was contradictory to American democratic 
principles. Lastly, because the U.S. had to deal with other state members among the Allied 
nations, it could not take action on Okinawa that was explicitly illegitimate.  
 
5.1.1 Keystone of the Pacific 
American military personnel often use the term “keystone” to express the geopolitical 
advantages the Okinawa Islands offered for locating U.S. military bases in the Pacific area. 
During the American administration of Okinawa, a symbolic phrase “Keystone of the 
Pacific” was embossed on American-owned automobile license plates in Okinawa. Instead 
of the initial representation of the islands as a steppingstone in the Pacific War, the U.S. 
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began to emphasize publicly Okinawa’s geopolitical importance in the Pacific from the 
outset of the American military administration. The discourse of keystone was not 
consistent with a discourse of democracy which the U.S. had repeatedly emphasized as one 
of its core principles. In general, the former was supported by the American military 
personnel, and the latter by civilian officers. For example, Miyazato (1986) and Oguma 
(1998) point out that in 1942, the Subcommittee on Security Problems insisted that the U.S. 
should be a lone administrator of Okinawa. On the other hand, the Subcommittee of 
Political Problems, which was supervised by the State Department, acknowledged that the 
Okinawa Islands belonged to Japan and was reluctant to occupy the islands. The inter-
departmental politics continued without definite reason or legitimacy for American 
occupation of Okinawa for 27 years.  
Documents produced by the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1945a) indicate that in the 
mid 1940s, the American military executives and planners sought sites for military bases at 
strategically crucial areas all over the world and targeted the Okinawa Islands as one of 
those sites. During and right after World War II, the U.S. military planners were eager to 
assure they had access to a world-wide military network in times of emergency. For 
example, the post-war air base plan1
                                                 
1 As potential sites for the American military bases, Brazil, Ecuador, Cuba, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, 
Portugal, and United Kingdom are discussed in this document. 
 of the JCS states that “it is essential that command and 
operational control of these bases be exercised at all times by the military authorities of the 
United States in order that freedom of military action may be assured in time of 
emergency” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945a). The U.S. military interests and requirements 
shifted according to their geopolitical situations. In the Joint Staff Planners’ report, 
Okinawa was ranked at a level of secondary base area out of four ranks of primary, 
secondary, subsidiary, and minor base areas (Joint Chiefs of Staff Planners 1945). Although 
the military importance of the secondary base areas is stressed, their expected role was “the 
protection and for access to primary bases” (Joint Chiefs of Staff Planners 1945). At this 
stage, in September 1945, the report states that “diplomatic negotiations are required” to 
assure the military base sites (Joint Chiefs of Staff Planners 1945). In the same series of 
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reports dated October, 1945, it states “the Ryukyus … be transferred from the secondary to 
the primary base area category” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945b). The primary base was 
assumed to “be under United States sovereignty or exclusively under United States strategic 
control” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945b). The mission to establish the military network was 
incompatible with overall post-war international policies of the Department of State. The 
department of State was determined at one point to establish an international system that 
included the United Nations in order to avoid a future war (Miyazato 1986, 17). 
Furthermore, the military plans at this stage to keep Okinawa under exclusive U.S. control 
already were contradictory to an American rhetoric of democracy and free nations.  
The Office of Territory document dated 1946 says that Okinawa was “the only 
island large enough to support the 26 projected airfields for the bombing of Japan proper 
with land-based planes … the ultimate invasion of Japan” (Goodhew 1946). The same file 
contains the memorandum which planned the permanent base construction project on the 
Okinawa Islands (Hashbourns 1946). During and right after the war, American 
administrators assumed it was necessary to keep Okinawa in order to maintain military 
bases against Japan because the latter was potentially dangerous for the U.S. Meanwhile, 
the documents reveal that U.S. personnel expressed anxiety regarding their long term U.S. 
military presence in Okinawa. The establishment and maintenance of military bases on 
foreign territories were not easy tasks due to economic and political constraints. Both U.S. 
military personnel and some civil officers acknowledged the strategic importance of the 
Okinawa Islands, but the economic and political constraints became a site of struggle 
among American elites. Firstly, economic constraints were a significant challenge that the 
U.S. had to consider since American administrators had to work within a limited budget. 
For example, the U.S. State Department points out that “control of the Ryukyus by the 
United States would in all probability require a considerable financial outlay” (Reid et al. 
1946). Similarly, JCS documents indicate American anxiety regarding expenditure and 
publicity of their military bases at the foreign territories. JCS concerned “not only 
additional expenditure of manpower and money but also … the disposal value of such 
installations or equipment” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945c). Secondly, as a newly emerging 
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leader of democratic states, in their overall political stance, the U.S. had to act in 
compliance with democratic principles. A memorandum that contains views of the U.S. 
State Department and the U.S. military indicates the U.S. aimed towards “liberalization and 
democratization of government” in its reconstruction plan in Japan (Ara 1995a). For 
example, the same memorandum proposes that after demilitarization of Japan, the U.S. 
would “permit freedom of speech, press and religion and (eventually) freedom of 
assembly” in Japan (Ara 1995a).  
 
5.1.2 American “Democracy” 
However the U.S. policy makers and military personnel defined or understood ideas and 
practices of democracy, it is important to note that the U.S. began to use discourses 
associated with principles of American democracy such as liberalization and 
democratization since the Cold War in a distinctive way. While the discourse of democracy 
was mainly employed in the context of political reconstruction programs in the mid 1940s, 
the U.S. officials and military personnel began to use the same term in contrast to 
communism as communist influence increased towards the end of 1940s in the Far East 
(Ara 1995a; Steeves 1956a). The American discourse of democracy has been associated 
with a discourse of security since 1945 (Ara 1995a; Steeves 1956a). The discourse of 
security also changed its meaning in the late 1940s. The discourse of security during the 
Cold War was mostly used in anti-communism contexts (Steeves 1956a).  
In the mid 1940s, the U.S. government implemented its security policies very 
carefully in compliance with international agreements. For example, the JCS document 
indicates that the U.S. monitored its military activities; “raising political difficulties in 
England, France and elsewhere” regarding military and commercial rights to use the 
airfields (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945c). At the Atlantic Charter in 1941, the American 
President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed not to 
seek territorial aggrandizement in the course and consequence of the Second World War 
(Nanpou Douhou Engokai 1972). The Cairo Declaration (1944) also states that the Allies 
“covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion” (Reid 1946). 
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There were conflicting themes within the US: anti-expansionist agenda on one hand and 
military interests on the other hand. However, their overall international policy was to 
comply with international laws and not explicitly violate rules among rival European 
nations. Therefore, the U.S. tried “[t]o retain control by the United States, in a manner 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, of those strategic points in the Pacific 
which are necessary for the security of the United States” (Ara 1995a, 44). The proposed 
aim was “to maintain international peace and security, and to lay solid foundation upon 
which a better world may be built” (Ara 1995a, 44). It was emphasized that the U.S. was 
willing to respect the principles of sovereignty, justice and international laws to realize 
freedom, democracy, self-governance, and peace among nations (Ara 1995a, 45). 
Harvey argues: 
 
coercion and liquidation of enemy is only a partial, and sometimes 
counterproductive, basis for US power. Consent and cooperation are just as 
important. If these could not be mobilized internationally and if leadership could 
not be exercised in such a way as to generate collective benefits, then the US 
would long ago have ceased to be hegemonic. The US must at least act in the 
general interest plausible to others even when, as most people suspect, it is acting 
out of narrow self-interest. This is what exercising leadership through consent is 
all about (Harvey, 2003, p. 39) 
 
In other words, compliance with the international norms – yet without compromising their 
minimum requirement of political and military influence – was a general trend within U.S. 
post-war international governance.  
 In the case of U.S. military occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. employed tricky 
strategies regarding Okinawans’ sovereignty to realize their military will to gain consent 
from most European states. The Potsdam Declaration indicates that Japan proper includes 
“[t]he four main islands of Japan – Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku and about 
1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including Tsushima” (Ara 1995a, 6). In 1946, General 
Headquarters declared the separation of Japan and Nansei Shoto (southern islands off 
Kyushu including the Okinawa Islands) (Kyan 1964). There is no clear indication of 
Okinawans’ sovereignty in the two declarations. The location of Okinawans’ sovereignty 
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was an issue within the U.S. The ideas of democracy and security again led the course of 
discussion about Okinawans’ sovereignty. As a meeting ground of two contradictory ideas, 
UN trusteeship eventually became a focus of negotiation within the U.S. 
The study prepared by State members (Reid et al. 1946) shows the American 
intention to implement the reconstruction project of Japan and Okinawa without territorial 
ambition. The study was to be signed by the President and to be undertaken in consultation 
“with the governments of other interested states at appropriate times regarding the terms of 
trusteeship for the Japanese Mandated Islands and other Japanese islands which are to 
remain under United States administration” (Reid et al. 1946). For example, it reads “[i]n 
areas where strategic considerations are not overruling and especially where large numbers 
of indigenous inhabitants are involved, the trust territories should be non-strategic in 
character” (Reid et al. 1946). In contradiction to their subsequent action in Okinawa, the 
1946 document also proposed that “[t]he Ryukyu Islands should be regarded as minor 
islands to be retained by Japan and demilitarized” (Reid et al. 1946). Given the nature of 
this study, which was submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, it was 
likely that the state members did not present purely “democratic” rhetoric which could have 
provoked the military authority.  
The same study reveals America’s ambitious stance with regard to post-war 
international politics. For example, it states “[t]he United States should be designated as 
sole administering authority in all of the trusteeship agreements … [and] … [t]he terms of 
trusteeship in all cases should be such as to safeguard the defense of the United States” 
(Reid et al. 1946). Moreover, the study contains the stance which became the common 
ground which settled the political negotiation between Washington and military; “[t]he 
terms of trusteeship in all cases should be such as to give the United States exclusive 
authority in all matters affecting the security of United States in the trust territory” (Reid et 
al. 1946).  
American politics with regard to Okinawans’ sovereignty was unresolved at the 
time that the Treaty of San Francisco was signed in 1951 (effective as of 1952). Eventually, 
the option of trusteeship was included in the Treaty, which under Article 3 states, “Japan 
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will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its 
trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto 
south of 29 deg. North latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands).”  
As a consequence of indecision regarding sovereignty of Okinawa, the U.S. 
military could not implement stable governance. It temporarily established three local 
administrative channels2
 During the period of U.S. military governance, many Okinawans sensed that it was 
taboo to talk about reversion to Japan (Kyan 1964). Few individual requests for Okinawa’s 
reversion to Japan were made to American administrators in concentration camps. 
However, in 1946, a former mayor of Shuri-city, Yoshimitsu Nakayoshi, went to Tokyo to 
petition General MacArthur for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan (Kyan 1964). In 1947, three 
political parties
 between 1945 and 1950 for indirect control of Okinawa. The three 
local institutions were not granted independent decision-making authority, but were only 
allowed to implement American military rules and orders to local people. A military 
directive allowed American administrators to “suspend the operation of any laws, 
ordinances or regulations which interfere with the furtherance of your objective” 
(Headquarters of the Commander in Chief 1945). While the U.S. military appropriated 
lands for military camps and bases, Okinawans were detained in concentration camps 
during the Battle of Okinawa, and movement from the camps was restricted (Headquarters 
U.S. Naval Military Government Okinawa 1945). The general attitude of the U.S. Military 
Government is stated in a military directive: “[i]n your treatment of the local population, 
the degree of severity to be exercised will be determined by the conduct and the attitude of 
the people and their willingness to cooperate with the military authorities” (Headquarters of 
the Commander in Chief 1945). 
3
                                                 
2 Okinawa Advisory Council in 1945, Okinawa Civilian Administration in 1946, and Gunto (archipela-
go) Governments in 1950 
 were organized, and political movements for Okinawa reversion to Japan 
grew. Nevertheless, because the Okinawa Civilian Administration did not have a legislative 
function but operated by means of military proclamations, ordinances and directives (Kyan 
3 Jinmin Doumei (Democratic Alliance), Jinmin Tou  (People’s Party), and Shakai Tou  (Socialist Party) 
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1964), their political actions were limited to petitions. Although local political movements 
were not reflected in policy making, there was a dawning of political resistance in 
Okinawa. 
 
5.2 Contracting Exception 
As I introduced in chapter 2, when the Treaty of Peace was signed in 1951, another 
signature for the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and 
Japan was conducted. The bilateral security treaty was renamed and renewed, but it has not 
changed its fundamental character. The security treaty enabled the U.S. military to be 
stationed in the Japanese territory and obligated Japan to support the U.S. military in Japan. 
The two treaties reflected American security interests in the context of Cold War politics, 
revealing the intention of the U.S. to use the archipelago in the Far East for fulfilling these 
interests. Archival documents (Ara 1995c) dated the beginning of the Cold War indicate a  
transition and dilemmas associated with American policy making regarding the Far East. At 
the time of the early occupation of Japan, the U.S. aimed to realize its democratic policy in 
Japan. I do not intend to evaluate American democratization of Japan, but a basic structure 
of liberal democracy such as sovereignty of the people, an election and parliamentary 
system, and freedom of expression was established in the immediate post-war years in 
Japan. On the other hand, the U.S. maintained provisional military governance in Okinawa 
between 1945 and 1950. As the ideological tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. grew, 
the U.S. sought permanent military base sites. Under the peace treaty, the U.S. military was 
able to govern Okinawa without bilateral intervention. Meanwhile, the U.S. needed to 
implement military governance in accordance with democratic principles in order to 
comply with the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration that prohibit territorial 
expansion of the concerned states. Therefore, multiple tactics were required to maintain the 
American state of exception in Okinawa. In this section, I examine how American claims of 
democracy as a tactic of “rationalization” was contested in the Cold War international 
politics and compromised in its application to Okinawa. 
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5.2.1 Communism and Security Treaty 
Growing communist influence altered the course of U.S. international policies in the Far 
East towards the late 1940s. On September 1945, a report for the Office of the United 
States Political Advisor (Ara 1995a) indicates the U.S. intention to cooperate with the 
U.S.S.R. although influence of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East should be observed. The report 
also indicates that the U.S. intended to avoid action that could cause colonial rivalry and 
conflicts in the Far East. In 1946, ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
became overt. In March, the U.S. – U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Korea was met. A report 
of the Commission from the United States Army Forces in Korea refers to the U.S.S.R. 
political stance that non-communist political belief is undemocratic and fascist (Ara 1995 
b). At the same time, a report by the U.S. Secretary of War shows difficulties with the 
U.S.S.R. in Europe and describes attitudes by U.S.S.R soldiers witnessed by U.S. troops in 
Europe as arrogant and hostile (Ara 1995b). In this context, up to the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. began to see 
Japan as a partner in security cooperation and Okinawa as a keystone of the Pacific.  
Decisions regarding American military policies in Japan ware made in this 
dynamic international context. An initial American post-war reconstruction plan for Japan 
was to de-militarize and establish a liberal government (Ara 1995a). It also aimed to 
promote “liberalization and democratization” of the local government (Ara 1995a, 34). As a 
consequence of the growing ideological rivalry with the U.S.S.R., military interests began 
to surpass American democratic principles. A JCS report in 1950 proposed an amendment 
to the pacifist constitution and militarization of Japan, so that the U.S. would be able to use 
Japan as military bases for the Korean War (Ishihara and Uemura 2000b). At the same time, 
under General MacArthur’s order, the Police Reserve Forces were established in Japan 
(Niihara 1990). In 1952, the U.S.-Japan Administrative Agreement in the Security Treaty 
between the United States and Japan entitled the U.S. to use military bases in Japan for 
security in the Far East (Gabe 2002). Nevertheless, the U.S. needed to avoid explicit 
military action in Japan proper because of the risk that it could provoke the rival states as 
well as the Japanese. The American dilemma between democratic principles and security 
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interests required a tricky solution. Okinawa became a convenient site for the U.S. where it 
could conceal its military ambition and assure a military presence by suspending any clear 
decision on sovereignty and rights of local people. While the inter-departmental debate 
between the State and Army regarding trusteeship was in succession (Allison 1953), 
American governance of Okinawa continued to be marked by indecision over long-term 
objectives. 
 
5.2.2 USCAR and GRI 
In 1950, the U.S. established the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands 
(USCAR) replacing the Military Government. The post-war emergency phase ended, and 
the U.S. began to seek a long term military staging site as the communist influence grew. 
Despite its title, the USCAR’s fundamental objective was not to improve civil affairs, but to 
sustain American military presence on Okinawa. As a local political body that would 
support this objective, they established the Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI). The 
establishment of the GRI for the USCAR was to ensure indirect control over Okinawa as 
well as to put a quasi-democratic varnish on the military domination. The GRI was given a 
pro forma legislative function, and legislative members were elected by popular vote. Most 
of the time, governors were not elected, but nominated by the USCAR. Moreover, the 
USCAR had superior authority to suspend any legislative decision that could threaten 
American military presence and objectives. The USCAR made ad hoc decisions on 
multiple problems in Okinawa. In that sense, the USCAR governance was indecisive in its 
political character, but the provisional measures were dysfunctional as the U.S. military 
began to aim for a long term presence in Okinawa.  
The USCAR’s indecisive policy impeded Okinawa’s post-war recovery, and 
Okinawans were anxious about the long term military presence (Kyan 1964). The American 
personnel who were in charge of Okinawa governance regarded and treated Okinawans as a 
fundamentally foreign ethnic group (Steeves 1956a). Therefore, the USCAR did not 
seriously consider policies that sought to improve Okinawans’ living standards and political 
rights. Appropriate measures for post-war development were not implemented, and the gap 
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in living standards between Okinawa and Japan proper enlarged. A USCAR mission states 
that, “Improvement in the standard of living above that existing prior to the war will be 
accomplished through the efforts of the Ryukyuans themselves, without the assistance of 
United States appropriated funds” (The Administrative Office 1954). On the islands without 
abundant arable area, land was a critical element for food supply. While the U.S. military 
was aware that over 70% of households on Okinawa were farmers before the war (Taylor 
1946), it appropriated land for construction of military bases. Along with the Okinawans’ 
dissatisfaction with their living standard under the USCAR governance, the land 
appropriation gave rise to serious resistance by people on Okinawa. In the next section, I 
analyze American discourses of democracy, military interests, and the Okinawan “Other” 
which are significant indicators to understand American misreading and mishandling of 
Okinawa.  
 
5.3 Unnormalized Exception and Resistance 
The U.S. military seized the Okinawa Islands, constructed military bases by force, and 
maintained its administration for 27 years, but Okinawans did not accept the USCAR 
governance as an enduring rule. In the previous section, I discussed how the American 
military governance of Okinawa began to depart from a focus on provisional elements as 
the ideological tension and military interests grew. As it became apparent that the U.S. 
military was re-oriented towards a long term presence, Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. 
military governance grew. In other words, the U.S. military succeeded in making an 
exception, but failed to normalize it. In addition to the tactical failure regarding 
“provisionality,” the U.S. military also failed to provide an effective rationale for its 
presence and governance in Okinawa. The “rationalization” of the U.S. military governance 
of Okinawa was consistent with the two American agendas of democracy and keystone held 
up by the Department of State and the Department of Army in its predominant approach to 
international politics. Okinawans were not privy to decisions framed within American 
politics and did not give importance to the American agendas so far as compliance with the 
USCAR governance did not ameliorate their living conditions. In that sense, the tactic of 
72 
“rationalization” by discourses of democracy and keystone did not seem reasonable 
agendas for Okinawans that could assure stable governance by the U.S. military in 
Okinawa. In this section, I analyze further what factors contributed to mishandling of 
Okinawans by the U.S. military personnel.  
 
5.3.1 Okinawan “Other” 
In addition to the discourses that highlighted themes of democracy and keystone, I noticed 
in several archival documents that there were patterns of thought that differentiated the 
American “Self” from the Okinawan “Other.” Some of the archival documents (Steeves 
1956a; Department of the Army 1957) reveal the belief by American military personnel in 
their superiority over Okinawans. Based on this belief, they shared optimism and 
confidence that Okinawans would be obedient and guided by American orders (Steeves 
1956a). Okinawans began to resist American military practices that did not accord with 
Okinawans’ post-war recovery needs. These discourses were not mere ideas, but set the 
course for American military governance in Okinawa. The U.S. military made unilateral 
decisions on Okinawans in accordance with U.S. military agendas in conjunction with 
discourse of the American “Self” and the Okinawan “Other.” In practice, deployment of 
American democratic principles was greatly compromised in relation to the U.S. military 
agendas and its treatment of Okinawans, contributing to dysfunctional and contradictory 
discourses that impeded the capacity for America to rationalize and normalize its exception 
in Okinawa.  
Through analysis of archival documents, I found a binary characteristic of 
American discourses in relation to Okinawans. Americans represented themselves as 
superior people who could teach and lead the Okinawan “Other.” Okinawans are 
represented as those who are dissimilar to Americans who need to be guided and taught. 
For example, John Steeves who investigated the USCAR governance contends that 
Okinawans “are teachable and have demonstrated their ability to acquire technical skills 
and learning” while “the United States has sought to display the benefits of the type of 
world order we stand for” (Steeves 1956a). The American representation of Okinawans was 
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consistent with the paternalistic way in which American leaders regarded Asians in the 
immediate post-war era. General MacArthur argued that Asian people have “the pattern of 
Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership” in 
the context that the U.S. had to assure its leadership in the Western Pacific (Ishihara and 
Uemura 2000a, 67).  
 The Americans' belief in their superiority underlay how the USCAR governed 
Okinawa. The U.S. military attempted to rationalize the U.S. military presence by the self-
righteous agendas of democracy and security. A directive of the Department of Army states 
that the mission of the USCAR is to contribute to “the peace and security of the free world” 
(Department of the Army 1957). Meanwhile, the directive proposes that if Okinawans 
cooperate with the USCAR, they enjoy “a free and democratic society in which political 
and financial stability prevail” (Department of the Army 1957). The directive was issued in 
1957 when the Okinawans’ reversion movement was prevalent. Moreover, as I introduced 
in the previous section, the USCAR demanded that Okinawans should be responsible to 
improve their own living standard without American assistance while they were deprived of 
land – which had been a means of industry in Okinawa – due to the military base 
construction. The persistence of resistance by Okinawans demonstrates that the USCAR 
could not adequately rationalize and normalize its exceptional state of governance. The gap 
between American military rhetoric in its governance and Okinawans’ resistance indicate 
not only American failure in asserting hegemonic control over Okinawa, but also a 
contradiction between American democratic principles and military interests when both 
were applied in the U.S. military control over Okinawans who were represented and treated 
as inferior people by the U.S. military personnel.  
 
5.3.2 Failed Showcase 
In this subsection, I examine the case of American military land appropriation and 
Okinawans’ resistance. The case manifests the American exceptionalism and the USCAR’s 
tactical failure in Okinawa governance after the provisional phase of U.S. military 
occupation. As I introduced in chapter 2, various types of resistance by Okinawans were 
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drawn together and eventually took the form of an island-wide movement that demanded 
Okinawa reversion to Japan. Sarantakes (2000) argues that Americans could not understand 
Okinawans’ desire to be part of Japan given severe oppression that marked much of the 
history of Okinawa in relation to Japanese feudal and modern regimes. As I introduced in 
chapter 2, Okinawans had been exploited under Japanese control until the end of World War 
II. Nevertheless, I argue that the U.S. military mismanaged Okinawa to the extent that 
Okinawans began to demand reversion to Japan.  
In “Okinawa – American Showcase in the Western Pacific” (Steeves 1956a), a 
document prepared for political investigation in Okinawa and sent to the U.S. Department 
of State, John Steeves expressed his belief in American privilege regarding “ideas, 
techniques and a great amount of wealth” to be invested in the underprivileged Asian 
counterparts. Steeves was an expert in Asian affairs and served as a consul general and 
political advisor in Okinawa between 1955 and 1956. He was not satisfied with approaches 
by the USCAR administration that caused Okinawans’ resistance, but still believed in the 
potential for democracy to be applied to the U.S. governance of Okinawa. Meanwhile, in 
the same report, he also presented his understanding that American security and defence 
objectives took priority in Okinawa. By promoting further democratic principles, he 
believed that Okinawa could be a showcase of American democracy and realize “the 
development of all aspects of civil affairs” (Steeves 1956a). The idea of Showcase of 
American democracy was narrated in the context that communist influence was growing 
and “well-meaning programs sponsored by the United States” in Asia were unsuccessful 
(Steeves 1956a). Steeves (1956a) believed that if the U.S. could turn the Okinawa “pilot 
plant” or “experimental station” into a successful showcase, the American model and idea 
of democracy would be adopted and reproduced in other Asian countries.  
 The Steeves report not only contains the American belief in its own superiority 
over Asians, but also shows a distorted view of democracy. Steeves stated that some 
American sponsored programs failed when they had to deal with sovereign governments 
wherein American motives were “often the subject of suspicion and understanding 
cooperation on the part of local authorities” was lacking (1956a). On the other hand, 
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Okinawa served as a unique opportunity that should not be missed because the U.S. was “in 
control of most of the factors” (Steeves 1956a). In other words, Okinawa was a perfect 
experimental site for the U.S. because Okinawans’ sovereign rights were suspended, and 
the U.S. military could monopolize all decisions in its governance. What Steeves proposed 
for the experimental program was a technical resolution for the land problems that the 
USCAR caused in Okinawa. Steeves suggested that, “[i]t would be appropriate to the 
psychology of the moment in Okinawa to demonstrate what modern techniques, machinery, 
ingenuity and capital, can do” (Steeves 1956a).  
 The pro forma democracy wherein the USCAR monopolized ultimate decisions 
was not accepted by Okinawans. Okinawans began to recognize that acquisition of full 
political rights was the fundamental condition in order to improve their living 
circumstances. A dilemma that the U.S. military had was that Okinawans did not share the 
security and defence agendas with them, so that the military presence would have been 
more difficult if Okinawans had acquired full political rights and made their own decisions 
for the islands. Democracy was compromised and distorted in practice for the sake of the 
American military interests in Okinawa.  
In the early 1950s, the American forces began further land appropriation for 
military base construction. They used bayonets to repress Okinawans and bulldozers to 
destroy buildings (Wohl 1954). The forceful land appropriation resulted in serious 
Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military governance (Kyan 1964; Okinawa Prefecture 
1996; Senaga 1971). In 1953, the American Consular Unit on Okinawa sent a report 
entitled “Procedures Established for Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Ryukyus (Murfin 
1953) to the State Department regarding the land issue. It reveals that “a large number of 
Military Police stood by to prevent any attempts at resistance and the families of the 
farmers hastily endeavored to salvage their crops” (Murfin 1953). The report also includes 
issues of legality of the land appropriation and indicates that the USCAR attempted to issue 
an ordinance as “a legal basis for acquisition of land"4
                                                 
4 1. Prevention of U.S. Permanent Land Use by a Lump Sum Payment, 2. Proper Compensation for the 
 (Murfin 1953). In March, 1953, the 
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ordinance5
 The ordinance was hardly persuasive for Okinawans who had a strong attachment 
to their land. The resistance grew, and in 1954, the GRI legislative assembly adopted ‘Four 
Principles to Protect Land’ against the ordinance. In 1955, in order to settle the land 
problem, the House Committee on Armed Services sent a group of inspectors led by 
Congressman Melvin Price to Okinawa. The resulting Price Report released in 1956 
recommended a lump-sum payment formula and further land appropriation for military use. 
In response to the USCAR treatment of Okinawans for the land issue, a telegram from 
American Consul in Naha to the Secretary of State indicates that the “military operates 
Okinawa as though there were no Okinawans on the Island” (Steeves 1956b).  
 was issued. Moreover, in 1954, the USCAR announced a policy of permanent 
land use for military bases by a lump-sum payment.  
 As a consequence of the Price recommendation, Okinawans’ resistance against the 
presence of American military bases grew further. In 1956, the collective resistance 
“shimagurumi tousou (All-Island Struggle)” took place. However, the USCAR 
characterized the political upheaval on Okinawa as a mere communist action and tried to 
suppress political activities of certain individuals (Department of the Army 1957; Steeves 
1956b). In the late 1950s, as the USCAR’s mishandling of Okinawa became apparent, the 
State Department began to realize the limitations of military governance (MacArthur II 
1958). In the early 1960s, Okinawans’ movement became more systematic, but the USCAR 
reaction was still suppressive. The third High Commissioner of the USCAR, lieutenant 
general Paul Caraway, strengthened military control over Okinawa's politics and economy. 
The political and economic control had wide repercussions for Okinawa. As a result, the 
American President, Kennedy, dismissed Caraway.   
 After the mid 1960s, Okinawa became a staging site for the Vietnam War. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Appropriated Land, 3. Compensation for Damage on Land, 4. Release of Unused Land and Prevention 
of Further Land Appropriation 
5 Ordinance 109 “Land Acquisition Procedure” states “Whereas the United States has certain require-
ments concerning the use and possession of land in the Ryukyu Islands and whereas there are no provi-
sions of Ryukyuan law whereby such requirements may be satisfied, it is deemed appropriate and neces-
sary to establish procedures for the acquisition of and just compensation for such interests in land as the 
United States must have for the carrying out of its responsibility in the Ryukyu Islands.” 
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American soldiers stationed in Okinawa before dispatch to Vietnam committed serious 
crimes on Okinawa, and several military related accidents took place. In 1970, several 
thousand Okinawans engaged in a violent protest against the military presence. In such a 
difficult atmosphere, the U.S. started negotiations for reversion of Okinawa with the 
Japanese government. The American military project of making and normalizing a state of 
exception on Okinawa failed, but the Japanese government eventually contracted with the 
U.S. to continue the project. I will continue my analysis of U.S. military governance of 
Okinawa and Okinawans’ resistance in relation to another tactic, that of “concealment,” and 
Okinawa reversion negotiations between the U.S. and Japan in the next chapter. I argue that 
Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military governance in Okinawa and U.S. military failure 
in deployment of “concealment” contributed to reversion of administrative rights over 
Okinawa to Japan.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The U.S. military used excessive force to create a state of exception in Okinawa during the 
Pacific War. The military forcibly appropriated Okinawans’ land and suspended political 
rights. At the beginning of the period of U.S. military occupation in Okinawa, the U.S. 
military policy in Okinawa was provisional since the U.S. government was hesitant to 
expand its territory with regard to international agreements. As the Cold War progressed, 
the U.S. security interests in the Okinawa Islands, as a keystone of the Pacific, outweighed 
American commitment to democratic principles. The U.S. military began to focus on ways 
to establish a longer term presence in Okinawa. For Okinawans, who were exposed to U.S. 
military violence, the rationales provided by the American military for its governance in 
Okinawa, such as democratization and security of the Far East, were not acceptable reasons 
for the U.S. military presence. Consequently, as I introduced in chapter 2, Okinawans began 
to undertake organized resistance to the U.S. military in Okinawa. In short, the U.S. 
military successfully created a state of exception in Okinawa, but its tactics of 
“provisionality” and “rationalization” began to fail at the beginning of the Cold War. As a 
result, normalization of its state of exception became a difficult task for the U.S. military in 
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Okinawa.  
Another tactic of “concealment” helped the U.S. military endure its presence in 
Okinawa, but Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military administration in Okinawa began 
to reveal what was hidden. As a result, the U.S. military governance in Okinawa became 
political and economic burdens for the U.S. government. Meanwhile, the Japanese Prime 
Minister, Sato, was interested in regaining the administrative rights of Okinawa from the 
U.S. government. He secretly negotiated with the U.S. government and agreed to allow 
continuous U.S. military presence in Okinawa. In the next chapter, I will examine the U.S. 
military tactic of “concealment” as one of contributing factors that sustained the U.S. 
military administration in Okinawa. Moreover, I will present how Sato concealed 
unfavorable information about Okinawa reversion and attempted to provide a rationale for 
the policies employed by Japan in governing Okinawa by providing Okinawa with financial 
subsidies.  
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Chapter 6: Confidential Exception 
6.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I examined how the U.S. military constructed and maintained its 
military bases in Okinawa. The U.S. military was able to seize the Okinawa Islands and 
began to implement its practice of exceptional governance with the occasional exercise of 
physical force. As the ideological tension between the U.S. and communist states 
intensified, the U.S. military expanded the scale of military bases and claimed its authority 
for a longer term presence. Within the Cold War international politics in the late 1940s and 
the early 1950s, U.S. military policy began to lose its provisional elements. Moreover, the 
democratic ideal was compromised in practice since it was not commensurable with the 
increasing U.S. security and defence interests. Therefore, for Okinawans, the discourse of 
democracy was mere rhetoric that did not provide them with a substantive political means 
to better their living by their own decisions. Consequently, the American discourse of 
democracy did not contain hegemonic power over Okinawans, and the U.S. military could 
not legitimize its governance by presenting a democratic agenda to Okinawans. Having two 
dysfunctional tactics of “provisionality” and “rationalization,” the USCAR could not 
normalize its state of exception in Okinawa and had to face escalating resistance by 
Okinawans.  
 In this chapter, I examine how another tactic, that of “concealment,” prolonged 
U.S. military governance in Okinawa, but also posed problems in normalizing the 
American state of exception. The U.S. military concealed information about Okinawans’ 
resistance to its administration as well as the reality of Okinawans’ hardships under 
American exception (Monna 1996). Despite these intentional efforts to contain information, 
military problems, such as military accidents and soldiers’ crimes, began to be leaked by 
American, Japanese and Okinawan individuals and also reported by media inside and 
outside Okinawa. As a result, the tactic of “concealment” collapsed, and the maintenance of 
exceptional administration became a more difficult task for the USCAR. Meanwhile, the 
Prime Minister of Japan, Eisaku Sato, schemed to accomplish Okinawa reversion to Japan 
as part of his own personal political agenda. Sato also employed the tactic of 
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“concealment” not only to realize the reversion, but also to maintain the American 
exception. He concealed terms contained in the negotiations with the U.S. over reversion of 
Okinawa that could have been politically troublesome for him and allowed the U.S. 
military exception to continue in the post reversion era. Moreover, in order to mitigate 
Okinawans’ distress and immediate resistance to the continued military presence, the 
Japanese government sidestepped the military issues and implemented a policy to advance 
economic investment for Okinawan development.  
 
6.1 Failed Concealment 
The U.S. military tried to conceal facts about Okinawans’ hardships, struggles and 
resistance during its administration in Okinawa (Monna 1996). Travels from and to 
Okinawa were regulated, and reports about Okinawa were carefully monitored by the U.S. 
military. As a result, military problems in Okinawa were not thoroughly recognized outside 
Okinawa in the early years of military occupation (Oota 1984). The land struggles in the 
mid 1950s and anti-military reversion movement in the 1960s made the U.S. government 
aware of the military mishandling of Okinawa. Meanwhile, American military intervention 
in the Vietnam War caused further hardships among Okinawans. The Okinawa Islands 
became a military outpost for the Vietnam War, and many American soldiers were stationed 
on the islands. Soldiers’ crimes and military accidents contributed to hostility and resistance 
to the USCAR among Okinawans. In the 1960s, the USCAR tied to control Okinawans 
through betterment of civil programs that included education, but it could not resolve the 
Okinawans’ resistance against the U.S. military. Together with the two tactics of 
“provisionality” and “rationalization,” the American tactic of “concealment” eventually 
reached its limit. Consequently, the military administration of Okinawa became a 
significant economic and political burden for the U.S. government. Therefore, the U.S. 
government had to seek alternative ways to maintain its military presence and save 
appearances and expenditures at the same time. In this section, I present several examples 
of “concealment” as a tactic of governance employed by the U.S .military. Eventual U.S. 
military failure in deployment of this tactic caused further difficulties for U.S. military 
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governance in Okinawa.  
 
6.1.1 Okinawans’ Resistance 
As I introduced in Chapter 5, the GRI had legislative, judicial and administrative structures, 
but did not function as an autonomous political body. The USCAR had superior authority 
and kept refusing GRI decisions when the U.S. military objectives were threatened. As the 
Cold War progressed, military burden on Okinawa as the American Keystone of the Pacific 
was intensifying. Around the mid-1950s, Okinawans began to be aware that the quasi-
democratic functions and limited political authority of GRI were not sufficient to warrant 
fundamental human rights for Okinawans. Consequently, Okinawans started organizing 
island-wide resistance and also publicizing the military problems in Okinawa (Kyan 1964). 
In 1958, the Okinawans’ land struggle that was caused by the forceful land appropriation 
and the Price Recommendation was settled with the intervention of the American State 
Department, but problems arising from U.S. military handling of Okinawa remained.  
Some studies, such as those by Okudaira (2010), Oguma (1998) and Kyan (1964), 
suggest that action to resolve problems related to military bases, education and labour were 
key agendas of the civil movements. These seemingly separate agendas were consolidated 
into an organized reversion movement (fukki undou). The reversion movement was seeking 
affiliation of Okinawa with Japan, a nation which had experienced significant social and 
economic development since the end of the war. In contrast to the post-war Japanese 
situation, Okinawa suffered from military risks and lower socioeconomic standards in the 
1940s and 1950s. In the late 1950s, military accidents and soldiers’ crimes caught 
Okinawans’ public attention and contributed to demands by Okinawans for reversion to 
Japan (Kyan 1964). Their struggles with the U.S. military presence were not only for 
protection of their land rights or development of social welfare, but also for protection of 
their lives against U.S. military violence. For Okinawans, who are well known for their 
anti-militaristic positions, the U.S. military presence did not assure security, but caused 
unusual and unacceptable incidents of deaths and other risks (Fukuchi 1995; Hiyane 2005). 
Consequently, the movement that campaigned for reversion contained an agenda of 
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affiliation with the Japanese pacifist constitution in order to end the military related 
problems (Kyan 1964). Okinawans believed that suspended fundamental political rights, 
such as those of legislation, judicature, and freedom of speech and travel, would be granted 
as administrative rights of Okinawa returned to Japan (Kyan 1964). The USCAR could not 
provide fundamental resolutions for the military problems. In the early 1960s, as a 
consequence of the American military interventions in the Vietnam War, the military burden 
on Okinawa increased, and some Okinawans began to rely on more radical means to alter 
their political situations. 
 
6.1.2 Concealed Exception 
The suppression by the U.S. Military Governments and USCAR of unsettling facts about 
Okinawans’ circumstances and resistance was oriented to avoid critiques and resistance 
inside and outside Okinawa. In Okinawa, newspaper publication started in 1945. The first 
post-war newspaper, Uruma Shinpou, was funded and censored by the U.S. Military 
Government. Since the Uruma Shinpou for the Military Government was a media device to 
support the smooth implementation of military governance, it could not carry news that was 
inconvenient for the U.S. military presence (Arasaki 1999). It contained very few articles 
reporting on American soldiers’ crimes on Okinawa (Arasaki 1999). According to Monna 
(1996), the U.S. Military Government did not provide a clear standard of censorship. 
Nevertheless, American executives on Okinawa provided “limitations of freedom of 
critique” in media through consultation with Okinawan local elites (Monna 1996).  
Okinawans were given the message that they had to believe American military 
personnel were sincerely doing their best for Okinawans, and Americans were willing to 
correct wrong doings (Monnna 1996). For example, Uruma Shinpou (Funabashi 1999) 
carried an article (6 Feb 1948) that encouraged Okinawans to report American crimes in 
Okinawa. The reality of American military governance differed from the rhetoric, and the 
consultation was merely to suppress freedom of speech on Okinawa that could conflict with 
American military governance (Monna 1996). When media did not comply with the 
agendas, the U.S. military prohibited or punished the publication (Monna 1996). Two cases 
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of American suppression of media, for instance, occurred in 1950: Jinmin Bunka (People’s 
Culture) and Ryukyu Nippou (Ryukyu Daily). Jinmin Bunkasha carried an article written by 
Kamejirou Senaga that criticized an unclear transaction that occurred within the Okinawa 
development budget (Monna 1996). The U.S. military suspended the publication license of 
Jinmin Bunkasha, claiming that the magazine had made unfair accusations against certain 
individuals or groups (Monna 1996). Ryukyu Nippou carried correspondence between two 
contributors regarding U.S. military aid in Okinawa (Monnna 1996). One contributor, 
Uema, wrote that Okinawans should accept aid from the U.S. military, and the other 
contributor, Kawahira, replied to Uema that receiving the aid was a beggar’s attitude 
(Monna 1996). In response, Uema argued that Okinawans should not be shamed out of the 
aid because the prosperity of the U.S. people in the post-war era was to no small extent 
founded on the sacrifice of Okinawans (Monna 1996). The U.S. Military Government sent 
Uema and a Ryukyu Nippou editor, Urasaki, to the U.S. military court for their hostility to 
the U.S. military (Monnna 1996). Uema was sentenced to nine months in prison and 
suspended for two years, and Urasaki was sentenced to eighteen months in prison and 
suspended for two years (Monna 1996).  
Fukuchi (1995) conducted an interview with people who were victims of or 
bereaved by military accidents and soldiers’ crimes. Fukuchi (1995) argues that there had 
been inadequate judgements in assessing these accidents and crimes, so that the victims and 
bereaved were not provided with proper compensation. For example, in 1948, an accidental 
detonation of collected unexploded bombs caused 103 deaths and 109 injuries of 
Okinawans. The U.S. military did not make monetary compensation, but provided each 
Okinawan sufferer with a ration and a blanket. In 1967, after a long and painstaking 
petition by Okinawa sufferers to the USCAR and the Japanese government, monetary 
compensation was eventually made by the USCAR. In the preface, Fukuchi (1995) argues 
from his own experience that, until the late 1950s, making public any damage or loss of 
human bodies by Americans was regarded as an anti-American action, so that it took great 
courage for Okinawans to demand compensation from the U.S. military. After reversion, it 
was made public that large numbers of victims had not been compensated for accidents and 
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crimes (Fukuchi 1995). As a result of another petition by Okinawans, it was decided that 
the Japanese government would subrogate the compensation. Fukuchi’s research illustrates 
that facts about Okinawans’ hardships caused by the U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ 
crimes did not receive adequate attentions from the U.S. military and Okinawans did not 
have means to make these issues widely acknowledged inside and outside Okinawa.   
 The tactic of “concealment” was also employed to prevent leaks of damaging 
information about the Okinawans’ situation from reaching beyond Okinawa. As one 
advantage of the USCAR control over the islands, Steeves stated that Okinawa was “far 
enough removed from the mainland to provide isolation of the problem area” (Steeves 
1956a). He did not explore why the isolation was an advantage for the USCAR in his 
report. Given his dissatisfaction with the USCAR governance in 1957, it seems that he was 
not willing to publicize what was not presentable as a showcase. Isolation of Okinawa was 
not only Steeves’s idea, but a shared practice since the beginning of military occupation. It 
was only in 1949 that American journalists were allowed to freely observe Okinawa for the 
first time (Monna 1996). Even after 1949, publication and reports abroad about Okinawa 
were checked by the U.S. military. For example, in 1956, the U.S. military acquired 
information about an article in Contemporary Issues, which carries articles on human rights 
issues (Davis 1956). One man who had been to Okinawa attended a meeting of the 
Contemporary group and reported it to an American colonel. The Contemporary group was 
critical of the American military presence on Okinawa. One participant of the meeting said:  
 
it is about time that someone has the guts enough to stand up and give out 
the facts about the conditions on Okinawa … the Army is purposely 
keeping under cover and trying to eliminate the reports prepared by the 
Scientific Board that the Army invited out to the Ryukyus (Davis 1956). 
  
The executive director to the military side suggested:  
 
There are many rotten apples in the Okinawan barrel, and if it gets before 
the American public, there will be an investigation that will have many 
heads rolling. This investigation would seriously hurt American prestige 
throughout the world (Davis 1956) 
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The report of the meeting was also sent to the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. The 
executive director wrote to the Office that, “I am happy that I can keep an eye on them” 
(Davis 1956) and attached a personal letter from the author of the article.  
 The initial prohibition of journalist activities and related correspondence are 
examples of how “concealment” of military problems in Okinawa worked as a tactic to 
maintain stable governance. The capacity to maintain this “concealment” began to break as 
Okinawans’ resistance grew. In 1956, Kamejirou Senaga was elected to be a mayor of Naha 
city. He was publicly critical of the Price recommendation as well as the American military 
presence in general (Senaga 1971). Therefore, Senaga was an unfavorable local political 
leader for the USCAR. The USCAR tried to make him resign from his post by cutting 
subsidies and freezing the bank account of Naha city. With Naha citizens’ support, Senaga 
was able to allow the city to manage self governance. Prior to the election, in 1954, Senaga 
was accused of sheltering two communist party members (Senaga 1971). The U.S. Civil 
Administration Courts sentenced him to two years in prison. The High Commissioner of the 
USCAR, James Edward Moore, amended a Civil Administration ordinance and 
disenfranchised the eligibility of ex-convicts for election. Senaga was suspended from the 
post, but his case received Okinawans’ attention and support contributing to island wide 
resistance to USCAR’s oppression. Afterwards, this incident also drew the attention of the 
U.S. State Department. The State Department suggested joint governance of the islands 
with the Army Department to avoid further political difficulty. The Army’s response in 
1958 was: 
 
The administration of the Ryukyus is … a responsibility of the 
Department of the Army which it cannot share with other agencies… we 
cannot evade our responsibility by instituting a system of joint reporting 
and joint decision-making… However, following the Senaga incident we 
have reiterated to the High Commissioner the necessity for advance 
reporting on important matters (Department of the Army 1957) 
 
The Senaga incident did not ameliorate the USCAR policies or High Commissioners’ 
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attitudes, and the reversion movement continued in the 1960s. Okinawans made organized 
petitions to American and Japanese governments. It turned out that Okinawans were not the 
docile “Other” for the USCAR personnel.  
 
6.1.3 Costs of Okinawa Governance 
The U.S. had to deal with political and economic costs of its military administration in 
Okinawa. As the Vietnam War intensified, both kinds of costs imposed a further burden in 
the mid 1960s. Initially, a major USCAR expense was allocated for military infrastructure, 
and therefore public welfare and service on Okinawa were not matters of primary concern. 
For example, in 1950, Chobyo Yara, an Okinawan educator who visited Japan proper was 
surprised to see the post-war development of Japan and recognized disparities between 
educational services in Japan and Okinawa (Okudaira 2010). He saw abundant study-aid 
books and a three-story reinforced-concrete schoolhouse that was, he assumed, something 
that would not be built on Okinawa (Okudaira 2010). On Okinawa, some classrooms were 
held under tents without teaching materials or blackboards (Okudaira 2010).  
As mentioned earlier, dissatisfaction among Okinawan teachers became one of 
major driving forces of the reversion movement. In 1952, a meeting of school principals 
passed a resolution in support of reversion. In the same year, they established the Okinawa 
kyoushokuinkai (teachers association) and petitioned the GRI Legislature for reversion. 
Also in the same year, the Okinawa kyoushokuinkai played a central role in re-organizing 
the Association for Promoting Reversion (fukki kiseikai in Japanese, originally established 
in 1951). Yara initially believed that the reversion movement was an ethnic matter and 
should not involve political actions (Kyan 1964). Dissatisfied with the state of political 
suspension and the USCAR’s suppression, the reversion movement eventually became 
politicized in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1960, the Council for the Reversion of Okinawa 
Prefecture to the Fatherland (commonly called fukkikyou in Japanese) was established. The 
Council was a collaborative body of both political parties and civil society, so that both 
political and civil affairs were involved in the reversion movement.  
 In order to maintain the military bases on Okinawa, the USCAR tried to control 
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the reversion movement by increasing public assistance in the late 1960s. The Department 
of Army requested a supplementary budget in 1968 for the next fiscal year. The 
fundamental objective of the public assistance was that: 
 
Our bases on Okinawa are most important to our Far East defense 
posture, and to our effort in Vietnam. The assistance provided to the 
civilian population of the Ryukyu Islands helps ensure continued 
acquiescence of the inhabitants of these islands in our administration, and 
thus contribute to the free use of our bases there. (Secretary of Defense 
1966) 
 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. military seizure and administration of 
Okinawa were contradictory to the principle of American democracy. For the U.S. military, 
Okinawa’s prior role was a keystone of the Pacific, and Okinawans’ political rights were of 
secondary concern. When “concealment” of the state of suspension became impossible, and 
resistance by Okinawans escalated in response to military accidents and soldiers’ crimes, 
the USCAR tried to allay Okinawans’ anti-military and anti-American mood by offering 
public assistance. Nevertheless, the reversion movement by Okinawans did not calm down. 
Initial American confidence for governance of Okinawa turned out to be a challenging task, 
and the U.S. government began to recognize political disadvantage of long term USCAR 
governance in Okinawa.  
 
6.2 Sato’s Misreading of Okinawan Politics 
As the Cold War tension progressed towards the late 1940s, the U.S. began to see Japan as 
a potential ally of liberal democracy. For the U.S., Japan itself was a key geopolitical site in 
the Far East with respect to its interest to check ideological rival states such as the U.S.S.R 
and China. Therefore, the U.S. government carefully negotiated with the Japanese 
government in order to assure a close bilateral relationship without compromising its 
security interest in the Far East. The State Department concerned the political situation of 
Okinawa with respect to the USCAR’s mishandling of Okinawa, since it could threaten the 
bilateral alliance with Japan. Moreover, the U.S. did not apply the UN trusteeship system 
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that could risk the alliance even though the potential application was stated in the Peace 
Treaty. In the mid 1960s, Japanese Prime Minister Sato began to negotiate with the U.S. 
government for Okinawa reversion, and the U.S. government finally agreed to return the 
administrative rights of Okinawa to Japan. Nevertheless, he was ignorant about the U.S. 
government’s anxiety regarding U.S. military issues in Okinawa and failed to resolve the 
problem of the state of exception that continued on Okinawa. His tactic was to leave 
sensitive articles as indefinite as possible and to conceal conditions of reversion such as 
continuous free use of military bases by the U.S. military in Okinawa after reversion that 
could have fueled protest in Okinawa because Japanese officials betrayed the interests of 
Okinawans. In this section, I discuss how Sato managed to proceed and conclude the 
Okinawa reversion agreement by employing a tactic of “concealment.” 
Okinawans felt their islands were officially separated from Japan proper under 
Article 3 of the Peace Treaty in 1952 (Kyan 1964; Senaga 1971). According to the Article, 
the U.S. could decide whether Okinawa should be under the trusteeship system and the 
U.S. could be responsible for administration. The U.S. military continued its governance 
for 27 years, but the trusteeship system was not applied. While the U.S. Army Department 
wanted to continue occupation, the U.S. State Department hesitated to officially incorporate 
Okinawa into American territory (Miyazato 1986). As a result, any decision on the 
sovereignty of Okinawa was prolonged for an indeterminate period. With regard to the 
sovereignty of Okinawa, Sato stated in the Diet that delegates of the U.S. and U.K. 
recognized Japanese residual sovereignty at the peace conference in San Francisco 
(American Embassy, Tokyo 1969). Meanwhile, the U.S. was a sole administrator and had 
“the rights to exercise all or part of the administrative, legislative and judicial rights over 
the territory” (American Embassy, Tokyo 1969). In other words, sovereignty over Okinawa 
was split into Japanese residual sovereignty and American administrative rights. As a result, 
Okinawa was neither separated from nor fully belonged to Japan for 27 years, and 
Okinawans were governed under a state of exception.  
Japan relied almost solely on the U.S. for the post-war reconstruction project, 
including matters of security, for which the Japanese government was willing to allocate 
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space and budgetary resources for the American military presence. Meanwhile, anti-war 
and anti-American military movements took place in Japan and Okinawa. In particular, 
negotiation for revised extension of the Security Treaty with the U.S. caused a nation-wide 
student and leftist protest in the late 1950s. As Okinawans’ hardships and political situation 
in Okinawa became well publicized, connections among leftist movements in Okinawa and 
Japan proper were strengthened to an extent that Japanese politicians needed to deal with 
the Okinawa reversion matter.  
In 1965, Sato visited Okinawa and stated that Japan’s post-war reconstruction was 
incomplete unless Okinawa reversion was realized (Wakaizumi 1994). Sato began to 
investigate the possibility of Okinawa reversion and negotiate with the American 
government. He could not recognize that the U.S. government was concerned with the 
political and economic costs of Okinawa occupation. Kei Wakaizumi, who was Sato’s 
personal envoy to the U.S., emphasized in his publication the political difficulty of 
Okinawa reversion since Okinawa was a critical keystone of the U.S. for the Vietnam War 
(Wakaizumi 1994). With Sato’s visit to the U.S., American and Japanese governments 
began formal negotiation for Okinawa reversion in 1969. According to a memorandum by 
the Secretary of State, the U.S. side had assumed that it would be difficult to negotiate 
continuous use of Okinawa for military bases after reversion. It reads: 
 
The Japanese have gone somewhat further than we originally expected in 
the public assurances that they will give on our ability to use Okinawa 
bases, as well as those in Japan proper (Rogers 1969)  
 
 For the U.S., the reversion negotiation went far better than they had expected. A 
prior objective it held for Okinawa occupation was an exclusive use of the islands for 
American military bases, and the Japanese government agreed with free use of the islands 
for the U.S. military bases after the reversion. Moreover, in return for the Okinawa 
reversion, the Japanese government agreed to extend the Security Treat in 1970. The 
Security Treaty includes SOFA (U.S. – Japan Status of Forces Agreement) that allows the 
application of American criminal laws to American soldiers’ crimes committed in Japan. 
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Under the SOFA, Japanese citizens are not protected by the Japanese laws against U.S. 
military accidents and soldiers crimes, and the Japanese government has to provide the U.S. 
military with facilities and budgets to maintain the U.S. military presence in Japan (Gabe 
2002). Therefore, the negotiation and extension of the treaty in 1970 were sensitive matters. 
Sato tried to legitimate the U.S. military presence on Okinawa after reversion by 
emphasizing its security advantage of the U.S. military presence. He answered in the Diet 
that: 
The Government is now exploring means by which the people’s wish for 
the early reversion of the administrative rights over Okinawa can be 
realized, in a way which is most in harmony with the national interests 
of our country, centering on the point of how it can be realized without 
impairing the important security role which the United States Forces’ 
bases in Okinawa are playing for our country and the Far East, including 
our country (American Embassy, Tokyo 1969) 
 
However, the anti-American military and anti-Security Treaty movement continued in both 
Okinawa and Japan proper. In this sense, Sato failed to provide a rationale for the 
continuing American military presence. Meanwhile, he continued to make possible a 
concession to the U.S. for earlier reversion during his term as Prime Minister.  
The reversion movement involved multiple agendas including civil affairs, but as 
the military burden increased on Okinawa due to the Vietnam War, Okinawans began to 
focus on an anti-war agenda. The slogan of reversion was “anti-war (hansen) reversion 
(hukki).” According to Nishiyama (2007), the U.S. side recognized that Sato was eager to 
conclude the reversion negotiation as early as possible for his own political ambition. 
Taking advantage of Sato’s ambition, the U.S. could lead the negotiation so as to maintain 
its military presence on Okinawa without being responsible for direct governance of the 
whole islands. Although Sato publicly stated the three anti-nuclear principles that prohibit 
possession, manufacture and introduction of nuclear weapons, he agreed that the U.S. could 
not only maintain a post-reversion military presence and free use of bases, but could also 
introduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa in times of emergency. In the anti-war atmosphere 
in Japan and Okinawa, Sato was not able to publicize the agreement, and in fact kept it 
secret (Nishiyama 2007).  
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Many confidential documents related to the Okinawa reversion negotiations have 
been released in the U.S. (Nishiyama 2007), but several agreements Sato made were kept 
secret in Japan for a long time. Wakaizumi (1994) admitted that Sato signed a secret 
agreement to allow the U.S. to introduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa. Although evidence 
of secret agreements has been released in the U.S. through official and unofficial channels 
(Nishiyama 2007), the Japanese government has not acknowledged existence of written 
secret documents. Officially, the government admitted that there was a secret agreement 
regarding introduction of nuclear weapons only in a broad sense. In 1974, Sato was 
awarded a Nobel peace prize for representing the Japanese will for peace. Nevertheless, as 
the materials that revealed secret negotiations of reversion were released in the 1990s, his 
adherence to the three antinuclear principles became known to be myth (Nishiyama 2007). 
 
6.3 Succeeding a State of Exception 
Consequences of the secret reversion negotiation included not only the continued presence 
of U.S. military bases, but also furthered inequalities within the Japanese-American 
bilateral relationship. In addition to the nuclear weapons deal, Sato secretly agreed with the 
U.S. that the Japanese government covers some expenses associated with reversion for 
which the U.S. was supposed to be fully responsible. Furthermore, Japan began to provide 
the U.S. with additional payments (Omoiyari Yosan6
The reversion of Okinawa to Japan relieved the U.S. from the political and 
) in 1978. The secret negotiation 
created a path in which the U.S. could continuously rely on Japan to offset much of the 
financial and political burden associated with its military presence. Additionally, the 
Japanese government used financial means from the reversion arrangement to fulfill some 
of the necessary Japanese contributions to Okinawa. In this section, I will summarize some 
consequences of the reversion for the U.S. and Japan. I argue that the Okinawa reversion 
did not relieve Okinawans from a state of exception, but the Japanese government 
succeeded the U.S. military role to normalize the U.S. military exceptionalism.  
                                                 
6 It is also called “Host Nation Support” or “financial support towards welfare benefits and allowance of 
U.S. forces stationed in Japan.” 
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economic burden it had borne as an administrator. Sato’s concessions in the reversion 
negotiation enabled the U.S. not only to run military bases with a much lower financial 
cost, but also to avoid administrative responsibility. The U.S. military failed to establish a 
local political institution through which it could indirectly govern the islands during its 
occupation of Okinawa. Therefore, it was not able to normalize the exceptional regime 
through modern disciplinary mechanisms. After the reversion, the U.S. indirectly 
maintained the state of exception on Okinawa through the Japanese government. While the 
U.S. was relieved from the economic and political costs of administration over Okinawa, 
the Japanese government needed to find ways in which to meet U.S. military demand and 
mitigate Okinawans’ resistance at the same time. In the process of negotiations for 
reversion, it became clear that Japan could not provide the islands with mainland status. 
The continuing presence of American military bases in post-reversion was for Okinawans 
an unacceptable condition of reversion (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). As a result, Okinawans 
began to express their frustration and anger upon recognizing that inequality between 
Okinawa and Japan proper would continue in the post-reversion era, especially after 
incidents drew attention to the consequences of these conditions. For example, in 1970, an 
American soldier’s car accident triggered a violent protest in Okinawa. Several hundred 
Okinawans burned and destroyed American vehicles and facilities. The incident, Koza 
boudou (uprising), was a reaction to the long-term and continuous military problems on 
Okinawa (Takamine 1984).  
 The Japanese government has regularly relied on granting subsidies for the 
economic development of Okinawa in order to control Okinawans’ dissatisfaction related to 
reversion. For example, in 1971, the Japanese government started a project to host an 
international fair aimed at the promotion of industry and technology, Exposition ’75 
(Okinawa kokusai kaiyou hakurankai), and subsidized infrastructure in Okinawa. In the 
post-reversion era, the Japanese government has implemented various and continuous 
economic development projects through official development boards, but infrastructural 
projects have contributed more to Japanese corporations than to the local economy 
(Yamada 2012). Moreover, a major part of maintenance fees for U.S. military bases has 
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been covered by the Japanese government (Gabe 2002). For Okinawans, the U.S. military 
bases were significant sources of income during the American occupation. By investing a 
large budget in the military industry, the Japanese government has fostered Okinawans’ 
reliance on the military bases, so that some Okinawans assume that the Okinawan economy 
requires the military presence. This financial assistance provides Okinawa with a temporary 
economic gain. Moreover, by creating Okinawa’s structural reliance on subsidies and base-
related industry, the Japanese government has attempted to justify the U.S. military 
presence in Okinawa. I elaborate on how the Japanese subsidies in Okinawa after the 
reversion represented as a tactic of “rationalization” in the next chapter. 
Military accidents and American soldiers’ crimes are still problems in Okinawa 
today. For those accidents and crimes, according to the Security Treaty, the U.S. military 
has superior authority to investigate and judge relative to the Japanese police and courts. In 
this sense, the state of exception wherein Okinawans’ judicial rights are suspended, 
continues to exist in the post reversion era. What the reversion changed was not the 
political suspension itself, but who maintains the exception. Okinawans’ resistance to the 
U.S. military presence in the post-reversion era indicates that the Japanese government has 
not succeeded in normalizing the exception and realizing hegemonic control over 
Okinawans. Despite Okinawans’ dissatisfaction and resistance against the U.S. military 
presence on their islands, the Japanese government has succeeded in maintaining and 
concentrating the U.S. military bases in Okinawa through non-violent tactics of 
governance. Along with the financial means, the Japanese government also has employed 
tactics of “concealment” and “provisionality” in order to sustain the U.S. military bases in 
Okinawa. In the next chapter, I examine, in more detail, how the Japanese government has 
sustained the U.S. military presence – which still causes violent problems in Okinawa – 
through multiple tactics of governance.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Despite Okinawans’ concerns about the long-term U.S. military presence and contradictions 
between American democracy and security interests, the U.S. military managed to sustain 
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its presence as governing authority for 27 years. The “provisionality” of its governance was 
lost in the Cold War international politics, and Okinawans did not share the security reasons 
with the U.S. military, but the American tactic of “concealment” contributed to continuance 
of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Towards the late 1950s, Okinawans’ resistance 
began to be publicized, and it became a significant political concern for the U.S. 
government. Additionally, betterment of social welfare in Okinawa was an economic 
burden for the U.S. government. Sato’s proposal for Okinawa reversion was presented to 
the U.S. government which was facing increasing difficulties with its military governance 
in Okinawa. Sato’s ignorance and impatience resulted in American advantage in the course 
of the Japan-U.S. bilateral negotiations for the Okinawa reversion. Consequently, the 
Japanese government agreed to sustain the U.S. military bases. Sato and his close advisers 
concealed terms of the Japan-U.S. agreements that represented major concessions made by 
Japan. As it became clear that the U.S. military bases would continue to remain in 
Okinawa, Okinawans began to express their dissatisfaction with the conditions of reversion. 
In order to mitigate the Okinawans’ dissatisfaction, the Japanese government began to 
provide Okinawa with subsidies.  
 In the post-reversion era, the Japanese government has continued to employ 
economic measures in order to justify its approach to governance of Okinawa. While the 
Japanese government has not been successful in justifying the U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa by means of a discourse of security, it has been able to control local politics of 
Okinawa by the economic measures. The Japanese government also has used economic and 
political provisional measures in sustaining the U.S. military presence. Moreover, the 
Japanese government decided in secret terms and conditions within the Security Treaty that 
legalized the U.S. military exception in Okinawa. In the next chapter, I will examine these 
tactics of “rationalization,” “provisionality” and “concealment” along with analysis of 
Okinawan identity. I argue that Okinawans’ ambivalent identity – of otherness and 
sameness – for the majority of Japanese is a key element to understand why the U.S. 
military burden has been able to be imposed on Okinawans in the post World War II period. 
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Chapter 7: Governance by Japan 
7.0 Introduction 
The reversion of Okinawa to Japan did not grant Okinawans full legal rights; exceptional 
measures in Okinawa continued. The Japanese government succeeded USCAR in its role to 
administer Okinawa as well as to maintain the U.S. military presence. What Okinawans 
expected in reversion was not mere transfer of administrative rights (Oota 1984), but an 
improvement in their political, economic and social circumstances. Referring to the past 
experiences of hardships resulting from their relationship with Japan, some Okinawans 
have referred to the unsatisfactory reversion as the third Ryukyu shobun (disposition) 
(Miyamoto 1979) or argue that Okinawa again became a sacrificial stone for Japan 
(Fukuchi 1995). The Japanese government had to employ multiple tactics in order to 
control Okinawans’ resistance and to realize the reversion. The inconvenient terms 
produced through negotiations were concealed since they could fuel Okinawans’ resistance. 
Additionally, the Japanese government provided subsidies for Okinawa development and 
diverted the reversion issues into economic matters. Although Okinawans protested against 
the U.S. military presence, the Japanese government restored its administrative rights over 
Okinawa in 1972.  
 After the reversion, American military accidents and soldiers’ crimes continued to 
be significant problems in Okinawa. Under the terms of the Security Treaty, Okinawans’ 
political rights are still compromised. Consequently, the resistance by Okinawans to the 
U.S. military bases has taken place throughout the post-reversion period. In this sense, the 
Japanese government has not succeeded in making the state of exception a widely accepted 
rule for Okinawans. By employing multiple tactics through government channels, the 
Japanese government has controlled the Okinawans’ resistance and maintained the 
U.S .military bases for over forty years. In this chapter, I analyze what factors have made 
possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa” and “what is the 
significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa” in the post-reversion 
era. The analysis elaborates upon Foucault’s insights into governance. I argue that the 
Japanese government has attempted to make U.S .military exceptionalism in Okinawa an 
96 
accepted rule within the Japanese nation by multiple governing tactics that include 
“rationalization,” “provisionality” and “concealment.”  
 
7.1 Continued Exception 
Ibata (2010) points out the illegality of the American occupation of Okinawa. For example, 
the land appropriation after the Battle of Okinawa violated the Hague Convention that 
defines the lawful and unlawful acts regarding wars. Moreover, the U.S. proposal for the 
Trusteeship of Okinawa was supposed to be invalid since the U.S. recognized that Japan 
had residual sovereignty. I argue that the central issue regarding American occupation of 
Okinawa was not its illegality, but the supremacy that allowed the U.S. military to decide 
on exception. That is, given American military supremacy over Okinawa, the U.S. military 
could exercise its authority regardless of juridical constraint and acted in effect as a 
practical sovereign over Okinawa. The state of exception existed insofar as the U.S. 
military could act as a practical sovereign and impose its rules on Okinawans. The 
reversion movement and Japan-U.S. bilateral politics ended the USCAR regime, but the 
U.S. military presence and rules remained. In this chapter I examine how this presence has 
been able to be sustained and explore some of the major consequences it has produced. 
Firstly, this section introduces some cases and rules of exception. Secondly, I analyze 
identity of Okinawans within the Japanese nation in relation to the tactic of provisionality 
that has been employed by the Japanese government. I also examine how Okinawans have 
responded to the military problems on their islands.  
 
7.1.1 Crimes and Accidents 
Several cases of U.S. military accidents and soldiers crimes have not been investigated or 
punished under Japanese jurisdiction, but the Japanese government has allowed the U.S. to 
take police and judicial initiative. Japanese jurisdiction does not apply to some serious 
accidents and crimes committed by American military personnel due to the U.S. – Japan 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under the Peace Treaty Article VI. The SOFA grants 
superior authority to the U.S. for custody of American soldiers who commit crimes 
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(Arakaki 2010). As a result, in many cases, American crimes in Okinawa are unpunished, 
and suspects have managed to escape from Okinawa (Ryukyu Shinpou 1995). Two recent 
cases - one involving crimes committed by American soldiers and the other a military 
accident - illustrate some of the factors that emerge within the broader conditions in which 
many U.S. military accidents and soldiers' crimes are not met with adequately punishment 
of the offenders or compensation of the victims (Takasaku 2010). While both cases 
triggered island-wide resistance on the part of Okinawans, underlying these reactions were 
Okinawans’ frustration and anger that had accumulated over time (Nishitani 2012; Okinawa 
Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1995). 
A sexual assault case in 1995 caused island-wide resistance in Okinawa. A twelve 
year old girl was assaulted and injured by three American servicemen. The U.S. military 
initially rejected custody of the suspects as well as a police investigation by Japan. 
Prefectural and several municipal assemblies of Okinawa lodged resolutions against the 
U.S. military, and 85,000 people gathered at an island-wide rally (kenmin taikai). The tragic 
news spread to Japan proper resulting, for the first time since 1945, in the whole Japanese 
nation being involved in public protests against U.S. military crimes occurring in Okinawa. 
Rallies organized by various civil society groups, such as political associations, non-
governmental organizations, teachers’ associations, and Okinawans’ associations, took 
place in prefectures throughout Japan (Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1995).  
The news also spread to the U.S., and American media reported the news in 
unusual details over a long period, especially considering it was an incident in Okinawa. 
Major American newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post carried 
several articles covering not only the incident, but also the trial of the three accused soldiers 
and related matters (Associated Press 1995; Graham 1995). For example, the mothers of 
two of the three defendants demanded “to have the trial moved off Okinawa” since there 
was “antagonism toward United States bases” that could influence the judges (Associated 
Press 1995). This reaction from the two mothers was not surprising given that fact that 
many American soldiers’ crimes were judged by the military court. Moreover, the 
Washington Post reported a comment by Admiral Macke who was Commander of United 
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States Pacific Command on the incident, that the servicemen “could have hired a prostitute 
for the cost of the rental car in which the crime was committed” (Graham 1995). The three 
servicemen were eventually convicted and sentenced to 6.5-7 years each in prison at the 
Naha District Court, but the fundamental issues of SOFA and U.S. military presence have 
remained. In 1996, the Washington Post carried a small article that another case of sexual 
assault was “being handled through the military justice system” (Sullivan 1996).  
In another incident, in 2004, a military helicopter crashed into a university 
building. The U.S. military blockaded the accident site – part of university campus – for 
seven days and prohibited entry of Japanese civilians including police detectives and 
university personnel until the helicopter was removed (Kurosawa 2005). It was witnessed 
that, after extinguishing the fire, the U.S military personnel in protective clothing and 
masks sprayed a white chemical and carried away the soil and trees around the crash site 
(Kurosawa 2005). Leakage of a radioactive substance was suspected, but the U.S. military 
initially refused to provide the university with a clear explanation. After three weeks, the 
U.S military eventually admitted that their activities after the crash had something to do 
with a radioactive substance, that is, Strontium 90, contained in the helicopter safety 
device, but clear explanations have not been provided (Kurosawa 2005). According to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, under the Article XXIII of SOFA, the blockade was 
for protection of U.S. military property (Akahata Web Newspaper 2004). Arakaki (Akahata 
Web Newspaper 2004) argues that the U.S. police authority was not entitled to exercise its 
power in this case, and the blockage was an illegal activity even with reference to the 
SOFA. Kurosawa also argues that it clearly exceeded the prerogatives of American military 
under the SOFA (Kurosawa 2005). The events related to the helicopter accident represent a 
juridical contradiction of the SOFA and of American state of exception in Okinawa. 
Although the U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes are not secret information, media 
coverage of these incidents outside Okinawa is generally less enthusiastic and smaller in 
contrast to that within Okinawa (Ishihara 2006). Gen (2006) argues that Okinawans 
believed that mainland Japanese people felt sympathy for the Okinawans with regard to the 
U.S. military issues on the island in 1995 when the sexual assault case received 
99 
considerable attention. After a decade, it turned out to be gensou (illusion) that mainland 
Japanese people would share itami (pain) with Okinawans for U.S. military issues (Gen 
2006). Gen suggests that this illusion masks an image that Okinawa accepted the U.S. 
military burden in return for development support which had spread during the decade 
since 1995 (Gen 2006). Consequently, these incidents do not mobilize a nation-wide anti-
U.S. military movement. I argue that in the post-reversion era, the Japanese government has 
not been able to normalize the American exception, but has succeeded in enclosing the 
military problems within Okinawa through multiple tactics.  
 
7.1.2 Special and Provisional Okinawa 
“Provisionality” is one of these tactics that the Japanese government employed. The 
Japanese government used several provisional and special measures in its control and 
regulation of Okinawans with emphasis on Okinawans’ special status. In Japanese official 
discourse, Okinawa’s special status is expressed, and many special measures are applied to 
Okinawa. For example, general provisions of the Special Measure Law for Development of 
Okinawa (Okinawa Shinkou Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochihou Kenkyuukai 1974) state that the 
special measure for development is provided given Okinawa’s special circumstances. The 
special circumstances usually include Okinawans’ war experience, U.S. military 
administration, island environment, concentration of military bases, and fragile economy 
(Maedomari 2012). Moreover, the Special Measures Law for USFJ (United States Forces, 
Japan) Land Release (chuuryuu gunyouchi tokubetu sochi hou 1952) was applied to 
Okinawa. The Land Release Law was originally established to provide base sites for the 
U.S. military as required under the Security Treaty. This law makes it possible for foreign 
forces to be granted authority to use a given tract of land in Japan in cases when those 
forces are not able to conclude land rental agreements with an owner (Ministry of Defense 
2012). Because most sites provided in Japan proper were nationally-owned land, the terms 
of the law were applied for only forty-nine sites between 1953 and 1962 (Ministry of 
Defense 2012). On the other hand, the law has been applied to 75 sites on Okinawa since 
1982.  
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Between 1972 and 1982, the Japanese government employed legislation of 
specified duration on Okinawa to maintain the U.S. military presence. These laws were 
kouyouchi zantei shiyou hou (Act on Provisional Use of Official Area) and Okinawa kenno 
kuikinai niokeru ichikyoukai fumeichiikino kakuhituno tochino ichikyoukaino 
meikakukanado nikansuru tokubetsu sochihou (Act on Special Measures concerning Fixing 
of Boundaries of Each Land Lot in Districts Where Land Boundaries Are Not Clearly Fixed 
Located in Okinawa Prefecture). During the specified terms, the Japanese government 
aimed to purchase private real estate allocated for military bases while making continued 
expropriation of land legally possible. Given Okinawans’ attachment to land, the purchase 
of land was difficult. The Japanese government eventually applied the Land Release Law to 
Okinawa in 1982. Meanwhile, the Japanese government had to employ the provisional 
measures in order to make time for negotiations with the local land owners in Okinawa. 
The negotiations did not anticipate return of the U.S. military sites to the owners. The 
Japanese government needed to retain the land in order to maintain the U.S. military bases 
in compliance with the Security Treaty. Therefore, the provisional measures aimed to 
postpone immediate demands from many land owners for land return.  
The special and provisional measures that have been employed to govern Okinawa 
are not to achieve for Okinawans political and social equality under the Japanese 
constitution, but to maintain the state of exception under the Security Treaty. Masahide 
Oota, in his capacity as an Okinawa governor, tried to resist the provisional measure that 
sustained the U.S. military burden in Okinawa. The provisional measure for land release 
required an Okinawa governor’s proxy signature. Oota announced that he would refuse the 
proxy signature for contract renewals given Okinawans’ increasing dissatisfaction and 
resistance to the U.S. military after the sexual assault case in 1995. As Oota refused the 
proxy signature, the Prime Minister instituted a lawsuit against Oota for execution of duty 
(Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1996). The Naha branch of the Fukuoka High Court 
supported the plaintiff and ordered Oota to execute the proxy signature (Okinawa Mondai 
Henshuu Iinkai 1996). Oota’s final appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court in 1996. 
Meanwhile, because some provisional contracts had expired during the lawsuit, the 
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Japanese government revised the Land Release Law and enabled provisional use of the land 
appropriated for the U.S. military bases on Okinawa. Moreover, the revision allows the 
Prime Minister to appropriate land under his/her authority.  
 
7.2 Incomplete Governmentality 
Agamben (2005) argues that a sovereign is able to create a state of exception which has 
strong prospects of becoming the rule. However, the process in which a rule is normalized 
and accepted in a society can be unique, and understanding of the process requires 
empirical reflection. In this section, I examine the tactics of “rationalization” through which 
the Japanese government has attempted to normalize the American state of exception in the 
post reversion era. The first element of the tactic is to create political reasons for the U.S. 
military presence. Official discourses emphasize the necessity of the U.S. military in the 
Japanese territory in order to assure security of the Far East and the Pacific. The second 
element is the use of special and provisional economic measures. The special and 
provisional measures are employed not only to impose Japanese juridical authority, but to 
control Okinawa by economic means. During the period of USCAR governance, the U.S. 
military was a major industry for Okinawans while alternatives to produce a self-
sustainable economy were impeded. In 1972, military-related income represented 21.49% 
of the gross Okinawan income (Oota 1984). In 2007, it represented 5.3% (Ryukyu Shinpou 
2007), so that Okinawa’s economic dependence on the military has significantly declined 
since the time of reversion. The Japanese government has created a new structure for 
Okinawa’s economic dependency on the U.S. military by providing Okinawa with official 
funding for Okinawa development in return for the U.S. military presence on the Okinawa 
islands.  
 
7.2.1 “Rationalizing” U.S. Military Presence 
The Japanese government has used discourses of emergency and security as means to 
justify the U.S. military presence. For example, Yara (2009) points out that the Japanese 
government argues that Okinawa is important for strategic and geopolitical reasons. In 
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Okinawa, the Cold War and military requirements in the Pacific were a consistent “reason” 
for the U.S. to maintain its military presence on Okinawa. In the post Cold War era, the 
Japanese government still resorts to the same justification by referring to the importance of 
the Security Treaty. After the 1995 sexual assault case, Oota repeatedly asked the Japanese 
government to revise the SOFA, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Youhei Kouno, insisted 
on the importance of the SOFA and the Security Treaty for peace in the Asia-Pacific 
(Ryukyu Shinpou 1995). Whether Japan is exposed to practical risks of military invasion 
has been a consistent and unresolved topic of discussion. Nevertheless, the Japanese 
government has repeatedly emphasized the geopolitical importance of the Okinawa Islands 
and the advantages that the U.S. military offers as deterrence against foreign military 
invasion into Japan.  
If the Japanese government’s claim to U.S. military deterrence is reasonable, it still 
has to provide Okinawans with a reason why the U.S bases have to be concentrated in 
Okinawa. An Okinawan journalist, Tomonori Yara (2009), investigated recent Japanese and 
American geopolitics regarding Okinawa. In response to Yara’s (2009) question as to 
whether the U.S. marine corps in Okinawa can be relocated to other areas in Japan, an 
American commander answered that it does not have to be in Okinawa as long as the 
Japanese government is prepared to offer fair conditions for the relocation. Meanwhile, a 
Japanese executive officer of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency could not 
provide an answer for why the Japanese government could not distribute the U.S. military 
bases in Okinawa to other areas in Japan (Yara 2009). The security and geopolitical 
discourses do not provide enough reason that only Okinawans have to make an everyday 
sacrifice for the U.S. military burden (Yara 2009).  
The Japanese policy makers and officials have attempted to justify the post-
reversion U.S. military presence in Okinawa by means of the geopolitical discourse and the 
importance of the Security Treaty. Nevertheless, U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ 
crimes have reignited Okinawans’ resistance against the U.S. military presence as well as 
Japanese handling of Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Yara 2009). As noted previously, 
Yamada (2012) argues that Okinawans who became victims of the Pacific War due to the 
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Japanese military presence in Okinawa do not believe in the deterrence of the U.S. military 
presence. Despite its failure in legitimizing and disseminating effectively its geopolitical 
discourse in Okinawa, the Japanese government has successfully confined the military 
problems to Okinawa. I argue that, along with the geopolitical justification, the Japanese 
government also has employed other tactics of governance and been able to control 
Okinawans’ resistance to the level that it does not jeopardize either the Security Treaty or 
the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.  
 Japanese official narratives stress economic problems in Okinawa and financial 
contributions of the Japanese government to Okinawa. For example, the Okinawa 
Development Bureau (Okinawa Development Bureau 1980, 1, my translation) states that, 
“it is [the] responsibility of the country to repay Okinawa for its long-term hardships and 
sacrifice and to provide Okinawa with a desired position within the Japanese economic 
system.” According to the Okinawa Development Bureau, the Japanese government should 
financially repay Okinawans for the destruction of lives and soil in Okinawa during the war 
(Okinawa Development Bureau 1980). The idea that problems in Okinawa could be 
addressed by economic contributions is also shared by individual Japanese officers. For 
example, a former Japanese officer of Defense Facilities Administration Agency testified 
how the Agency had responded to a military accident case in 1978 (Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency 2007).  
 
On November 1978, a U.S. military carrier dropped a feed pipe by accident 
and cut off a power cable. It caused a power failure in a large area… We 
were not sure how much compensation should be paid. One younger officer 
proposed that “Let’s visit each house and check what has gone bad in a 
fridge,” (laugh) but it did not sound possible… Among several ideas, we 
decided to provide consolation payments depending on the length of power 
failure. I think it was two million yens in total. There was not complaint 
from the aggrieved party since we made the consolation payments in a 
speedy manner and with a clear standard (Defense Facilities Administration 
Agency 2007, 61, my translation). 
 
The officer narrated the incident half in jest and did not problematize the military accident 
itself that could have caused Okinawans’ deaths. His testimony reveals the official views 
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that a military accident can be compensated by money, and Okinawans remain calm as long 
as the damage is compensated.  
Takemasa Moriya (2010), who was an administrative vice minister of Defense, 
explains how the Japanese government dealt with the Okinawa local government for 
relocation of the Futenma military base from an urban area in Okinawa. In his book, he 
argues that the Japanese government had already decided that the Futenma military base 
would be relocated to northern Okinawa main-island offshore, but the governor of Okinawa 
was not willing to cooperate with the project (Moriya, 2010). While Moriya (2010) worries 
about the frustration of the American side, he suggests forcible dispersal of Okinawans’ 
protesters from the construction site. Moriya (2010) expresses his disappointment with the 
slow progress of the project and the governor’s unwillingness to cooperate with the project. 
Moriya (2010) also mentions that a great amount of budget for Okinawa northern 
development project has been allocated in return for the military base relocation from 
Futenma to the northern region in Okinawa. Moriya shows the Japanese security concern 
that prevails in the bilateral relationship with the U.S., and also reveals his position that 
Okinawa is supposed to remain manageable as long as monetary assistance is provided. 
Therefore, resistance by Okinawans, who receive economic benefit from the Japanese 
government, is regarded as problematic. In other words, official discourses attempt to 
justify the U.S. military presence in Okinawa as a price Okinawans should pay in return for 
the Japanese monetary assistances.  
 
7.2.2 Developing Okinawa Dependency 
According to national census data, the population of Okinawa in the early 1970s was 
around one million. Before the reversion, about 20,000 people were employed in U.S. 
military bases (Oota 1984), and over 20% of domestic income on Okinawa was military-
related in 1972 (Oota 1984). Significant portions of arable land were appropriated for U.S. 
military bases, so that for most Okinawans whose major industry had been farming, 
employment in military bases and service industry for American soldiers became major 
sources of income. In other words, the Okinawa economy had become heavily dependent 
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on the U.S. military before reversion. The economic dependency of Okinawa on the 
military industry has gradually declined since the reversion. Despite less and less 
dependence on military related employment and business after the reversion, a fair amount 
of Okinawans continue to believe that the Okinawa economy is not sustainable without 
U.S. military presence.  
I argue that the Japanese government has created Okinawa’s structural dependency 
on U.S. military presence by providing economic support in compensation for hosting 
military bases in Okinawa. Oota (1984) argues that Okinawa’s prefectural administration is 
constrained by government funding, so that Okinawans’ demand for resolving military base 
issues is not well reflected in the policy making of the Okinawa government. Yamada 
(2012) points out that the conservatives in the Okinawa government assumed it was 
necessary to tolerate the U.S. military burden in Okinawa in order to receive subsidies from 
the Japanese government that contributed to Okinawa development. Similarly, Arashiro 
(2006) argues that while the U.S. military bases impede the possibility of Okinawa’s 
economic independence, the Japanese government tells its residents that the U.S. military 
bases economically help Okinawans. By 2009, the Japanese government funded 8.788 
trillion yen for Okinawa development projects and provided municipalities that host 
military bases with additional subsidies (Takasaku 2010). The central government has 
superior authority to decide the contents of development projects. For example, the 
Okinawan governor’s proposal for an objective to achieve a development project that 
would enable “Okinawans’ life without military bases and pollution” was deleted by the 
Japanese development bureau (Matsuda 1974). Additionally, laws, programs and subsidies 
for Okinawa development also involve provisional aspects. The Japanese government has 
funded new projects on a provisional basis in return for the U.S. military presence and can 
withdraw from Okinawa development anytime.  
  
7.3 Concealment and Unconcern 
Okinawans have been disappointed with the Japanese policy that has sustained the U.S. 
military presence (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Yamada 2012). As I introduced earlier, the 
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majority of Okinawans have not demanded independence of Okinawa from the Japanese 
nation state (Lim 2009). In that sense, the Japanese tactics of governance have seemed 
more functional than those of the pre-reversion U.S. military governance in Okinawa. In the 
mean time, Okinawans’ frustration has accumulated (Yamada 2012), and any case 
involving a U.S. military accident or soldier’s crime, such as the sexual assault case in 1995 
and the helicopter crash in 2005, can still give rise to a movement of Okinawans against the 
U.S. military presence and Japanese governance. I argue that the Japanese government also 
has employed a tactic of “concealment” in order to make its Okinawa governance less 
troublesome.  
It does not seem possible to conceal the news of American military accidents and 
soldiers’ crimes today. Therefore, the tactic of concealment is deployed by the Japanese 
government in another way. The Japanese government has decided on important bilateral 
security terms with the U.S. behind closed doors and has not provided the Okinawa 
government with relevant information in advance (Umebayashi 2006). In most cases, when 
information is eventually released, the Okinawa government has to comply with what is 
already decided between the Japanese and U.S. governments. The local political leaders are 
aware that there is an institutional framework in which they eventually must comply with 
state decisions on the security issues (Umebayashi 2006). For example, Oota eventually had 
to conduct the proxy signature after the rejection of his appeal at the Supreme Court. The 
institutional framework, which constrains local political decisions and actions, has been 
founded on political, judicial and bureaucratic decisions made behind closed doors. The 
Japanese government has been able to prevent immediate scandals and mitigate counter 
movements by concealing inconvenient political negotiations and decisions. A recent 
publication (Moriya 2010) argues not only that the exclusive decisions have been made by 
the Japanese central government, but also that the Japanese government has given 
precedence to the security agenda with the U.S. over local circumstances in Japan. Such an 
argument does not seem to result in a notable movement against the Security Treaty in 
Japan. I argue that the concealment tactic in conjunction with the Japanese institutional 
framework has contributed to political apathy among Japanese people in terms of the 
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security issues. In the following, I present examples of the tactic of “concealment” and the 
institutional framework that have contributed to maintenance of the Security Treaty and the 
U.S. military presence in Okinawa.  
Umebayashi (2006) argues that local political leaders in Japan feel wrath because 
the central government conceals important information and does not consult with local 
political bodies for important political decisions. Above all, agreements and decisions 
regarding the Security Treaty are carefully concealed by the Japanese government. Article 2 
of the SACO ordains that the U.S. – Japan Joint Committee decides terms and conditions of 
military facilities and areas that are provided for the U.S. military in Japan (Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency 2007). In principle, terms of agreements are subject to 
non-disclosure unless both Japanese and American governments agree on disclosure 
(Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007).  
Recent archival study and publications (Niihara and Fukawa 2013; Wada 2012) 
explicate how the Japanese government has established the institutional framework that has 
enabled the concealed practices and sustained the Security Treaty as well as the U.S. state 
of exception. In 1959, regarding the Sunagawa case trial, the Japanese Supreme Court 
Chief Justice, Koutaro Tanaka, stated that whether the Security Treaty is unconstitutional or 
not is highly political, so that it is not within the authority of the judicature to make a 
judgement on this point (Wada 2012). Prior to the Tanaka decision, in 1955 at the Tokyo 
district court on the Sunagawa case, it was judged that it was unconstitutional for U.S. 
forces to be stationed in Japan (Wada 2012). The Sunagawa case was the second case in 
Japan that skipped a high court and was directly sent to the Supreme Court (Wada 2012). In 
2008, Shouji Niihara divulged fourteen telegrams to the Akahata newspaper (Wada 2012). 
These documents revealed that the American ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur II, 
suggested the direct appeal of the Sunagawa case to the Supreme Court, and the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Aiichirou Fujiyama, fully agreed with the suggestion (Wada 2012). One 
of the telegrams also indicates a secret meeting between MacArthur II and Tanaka prior to 
the Supreme Court Trial (Wada 2012). In 2013, Reiko Fukawa made a request to the NARA 
for disclosure of archival documents related to the Sunagawa case. One of the newly 
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disclosed documents demonstrates American intervention in the Sunagawa case and 
Tanaka’s information leakage to the U.S. side (Niihara and Fukawa 2013). Until 2008, 
information about the American intervention into the Japanese judicature on the security 
matter was not discovered (Wada 2012). Meanwhile, the Tanaka judgement has become a 
key judicial precedent for issues concerning the Security Treaty and the U.S. military 
presence in Japan. In other words, the judicial decisions on the security matters have been 
greatly influenced by the Tanaka decision which was undermined by the U.S. security 
interests and the actions taken on their behalf.  
 The Japanese bureaucratic system also helps ensure the tactic of “concealment” as 
well as the functioning of the Security Treaty. Moriya (2010) argues that one of the most 
important duties for public servants is confidentiality. Moriya (2010) outlines how the 
Japan – U.S. security terms are decided among politicians and high ranking bureaucrats and 
argues that information leakage is regarded as a significant problem. Japanese bureaucrats 
also influence political actions behind closed doors. For example, in response to the 
helicopter crash in the university building, the Japanese Minister of Defense, Ishiba, 
attempted to remonstrate Rumsfeld, who served as the U.S. Secretary of Defense, on the 
accident (Moriya 2010). Moriya (2010) persuaded Ishiba not to remonstrate Rumsfeld on 
this matter. Moriya (2010) assumed that the Japanese side was to be blamed because the 
Japanese government had not executed the relocation project in a prompt manner. While the 
U.S. military concealed the information about the helicopter crash, the Japanese bureaucrats 
secretly acted to side with the U.S. military.  
As I discussed in the previous chapter, since Sato’s weak approach to the reversion 
negotiations, the Japanese government has continued to concede to the U.S. in security 
matters. Nishiyama (2012) argues that the Japanese government has cooperated with the 
U.S. global stratagems and accepted various American demands since the reversion. The 
Japanese government has decided its due roles based on the American conditions which it 
has unconditionally accepted (Nishiyama 2012). Therefore, the Japanese government also 
has complied with the U.S. demands to sustain its military presence in Okinawa as well as 
the Security Treaty. The Japanese central political, judicial and administrative bodies and 
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personnel have collaborated to assure that they comply with the U.S. demands by 
concealing what could cause immediate and organized resistance against the Security 
Treaty. The “concealment” tactic has allowed the Japanese government to prevent critical 
resistance against the Security Treaty by the majority of Japanese people. It does not mean 
that the Japanese government has not had to deal with the Japanese resistance against the 
Security Treaty. In the 1960s, the Japanese government was compelled to suppress 
forcefully the nation-wide student protest against the renewal of the Security Treaty and the 
Vietnam War. In that sense, the Japanese policy makers processed the security matters 
secretly because they were aware that the American demands were not reasonable for the 
majority of Japanese. 
Yamada (2012) points out that apathy regarding the U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa is spreading among Japanese citizens and some Japanese people avoid worrying 
about military problems. Meanwhile, Okinawans feel helpless, considering it seems 
fruitless to protest against U.S. military problems (Yamada 2012). Okinawa’s local media 
repeatedly report American military accidents and soldiers’ crimes (Takamine 2006). 
Nagamoto (2006) argues that most Japanese major media treat U.S. military news in 
Okinawa as secondary coverage. For example, the assault case by the three American 
servicemen was reported sensationally, but most major newspapers and TV news had less 
coverage of the helicopter accident than that of the Athens Olympics and the resignation of 
a baseball team owner (Ishihara 2006). The Institute of Ryukyu Culture at the Okinawa 
International University conducted a survey to research media coverage of the helicopter 
accident. The research results show differences in degrees of interests in the helicopter 
accident between Okinawan media and other Japanese media (Tamaki 2006). The latter’s 
lack of interest in the helicopter accident seems to indicate and reflect general disinterest in 
the military problems in Okinawa among the majority of Japanese people.  
 Yamada (2012) argues that the concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa 
represents Japanese discrimination against Okinawans, but Okinawa development projects 
and resulting economic development in Okinawa have appeased Okinawans’ feelings that 
they are discriminated against. In 2009, the former Prime Minister Hatoyama in the 
110 
Japanese Democratic Party proposed relocation of the Futenma base from Okinawa. 
Yamada (2012) argues that the Hatoyama’s idealistic approach consolidated Okinawans 
against the Japanese discrimination that has maintained a high concentration of U.S. 
military bases in Okinawa. Moreover, the change that Hatoyama brought made it difficult 
for Okinawans to accept the situation that they receive the deceptive development projects 
in return for the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. While other prefectures refused 
relocation of the U.S. military base from Okinawa to their prefectural areas, Okinawans’ 
frustration grew. In 2011, Ryukyu Shimpo and Asahi newspapers carried articles about U.S. 
telegrams disclosed by WikiLeaks. The telegrams issued in 2009 indicate Japanese 
bureaucrats’ suggestion to the U.S. side that the U.S. government should not be flexible in 
accepting the Futenma relocation proposal by the Japanese Democratic Party (Asahi 2011; 
Ryukyu Shimpo 2011).  
The Japanese government has not been able to offer an adequate rationale for the 
Security Treaty and the U.S. military presence in Japan, but it has succeeded in 
concentrating the U.S. military problems in Okinawa. Whether or not the WikiLeaks 
information is a reliable source, lack of media attention to the military issues in Okinawa 
and the failure of the Futenma relocation proposal suggest that most Japanese people do not 
regard the U.S. military problems in Okinawa as immediate problems of their own. In the 
Japanese official discourses, Okinawans are represented as a special group for which 
special measures are required. The Okinawan “Other” is not only represented as a special 
people, but also treated as a convenient people upon whom military risks can be imposed 
for the sake of Japanese security. For example, the Japanese conservative politicians and 
bureaucrats have been promoting the Futenma relocation plan within Okinawa since other 
prefectures do not accept the U.S. military burden (Watanabe 2008; Yamada 2012). 
Meanwhile, the Japanese government has implemented special financial measures for 
Okinawa development in return for the U.S. military burden in Okinawa (Watanabe 2008; 
Yamada 2012). While Okinawans are required to share the security responsibility as 
Japanese people, they are imposed the military burden as the special “Other.” The Japanese 
government has exploited the identity of Okinawans in order to mitigate the military burden 
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on the majority of Japanese while the American security demands are still realized within 
Japanese state boundaries (Yamada 2012). The tactic of “concealment” has prevented 
sudden sensationalization of U.S. military problems, and Japanese people have been 
desensitized by the constant resistance by Okinawans. Moreover, under the Japanese 
institutional framework, critical voices speaking against the Security Treaty have been 
rejected and ignored. For instance, the Futenma relocation project has been decided upon 
and processed by policy makers and bureaucrats within the Japanese central government, 
and Okinawans are excluded from the decision making and implementation of the project 
(Watanabe 2008; Yamada 2012). The Japanese government also has succeeded in creating 
political apathy within Japan about the security matters by its exclusive and secret practices 
(Yamada 2012). In order to eliminate the U.S. military exception, it is necessary that the 
majority of Japanese sees the U.S. military problems and security issues as concerns that 
they share with Okinawans.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, in response to the two research questions, I introduced how the Japanese 
government has sustained the highly concentrated U.S. military bases in Okinawa since the 
Okinawa reversion in 1972. The U.S. military governance ended in 1972, but its continued 
presence has produced significant problems in Okinawa. Some cases of U.S. military 
accidents and soldiers’ crimes have not been properly judged under the Japanese 
jurisdiction. Several critical studies (Gabe 2000; Ibata 2010; Ikemiyagi 2008) point out that 
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that has allowed the U.S. juridical supremacy in its military 
matters in Japan is a cause of these juridical contradictions in Okinawa. With reference to 
the tactics of governance and Agamben’s theory of state of exception, I aimed to contribute 
to analytical development of these critical studies. Agamben (2005) presents many cases of 
state of exception wherein political rights of certain individuals or groups are suspended. I 
argue that the case of juridical suspension in Okinawa regarding the U.S. military presence 
can be examined through Agamebn’s (2005) theoretical insight that sovereignty is 
monopolized by certain elites while political rights of certain people are compromised. I 
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also addressed three tactics of governance – “rationalization,” “provisionality” and 
“concealment” – as key elements that have enabled the Japanese government to sustain the 
exceptional U.S. military presence in Okinawa. Moreover, I elaborated Foucauldian 
analysis of representational reality and argued that the Okinawans’ ambivalent identity as 
the “Self” and the “Other” with the Japanese nation is a key factor to understand why the 
U.S. military burden has been concentrated in Okinawa. In the concluding chapter, I will 
summarize and analyze main findings of this study as well as contributions, limitations and 
future directions associated with the research. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.0 Introduction 
This study has aimed to answer the two research questions related to the governance of 
Okinawa after World War II. Firstly, I investigated governing techniques through which the 
U.S. military and the Japanese government have sustained the U.S. military bases in 
Okinawa in order to respond to “what factors have made possible the continued presence of 
U.S. military bases in Okinawa?” Secondly, I investigated identity politics regarding 
Okinawans to answer “what is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases 
in Okinawa?” This study contains new findings and analytical elaboration that can 
contribute to future studies of U.S. military bases as well as to studies of governance at 
large. The new findings are based on information from archival and secondary references 
that were analyzed through analytical approaches of Foucault and Agamben as well as my 
own articulation of particular forms of tactics of governance. I argue that the approaches 
developed by Foucault and Agamben are useful analytical tools that also may be applied to 
other cases of governance. Additionally, the three tactics of governance – “rationalization,” 
“concealment” and “provisionality” – which I introduced in this study can contribute to 
examining governing practices through which political executives attempt to turn 
exceptional measures into rules. In this chapter, I summarize research findings, 
contributions, limitations and future directions of this study.  
 
8.1 Findings and Analysis 
This section summarizes research findings with reference to Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality and Agamben’s theory of state of exception as well as tactics of 
governance. By applying analytical insights of Foucault and Agamben, this thesis draws 
attention to the distinct U.S. and Japanese governing structures that have sustained and 
concentrated the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I argue that three tactics of governance 
have contributed to relatively stable structures of governance through which the U.S. 
military and the Japanese government have maintained the heavy U.S. military burden in 
Okinawa. Meanwhile, I suggest that there are also differences in how the U.S. military and 
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Japanese government have deployed their governing tactics, and these differences are key 
elements that have caused failures in the U.S military governance and relative success in 
the Japanese governance in Okinawa.  
In the course of my archival research, I intended to search for key elements that 
sustained the U.S. military governance in Okinawa for 27 years. Initially, with reference to 
Agamben’s (2005) theory of state of exception and secondary sources (Fukuchi 1995; 
Senaga 1971), I wondered if I could find in archival documents, patterns of thought or 
practice that characterize the U.S. military governance in Okinawa. I could not help 
noticing that the term “democracy” is repeatedly used in many U.S. archival documents. It 
was an unexpected and surprising discovery that the U.S. military also employed the 
discourse of democracy in its governance in Okinawa. As I read more documents and 
referred back to Foucault’s insight about non-violent modern governance, I began to notice 
that the U.S. military as well as the U.S. State Department did not explicitly acknowledge 
that they would resort to their military power as a major means of military governance in 
Okinawa. In contrast to the discourse of democracy, the U.S. military forcibly appropriated 
Okinawans’ land for the construction of its bases. Moreover, Okinawans were not protected 
under proper political and juridical institutions. Having discovered these signs of American 
military exceptionalism in archival documents and secondary sources, I began to reconsider 
Agamben’s (1995) argument that state of exception becomes a rule. The analysis conducted 
for this research suggests that the U.S. military attempted to justify its exceptional 
governance in Okinawa by using a discourse of democracy in order to normalize the U.S. 
military presence in Okinawa.  
The U.S. military also tried to justify its governance in Okinawa by employing a 
discourse of security (Steeves 1956a). This discourse is shared among U.S. officials and 
military personnel as a primary objective of their governance in Okinawa. Nevertheless, for 
Okinawans who were exposed to military violence in their everyday life, the U.S. military 
presence in Okinawa for security of the Pacific was not a tolerable reality. The Japanese 
government also employed the discourse of security in order to justify the U.S. military 
presence in Okinawa. The Japanese discourse of security is produced in relation to the 
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Security Treaty (Yara 2009). The Security Treaty is a legal foundation on which the 
Japanese government has sustained U.S. military bases within the Japanese state boundary 
including Okinawa. Analysis of the Security Treaty still does not explain why the U.S. 
military bases have been unequally distributed and concentrated in Okinawa since its 
application is not limited to Okinawa, but effective to the entire Japanese territory. In order 
to investigate the concentration of U.S. military burdens in Okinawa, with reference to 
Foucault’s insights, I analyzed discourses that the Japanese government employed. The 
Japanese government emphasized deterrence of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa for the 
security of Japan. However, this does not offer an adequate explanation as to why these 
bases remain. As Yara (2009) discovered through his interviews with U.S. military 
executives, the U.S. military could have been relocated from Okinawa to other regions in 
Japan insofar as the U.S. military strategy in the Far East is concerned. 
For Okinawans who have suffered from U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ 
crimes, the security discourses do not seem to provide them with convincing reasons why 
the heavy U.S. military burden has to be imposed on them. Several studies (Yamada 2012; 
Yoshida 2008) point out that the heavy U.S. military burden in Okinawa constitutes a form 
of Japanese discrimination against Okinawans or that Okinawa is a military colony of the 
U.S. and Japan. I suggest that discourse analysis of identity politics in this study helps to 
inform an understanding of discrimination and military colony that is the focus of these 
other studies. Both the U.S. military and the Japanese government constructed and treated 
Okinawans as the “Other” group for whom the superior “Selves” – U.S. military and 
Japanese executives – can provide support. U.S. officials and military personnel 
presupposed their superiority and Okinawans’ inferiority regarding respective degrees of 
political development. The division between the superior American Self and the inferior 
Okinawan “Other” is explicit when the U.S. military personnel narrate their 
democratization efforts in Okinawa. Americans are represented as those who democratize 
Okinawa and teach Okinawans how to improve their life. Okinawans are portrayed as those 
who must learn ideas and practices of democracy from Americans. In practice, the 
American democratic principles were largely compromised for their security interests in 
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Okinawa. The representational division between the American “Self” and the Okinawan 
“Other” as well as Okinawans’ resistance against the U.S. military presence demonstrate 
that Americans and Okinawans on the Okinawa islands regarded each other as a foreign 
group of people. 
The Japanese government also represents and treats Okinawans as the “Other” 
group, but it exploits in a flexible manner ambivalent identities attached to Okinawans. On 
the one hand, Okinawans are expected to fulfill their security responsibility as part of their 
citizenship obligations within the Japanese nation. On the other hand, the Japanese 
government applies special financial measures to Okinawans who are represented as a 
special group within the Japanese nation. The special financial measures are provided for 
Okinawa economic development as if the Japanese government sincerely considers it 
necessary to recognize the historical and current hardship of Okinawans. According to 
Moriya (2010) and Yamada (2012), the Japanese government has subsidized Okinawa 
development projects as compensation for the U.S. military burden in Okinawa. The 
Okinawan conservatives whose local government has heavily relied on the subsidies from 
the Japanese government are hesitant to dispute explicitly the position taken by national 
elites regarding the U.S. military burden in Okinawa since it can terminate or curtail 
subsidies from the central government. Therefore, the Japanese official subsidy functions as 
a financial trap which constrains resistance by Okinawans and sustains the concentrated 
U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I argue that most Japanese people do not regard the U.S. 
military bases in Okinawa as a burden that the whole Japanese nation should be concerned 
with. The major reason why the concentrated U.S. military bases have been maintained in 
Okinawa is that the majority of Japanese people accept the Japanese central policies that 
exploit the Okinawan minority group. While the Japanese government cannot 
fundamentally justify the heavy U.S. military burden in Okinawa, maintaining the military 
burden in Okinawa is a reasonable practice for the majority of Japanese people. I argue that 
the U.S. military treated Okinawans as the incommensurable “Other” and could not make 
them share the U.S. security agenda. Meanwhile, the Japanese government exploits as it 
sees fit Okinawa as part of the Japanese nation that needs to share security responsibility, 
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and treats the Okinawans as the “Other,” a special group that needs official support.  
The ongoing U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes have stimulated 
Okinawans’ resistance against the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. For example, the 
assault incident by the three American servicemen in 1995 and the helicopter accident in 
2004 resulted in island-wide movements against the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. 
The former incident caught media attention not only in Okinawa, but also in the U.S. and 
Japan proper. The assault case explicated juridical contradiction in Okinawa under the 
Security Treaty that Okinawans are not properly protected under the Japanese jurisdiction 
when accidents and crimes are caused due to the U.S. military presence. I noticed that 
“rationalization” through discourses of democracy, security and Other/Self is not a 
sufficient governing tactic to normalize the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. In this 
study, I also analyzed tactics of “provisionality” and “concealment” as elements that 
mitigate Okinawans’ resistance. The Japanese tactic of “provisionality” is explicit in forms 
of temporary economic subsidies and provisional laws. I discovered that the Japanese tactic 
of “provisionality” differs from that which was employed by the U.S. military. While the 
Japanese government has intentionally employed provisional measures whenever necessary 
in order to prevent Okinawans’ movements against the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, 
“provisionality” of U.S. military occupation in Okinawa was an unintended consequence of 
U.S. national and international politics. The U.S. military employed provisional measures 
during the first five years following World War II when its future roles in Okinawa were 
still uncertain. In the USCAR regime, as it became apparent that the U.S. military aimed to 
station its bases in Okinawa for a longer period, Okinawans’ resistance intensified. Analysis 
of the tactic of “provisionality” employed by the Japanese government and the U.S. 
military suggests that this tactic can be employed both intentionally, such as Japanese 
subsidies in Okinawa, and unintentionally, as in the case of early U.S. military occupation 
of Okinawa. Moreover, it suggests that these provisional measures can mitigate immediate 
resistance by marginalized groups.  
Both the U.S. military and the Japanese government have intentionally conducted 
tactics of “concealment,” but the latter employs a more sophisticated institutional form of 
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“concealment.” Research by Vine (2009) suggests the U.S. military concealed its 
appropriation of indigenous land in Diego Garcia. As I read archival documents (Davis 
1956), I noticed that the U.S. military intentionally concealed other information about its 
governance in Okinawa. It was not difficult to find secondary sources (Monna 1996) that 
discuss the control of U.S. military information within Okinawa. The studies by Vine 
(2009) and Monna (1996) and the archival documents (Davis 1956) made me pay attention 
to the practice of “concealment” as another tactic of governance that has sustained the U.S. 
military presence in Okinawa. I began to examine whether the Japanese government also 
has employed the tactic of “concealment” in order to normalize the U.S. military 
exceptionalism in Okinawa. Moriya’s (2010) testimony demonstrates that the Japanese 
politicians and bureaucrats have concealed inconvenient factors about the Security Treaty 
that can cause resistance against the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I argue that the 
tactics of “concealment” by the U.S. military were not fully successful as information about 
problems of its governance in Okinawa began to spread to the U.S. and Japan, but still had 
effects on maintenance of the U.S. military bases. Meanwhile, the Japanese government 
created a more sophisticated institutional framework of concealment. A recent archival 
study (Niihara and Fukawa 2013) revealed that not only the Japanese legislative and 
bureaucracy, but also the judicature is involved in the institutional framework to conceal 
inconvenient information about the Security Treaty. The research finding suggests that the 
U.S. military and the Japanese government have employed the tactic of “concealment” to 
avoid immediate resistance. Moreover, different results of “concealment” by the U.S. 
military and the Japanese government suggest that the more sophisticated the form of 
concealment a governing body employs, the more effectively it can control resistance 
against it by a group that is not satisfied with its governance.  
 In this section, I presented my research findings and analysis. My research findings 
suggest that the U.S. military and the Japanese government share similar patterns of 
governance, that is, tactics of “rationalization,” “concealment” and “provisionality” in their 
governance of Okinawa. Deployment of these tactics has not allowed the U.S. military and 
the Japanese government to make the U.S. military presence an acceptable rule for 
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Okinawans. In other words, the U.S. military and the Japanese government have not been 
able to achieve their hegemonic control over Okinawans by employing these tactics of 
governance. Instead, these tactics of governance have allowed the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government to confine U.S. military bases in Okinawa since 1945. I regard the 
deployment of these tactics as part of ongoing processes in which the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government have attempted to normalize U.S. military exceptionalism in 
Okinawa. U.S. military failure in its governance in Okinawa in contrast to the Japanese 
government’s relative success suggests that deployment of these tactics is a contested 
process that is influenced by discursive factors. Therefore, in this study, I examined 
multiple factors, such as international politics and Okinawans’ resistance, that have 
influenced deployment of tactics by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in 
practice.  
 
8.2 Contr ibutions and Limitations 
The objective of this study is to investigate what factors have made possible the continued 
presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and what is the significance of the 
concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. In the process of investigation, I referred 
to the analytical insights of Foucault and Agamben as well as tactics of governance in order 
to analyze how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to normalize 
the U.S. military presence and maintain the U.S. military burden in Okinawa. This study, 
which focused on the case of various forms of governance represented by the U.S. military 
and the Japanese government in Okinawa, can be linked with other cases and situated 
within the broader study of governance. In this section, I introduce contributions of this 
study to the broader research on governance. I also present limitations that I faced in this 
research.  
 This study employed multiple analytical elements. Agamben’s theory of state of 
exception (2005; 1995) is a useful analytical approach to analyze how some executives in 
one regime monopolizes sovereignty to dominate certain groups or individuals whose legal 
rights are suspended. Meanwhile, Foucault’s (1991; 1977) analytical insights concerning 
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how governmentality is facilitated by deployment of discourses through institutions are 
relevant to analyze how ideas and practices of governance are disseminated and become 
accepted reality. I argue that the two analytical approaches by Agamben and Foucault can 
be integrated in order to grasp discursive and dynamic structures of modern governance. In 
this study, I employed Agamben’s insights to examine how the U.S. military employed 
exceptional measures to establish and prolong its bases. I also employed Foucault’s insights 
to examine how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have tried to sustain and 
normalize the U.S. military presence by providing rationale of their governances. The two 
analytical approaches by Agamben and Foucault can be linked by looking at exceptionalism 
as a threshold of governance and “rationalization” as a process to make the exceptionalism 
an enduring practice. The link between analytical approaches of Agamben and Foucault is 
one contribution of this study.  
My analysis has shown, moreover, that it is important to understand that 
governance often depends on multiple mechanisms, including tactics of “rationalization,” 
“concealment” and “provisionality.” Agamben (2005) presents several cases of state of 
exception and also argues that a state of exception becomes rule. I have argued in this study 
that in addition to “rationalization,” the U.S. military and the Japanese government 
employed tactics of “concealment” and “provisionality” to normalize the heavy U.S. 
military burden in Okinawa. The analytical approaches I employed in this study can be 
applied to other cases of state of exception to analyze how exceptional measures in these 
cases are normalized. As I discussed in chapter 2, Sassen’s (2006) study suggests structural 
similarities between national and international forms of governance. Both in national and 
international settings, power is unequally distributed, and rights of certain groups of people 
are deprived (Sassen 2006). Analytical approaches that I employed in this study also can be 
applied to cases of international governance wherein exceptional measures are deployed by 
international institutions and unequal power relations are maintained. I believe that this 
study can contribute to analytical development in fields of national and international 
governance.  
Foucault (1972) argues that discourse and institutional practices are discursive; 
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governance in each setting in a given time may entail unique features. Therefore, I do not 
argue that the analytical approaches I employed in this study are always and perfectly 
applicable to any particular case of governance. I suggest instead that they serve as 
analytical references with which other scholars can investigate structural similarities and 
differences in other cases of governance wherein inequality among people or nations are 
sustained. 
It is also possible that more complex tactics of governance may have employed 
even within Okinawa. Within limited research time, I collected and analyzed as many 
archival documents as possible. I do not argue that I was able to search and read the entire 
archival collection related to the U.S. military governance in Okinawa, but I was able to 
read a sufficient amount of archival documents to grasp patterns of thought – such as 
discourses of the “Other,” democracy and security – shared among the U.S. military 
personnel.  
  
8.3 Future Directions 
In my master’s thesis (2004), I analyzed how the modern Japanese government has 
destroyed indigenous culture and environment in the northern island (Hokkaido) of Japan. 
The current study elaborates analytical insights of Foucault and critical approaches to 
history of the modern Japanese government which I used in the previous study. I would like 
to continue to investigate social problems that have been caused by the Japanese 
government in its modernizing projects. Future studies along with this trajectory include 
investigation of environmental problems in Okinawa. In the course of current research, I 
learned that the U.S. military bases have caused various environmental problems in 
Okinawa. I am interested in looking at other archival files and secondary sources to find out 
how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have dealt with the environmental 
problems in Okinawa. Moreover, I would like to expand research fields to other countries 
which were invaded and colonized by the Empire of Japan. Among many countries and 
regions, I would like to conduct research on the modern history of Taiwan. Okinawa and 
Taiwan were incorporated in the Japanese state boundary in the late 19th century. To date, 
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sovereignties of Okinawans and Taiwanese are largely compromised in international 
politics. I would like to investigate how the Japanese colonization has influenced recent 
sovereignty issues in both areas.  
 I am also interested in recent U.S. military situations on islands around the world. 
For example, the U.S. military is stationed in Hawaii and Guam, both of which are included 
in distinctive ways as American territories. I would like to investigate why islands of 
Hawaii and Guam were chosen as military staging sites and whether the U.S. military bases 
in these islands contain structural similarities to those in Okinawa. Moreover, I would like 
to know whether nationalities affect peoples’ feeling and reactions to military presence. 
Guam is a special territory of the U.S. while Hawaii is part of the United States, and I 
assume they have different sense of national belonging as well as attitudes about the U.S. 
military presence. Through comparative study of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, 
Hawaii and Guam wherein people have different senses of nationhood, I may be able to 
elaborate how identity politics affect the U.S. military planning to make its presence 
accepted by island peoples.  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I summarized my discussion and analysis and presented contributions, 
limitations and future directions of this study. The U.S. military constructed its bases and 
governed Okinawa between 1945 and 1972. I argue that the U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa can be analyzed with reference to Agamben’s theory of state of exception. On the 
other hand, creation of a state of exception by U.S. military forces did not guarantee its 
ability to sustain stable governance in Okinawa. The U.S. military and the Japanese 
government have employed multiple tactics to normalize the U.S. military presence. I 
looked at the tactics of “provisionality” and “concealment” in addition to Foucault’s 
insights into discourses and power in order to investigate how the U.S. military and the 
Japanese government have managed to maintain the long-term concentration of U.S. 
military bases in Okinawa despite the negative consequences for Okinawans. Governing 
regimes under both the U.S. military and the Japanese government have faced Okinawans’ 
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resistance and do not seem to operate as a functional form of governmentality in the 
manner that Foucault presented. I argue that modern governance is not always a stable 
practice, revealing instead varying forms of social control that must be both flexible and 
discursive, if social control is to be maintained on a long term basis without excessive 
coercion in a democratic context. I aimed to explicate representative aspects of these 
complex mechanisms of modern governance by looking at U.S. military exceptionalism in 
Okinawa. This study contains analytical elements that can contribute to our understanding 
of the study of governance. It may be a very small step in the process of achieving the 
capacity to better our societies; I hope that this study can be part of ongoing efforts to 
create societies in which no group is more advantaged or disadvantaged than others. 
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